IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS
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Safety of Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Facilities

DRAFT SPECIFIC SAFETY GUIDE XXX

DS 360
New Safety Guide

IAEA
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1
   BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................. 1
   OBJECTIVE ...................................................................................................................... 1
   SCOPE ............................................................................................................................. 1
   STRUCTURE ................................................................................................................... 3

2. GENERAL SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................... 5

3. SITE EVALUATION ......................................................................................................... 10

4. DESIGN ........................................................................................................................ 12
   GENERAL ....................................................................................................................... 12
      Main safety functions for reprocessing facilities ......................................................... 12
      Specific engineering design guidance ...................................................................... 12
      Other engineering design guidance ........................................................................... 14
      Design basis accidents and safety analysis ............................................................... 14
      Structures, systems and components important to safety ......................................... 15

SAFETY FUNCTIONS ........................................................................................................ 16
   Prevention of criticality .................................................................................................. 16
   Confinement of radioactive material ........................................................................... 18
   Protection against external exposure ........................................................................... 25

POSTULATED INITIATING EVENTS .................................................................................. 27
   Internal initiating events .............................................................................................. 27
   External initiating events ............................................................................................. 37

INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL .............................................................................. 42
   Instrumentation and control systems important to safety ............................................ 42
   Local instrumentation .................................................................................................. 44
   Sample taking and analysis .......................................................................................... 45
   Control systems ............................................................................................................ 46
   Control rooms ............................................................................................................... 47
1. INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

1.1. This Safety Guide on the Safety of Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Facilities provides recommendations on how to meet the requirements established in the Safety Requirements publication on the Safety of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1]. It supplements and develops those requirements by providing guidance relevant to aqueous reprocessing.

1.2. The safety of nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities\(^1\) is ensured by means of their proper siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning. This Safety Guide addresses all these stages in the lifetime of a reprocessing facility as defined in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], on an industrial scale, with emphasis placed on safety in their design and operation.

1.3. The radioactivity and radiotoxicity of spent fuel, dissolved spent fuel, fission product solutions, plutonium and other actinides and their solutions are high. Close attention should be paid to ensuring safety at all stages in the reprocessing of spent fuel. Uranium, plutonium, fission products and all waste from reprocessing facilities should be handled, processed, treated and stored safely, to maintain low levels of exposure to public and workers and to minimize the radioactive material discharged to the environment, and to limit the potential impact of an accident on workers, the public and the environment.

OBJECTIVE

1.4. The objective of this Safety Guide is to provide state of the art guidance, based on experience gained in Member States, on actions, conditions or procedures necessary for meeting the requirements established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1]. This Safety Guide is intended to be of use to designers, operating organizations and regulatory bodies for ensuring safety for all stages in the lifetime of a reprocessing facility.

SCOPE

1.5. This Safety Guide provides recommendations on meeting the requirements established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1), Sections 5–10 and Appendix IV. The safety requirements applicable to all types of nuclear fuel cycle facility (i.e. facilities for uranium ore processing and refining, conversion, enrichment, fabrication of fuel including mixed oxide fuel, storage and

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\(^1\)Referred to in this Safety Guide as ‘reprocessing facilities’.
reprocessing of spent fuel, associated conditioning and storage of waste, and facilities for the related research and development) are established in the main text of NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1]. The requirements specifically applicable to reprocessing facilities are established in Appendix IV of NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1]. Those requirements apply to plants using the PUREX process to reprocess fuels containing uranium and plutonium on a commercial scale. This guide does not specifically address thorium breeder reprocessing (THOREX) as insufficient experience of these facilities at a commercial scale exists in many countries. However the similarity between aqueous processes means that these recommendations will apply with suitable adjustments, to many types of fuel.

1.6. This Safety Guide deals specifically with the following processes:

(a) The handling of spent fuel;
(b) The dismantling, shearing\(^2\) or decladding\(^3\) and dissolution of spent fuel;
(c) The separation of uranium and plutonium from fission products;
(d) The separation and purification of uranium and plutonium;
(e) The production and storage of plutonium and uranium oxides or uranyl nitrate to be used as a feed material to form ‘fresh’ uranium or mixed (UO\(_2\) / PuO\(_2\)) oxide fuel rods and assemblies;
(f) The initial treatment and handling of the various waste streams.

1.7. The fuel reprocessing processes covered by this Safety Guide are a mixture of high and low hazard, chemical and mechanical processes, including high hazard fine particulate processes and processing involving hazardous solid, liquid, gaseous and particulate (dry, air and water borne) wastes and effluents.

1.8. This Safety Guide covers the safety of reprocessing facilities, and the protection of workers the public, and the environment. It does not deal with the ancillary processing facilities in which waste and effluent are treated, conditioned, stored or disposed of except in so far as all waste generated has to comply with the requirements established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1] paras. 6.31-6.32 and 9.54-9.57, Appendix IV, paras. IV.49-IV.50, IV.80-IV.82 and Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 5 [2]). In general, however, many of the hazards in such ancillary processing facilities are

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\(^2\)Shearing involves cutting spent fuel into short lengths to allow its dissolution inside the metallic cladding.

\(^3\)Decladding involves removing the metallic cladding of the spent fuel prior to its dissolution.
similar to those in a reprocessing facility, owing to, for example, the characteristics of the materials being treated.

1.9. Safety requirements on the legal and governmental framework and on regulatory supervision are established in Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 1 (Rev.1) [3] and safety requirements on the management system and on the verification of safety are established in Leadership and Management for Safety, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 2 [4]; recommendations on meeting these requirements are not provided in this Safety Guide. Recommendations on meeting the requirements for an integrated management system and for the verification of safety are provided in The Management System for Nuclear Installations, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-G-3.5 [5].

1.10. Sections 3–8 of this Safety Guide provide recommendations on meeting the safety requirements on radiation protection established in Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 3 [6]. The recommendations in this Safety Guide supplement the recommendations on occupational radiation protection provided in Occupational Radiation Protection, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. DS453 [7].

1.11. Terms in this publication are to be understood as defined and explained in the IAEA Safety Glossary [8], unless otherwise stated.

STRUCTURE

1.12. This Safety Guide consists of eight sections and two annexes. These sections follow the general structure of NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1]. Section 2 provides general safety recommendations for a reprocessing facility. Section 3 describes the safety aspects to be considered in the evaluation and selection of a site to avoid or minimize any environmental impact of operations. Section 4 deals with safety considerations at the design stage, including safety analysis for operational states and accident conditions\(^4\), the safety aspects of radioactive waste management in the reprocessing facility and other design considerations. Section 5 addresses safety considerations in the construction stage. Section 6 discusses safety considerations in commissioning. Section 7 provides recommendations on safety during operation of the facility, including the management of operations, maintenance, inspection

\(^4\)Accident conditions include design basis accidents and design extension conditions [8]. Design extension conditions are postulated accident conditions that are not considered for design basis accidents, but that are considered in the design process for the facility in accordance with best estimate methodology, and for which releases of radioactive material are kept within acceptable limits, see Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-2/1 (Rev.1) [9].
and periodic testing, control of modifications, criticality control, radiation protection, industrial safety, management of waste and effluents, and emergency planning and preparedness. Section 8 provides recommendations on meeting the safety requirements for preparing for the decommissioning of a reprocessing facility. Annex I shows the typical main process routes for a reprocessing facility. Annex II provides examples of structures, systems and components important to safety in reprocessing facilities, grouped in accordance with the processes identified in Annex I.

1.13. This Safety Guide contains guidance specific to reprocessing facilities. The recommendations in this guide have been referenced to the corresponding requirements in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1] and other IAEA safety standards, where consistent with the readability of the text. This Safety Guide covers all the important stages in the lifetime of a reprocessing facility, including site evaluation, design, construction, commissioning, operation, and preparation for decommissioning. It also considers modifications, maintenance, calibration, testing and inspection as well as emergency preparedness where there is specific guidance. References are also made to other IAEA standards for requirements and guidance on generic topics (such as radioactive waste and radiation protection) and to publications in the Nuclear Security Series for security issues that are not specific to reprocessing facilities.
2. GENERAL SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

2.1. In a fuel reprocessing facility, large quantities of fissile material, radioactive material and other hazardous materials are present (stored, processed and generated), often in easily dispersible forms (e.g. solutions, powders and gases) and sometimes subjected to vigorous chemical and physical reactions. Reprocessing facilities have the potential for serious nuclear and radiological emergencies. The potential hazards associated with reprocessing facilities should be considered when using a graded approach in applying the requirements at a reprocessing facility, as detailed in Section 1 of NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1] and in Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 7 [10].

2.2. The main risks are criticality, loss of confinement, radiation exposure and associated chemical hazards, against which workers, the public and the environment need to be protected by adequate technical and administrative measures taken in the siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of the facility.

2.3. In normal operation, reprocessing facilities generate significant volumes of gaseous and liquid effluents with a variety of radioactive and chemical constituents. The facility’s processes and equipment should be designed and operated to reduce and recycle these effluents as far as practicable, with account taken of the possible accumulation of undesirable species or changes in composition of recycled reagents and other feeds, such as: chlorides in cooling water; aromatic hydrocarbons in solvent extraction systems; radiolysis (degradation) products in organic diluents. In accordance with the optimization of protection and safety, specific design provisions should be made to ensure that recycled materials are safe and compatible with their reuse in the facility, which may involve the generation of additional effluents.

2.4. Effluents and discharges should be managed by the addition of specific engineering features to remove and reduce levels of activity and amounts of toxic chemicals. The operating organization of the reprocessing facility (and the operating organizations of any associated effluent treatment facilities) should monitor and report on discharges and, as a minimum, have to comply with all authorized limits and optimize protection and safety (see GSR Part 5 [2], GSR Part 3 [6], Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste from Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. DS447 [11], and Regulatory Control of Radioactive Discharges to the Environment, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. WS-G-2.3
When periodic safety reviews are being carrying out, the previous records of discharges should be examined thoroughly to confirm that the current engineered provisions and operational practices are such that protection and safety is optimized. In addition, further improvements in processes and in technology for the reduction and treatment of effluents should be examined for potential improvements.

2.5. The specific features of reprocessing facilities that should be taken into account for meeting the safety requirements established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1] are the following:

(a) The wide range and nature of radioactive inventories;
(b) The wide range and nature of process chemicals and their chemical reactions;
(c) The range and nature of fissile material, i.e. the potential for criticality in both liquid and solid systems;
(d) The range of dispersible or difficult to control radioactive material present, including:
   - Particulates;
   - Solids, such as contaminated items and scrap;
   - Aqueous and organic liquids;
   - Gaseous and volatile species.

2.6. The specific features associated with reprocessing facilities result in a broad range of hazardous conditions and possible events that need to be considered in the safety analysis to ensure that they are adequately prevented, detected and/or mitigated.

2.7. For the application of the concept of defence in depth (see Section 2 of NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1]), the first two levels are the most significant, as the risks are eliminated mainly by design and appropriate operating procedures (see Sections 4 and 7 of this Safety Guide). However all levels of defence in depth are required to be addressed (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], paras. 2.4-2.8). The third level should be provided by the iteration and development of the safety assessment and the design to incorporate appropriate passive and active structures, systems and components important to safety, with the necessary robust auxiliary systems, infrastructure (e.g. services, maintenance) and appropriate operation instructions and training (see Sections 4 and 7 of this Safety Guide). The recommendations for accident conditions (levels four and five of the concept of defence in depth) are provided in the sections of this Safety Guide on emergency preparedness (paras. 4.163-4.169 and 7.118-7.121).
2.8. The design, construction and operation of a reprocessing facility require well-proven process technologies and engineering knowledge. Engineering solutions adopted to ensure the safety of the reprocessing facility should be of high quality, proven by previous experience or rigorous (in accordance with a graded approach) testing, research and development, or experience of operating prototypes. This strategy should be applied in the design of the reprocessing facility, in the development and design of equipment, in construction, in operation, in carrying out modifications and in preparation for decommissioning of the reprocessing facility, including any upgrading and modernization.

2.9. Owing to the anticipated long lifetime of industrial scale reprocessing facilities and in accordance with the specific mechanical, thermal, chemical and radiation conditions of the processes, particular consideration should be given to the potential for ageing and degradation of structures, systems and components important to safety, especially for those components judged difficult or impracticable to replace. In selecting and designing for structures, systems and components important to safety, the processes that could cause the degradation of structural materials should be taken into account. Programmes should be developed and implemented to detect and monitor ageing and degradation processes. These should include provisions for monitoring, inspection, sampling, surveillance and testing and, to the extent necessary, specific design provisions and equipment for inaccessible structures, systems and components important to safety.

2.10. The reliability of process equipment should be ensured by adequate design, specification, manufacturing, storage (if necessary), installation, commissioning, operation, maintenance and facility management, supported by the application of an integrated management system (that provides for quality assurance and quality control) during all the stages of the lifetime of the facility. Inspection and testing should be carried out against unambiguous, established performance standards and expectations.

2.11. Adequately designed passive and then active engineering structures, systems and components important to safety are more reliable than administrative controls and are preferred in operational states and in accident conditions (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], para. 6.6). Automatic systems should be highly reliable and designed to maintain process parameters within the operational limits and conditions or to bring the process to a safe and stable state, which is generally a shutdown state⁵ (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.47).

⁵A safe shutdown state implies there is no movement of radioactive material or liquids, with ventilation and (essential) cooling only.
2.12. When administrative controls are considered as an option, the criteria for selection of an automated system versus administrative control should be based on the availability of adequate time for the operator to respond (grace period) and on careful consideration of the risks and hazards associated with a failure to act. Where an optimum response will need to be chosen manually from a number of possible options, consideration should be given to providing a simple automatic or manual response action and/or passive design features to limit the consequences for safety in the event of a failure to take sufficient or timely action (additional defence in depth).

2.13. In addition to the structures, systems and components identified as important to safety in the safety analysis, instrumentation and control systems used in normal operation are also relevant to the overall safety of the reprocessing facility. These systems include the indicating and recording instrumentation, control components and alarm and communications systems that limit process fluctuations and occurrences without being identified as important to safety. These structures, systems and components (systems that control normal operation) should be of high quality. Adequate and reliable controls and appropriate instrumentation should be provided to maintain variables within specified ranges and to initiate automatic safety actions, where necessary. Where computers or programmable devices are used in such systems, evidence should be provided that the hardware and software are designed, manufactured, installed and tested appropriately, in accordance with the established management system, for software, this should include verification and validation. The reprocessing facility should have alarm systems to initiate full or partial facility evacuation in the event of an emergency (e.g. criticality, fire, high radiation levels).

2.14. Ergonomic considerations should be applied to all aspects of the design and operation of the reprocessing facility. Careful consideration should be given to human factors, in control rooms and all remote control stations and work locations. This consideration should extend not only to controls, alarms and indicators relating to structures, systems and components important to safety and to operational limits and conditions, but to all control, indication and alarms systems and to the control room(s) as a whole.

2.15. Utility supply services are necessary to maintain the safety systems of the reprocessing facility in an operational state at all times, and they also provide services to structures, systems and components important to safety. Continuity of service should be achieved by means of robust design, including sufficient diverse and redundant supplies. Services for the safety systems of the reprocessing facility should be designed so that, as far as possible, the
simultaneous loss of both normal services and back-up services will not lead to unacceptable consequences. Wherever possible, the consequences of loss of motive power to devices such as valves should be assessed and the item should be designed to be fail-safe\(^6\).

2.16. The situations that necessitate shut down of the reprocessing facility process to put the facility into a safe and stable state (i.e. no movement or transfer of chemicals and/or fissile material) should be analysed and well defined in procedures in accordance with the assessment performed, and such procedures should be executed, when required in accordance with the nature or urgency of the hazard or risk. Such situations include potential criticality sequences, and natural or human induced internal or external events. The subsequent recovery sequences should be similarly analysed, defined and executed, when required, in a timely manner, for example, the managed recovery or reduction of fissile material in a multi-stage contactor\(^7\).

2.17. To maintain the facility in a safe state, some systems should continuously operate or should be restarted within a defined delay period if they become unavailable, for example:

(a) Active heat removal systems used in storage areas or buffer tanks, accountancy vessels or for high activity waste packages to remove decay heat;

(b) Dilution (gas flow) systems used to prevent hazardous concentrations of hydrogen;

(c) Safety significant instrumentation and control systems and utility supply systems.

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\(^6\)The fail-safe state of a valve, controller or other device is a valve position, for example, that can be shown, by analysis, to be the least likely to cause a deterioration in the safety of the system or facility. Fail-safe devices are designed to fail to this position usually in response to a loss (failure) of motive power or control input, e.g. a spring that moves the valve to a pre-set position in the event of a power failure. The device may still fail in any position owing to other causes, e.g. mechanical failure, and these events should be analysed in the safety assessment.

\(^7\)A contactor is a liquid-liquid extraction device.
3. SITE EVALUATION

3.1. The Safety Requirements on Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-R-3 (Rev.1) [13] and its supporting Safety Guides (Seismic Hazards in Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSG-9 [14], Meteorological and Hydrological Hazards in Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSG-18 [15], Volcanic Hazards in Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSG-21 [16], Site Survey and Site Selection for Nuclear Installations, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSG-35 [17], and Dispersion of Radioactive Material in Air and Water and Consideration of Population Distribution in Site Evaluation for Nuclear Power Plants IAEA Safety Standards Series No. NS-G-3.2 [18]) establish the requirements and provide recommendations for site evaluation, site selection criteria and the site selection process for a fuel reprocessing facility. These should be considered in addition to the requirements established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], paras. 5.1-5.8 and Appendix IV, para. IV.1.

3.2. In the siting of new reprocessing facilities particular consideration should be given to the following:

(a) The site’s ability to accommodate normal discharges of radioactive material to the environment during operation, including:
   - The physical factors affecting the dispersion and accumulation of released radioactive material and the radiation risk to workers, the environment and the public;

(b) The suitability of the site to accommodate the engineering and infrastructure requirements of the facility, including:
   - Waste processing and storage (for all stages of the facility’s lifetime);
   - The reliable provision of utility supply services;
   - The capability for safe and secure on-site and off-site transport of nuclear fuel and other radioactive material and chemical materials (including products and radioactive waste, if necessary);

(c) The feasibility of implementing the requirements of GSR Part 7 [10] in an emergency, including:
- Provision of off-site supplies in the event of an emergency (including diversity of
water supplies)
- Arrangements for access by off-site emergency services to the site
- Implementation of emergency arrangements for the evacuation of site personnel and,
as appropriate, the surrounding population from the affected areas.

(d) External hazards that may particularly effect parts of a reprocessing facility:

- Potential flooding and criticality, water penetration through openings in static barriers,
damage to vulnerable items such as gloveboxes;
- Potential earthquakes and containment structures for spent fuel, highly active liquids
and fissile materials.

(e) Nuclear security measures in accordance with the guidance provided in the Nuclear
Security Series publications, in particular Nuclear Security Recommendations on
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, IAEA Nuclear Security
Series No. 13 [19].

3.3. NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1] and NS-R-3 (Rev.1) [14]) establish the requirements for site
evaluation for new and existing facilities and the use of a graded approach for reprocessing
facilities. In addition, for reprocessing facilities, care should be taken and an adequate
justification should be made for any grading of the application of the requirements for site
evaluation. Particular attention should be paid to the following throughout the lifetime of the
reprocessing facility (including its decommissioning):

(a) The appropriate monitoring and systematic evaluation of site characteristics;
(b) The incorporation of periodic, on-going evaluation of the site parameters for natural
processes and phenomena and human induced factors in the design basis for the facility;
(c) The identification and the need to take account of all foreseeable variations in the site
evaluation data (e.g. new or planned significant industrial development, infrastructure or
urban developments);
(d) Revision of the safety assessment report (in the course of a periodic safety review or the
equivalent) to take account of on-site and off-site changes that could affect safety at the
reprocessing facility, with account taken of all current site evaluation data and the
development of scientific knowledge and evaluation methodologies and assumptions;
(e) Consideration of anticipated future changes to site characteristics and of features that could have an impact on emergency arrangements and the ability to carry out emergency response actions for the facility.

4. DESIGN

GENERAL

Main safety functions for reprocessing facilities

4.1. The requirements for design for a fuel reprocessing facility are established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1] Section 6 and paras. IV.2-IV.50. The main safety functions (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.2), that is the functions the loss of which may lead to releases of radioactive material or exposures having possible radiological consequences for workers, the public or the environment, are those designed for:

1) Prevention of criticality;
2) Confinement of radioactive material (including protection against internal exposure, removal of decay heat and dilution of gases from radiolysis);
3) Protection against external exposure.

Further guidance on the main safety functions is provided in paras. 4.13-4.62.

Specific engineering design guidance

4.2. Owing to its expected long service life, substantial inventory of radioactive and radiotoxic materials, the potential for criticality, and the use of aggressive physical and chemical processes, the design of a reprocessing facility should be based upon the most rigorous application of the requirements of Section 6 of NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1] as a high hazard facility, and particular consideration should be given to the reuse and recycling of materials to reduce discharges and waste generation.

4.3. Protection of the public and the environment in normal operation relies on robust, efficient and effective facility design, particularly for the minimization of effluent arisings and the pre-disposal or pre-discharge treatment of effluents.

4.4. For abnormal states, the protection of people and the environment should mainly rely on the prevention of accidents and, if an accident occurs, mitigation of its consequences by robust and fault tolerant design providing defence in depth in accordance with a graded approach. These provisions should be supplemented by on-site and off-site emergency
arrangements to protect human life, health, property and the environment in accordance with GSR Part 7 [10], as the fifth level of the defence in depth concept.

4.5. The following requirements and guidance apply:

(a) Requirements for the confinement of radioactive material are established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], paras. 6.37–6.39, 6.52, 6.53 and Appendix IV, paras. IV.21–IV.25. In normal operation, internal exposure should be avoided by design, including static and dynamic barriers and adequate zoning. The need to rely on personal protection (personal protective equipment), should be minimized in accordance with the requirement for the optimization of protection and safety (see GSR Part 3 [6], Requirement 11);

(b) Requirements for the removal of decay heat are established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1] paras. 6.52 and Appendix IV, paras. IV.4–IV.6. In view of the decay heat generated, all thermal loads and processes should be given appropriate consideration in the design. Particular care should be paid to the provision of adequate cooling, passively if possible, in accident conditions;

(c) Requirements for the need to address the generation of radiolytic hydrogen and other flammable or explosive gases and materials are established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], paras. 6.53, 6.54 and Appendix IV, para. IV.33). In view of the widespread potential for the generation of radiolytic hydrogen, particular care should be paid to the provision of adequate diluting air flow (or alternative techniques) where applicable, without the need for ventilation fans or compressors, if possible, in accident conditions, or to other provisions for ensuring application of the concept of defence in depth, for example catalytic recombiners;

(d) Requirements for protection against external exposure are established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], paras. 6.40–6.42 and Appendix IV, paras. IV.26–IV.30. Owing to the radiation fields associated with high beta-gamma activity, alpha activity and neutron emissions, appropriate combinations of requirements for source limitation, shielding, distance and time are necessary for the protection of workers. Particular attention should be paid to provisions for maintenance in both design and operation;

(e) Requirements for the prevention of criticality are established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], paras. 6.43–6.51, Appendix IV, paras. IV.9–IV.20 and guidance is provided in Criticality Safety in the Handling of Fissile Material, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSG-27
[20]. All processes involving fissile material should be designed in such a way as to prevent an accidental criticality;

(f) Design requirements for provisions for decommissioning are established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], paras. 6.35-6.36 and should be strictly implemented owing to the long operational lifetimes of reprocessing facilities, large throughput of radioactive and radiotoxic materials and the cumulative effects of modifications.


Other engineering design guidance

4.7. The operating organization should develop (or have developed) a set of standardized designs and should set out conditions for their use in the design and modification of a reprocessing facility. Such standardized designs should be developed on the basis of proven experience and should be capable of being applied to a wide range of applications. For example, standardized designs should be applied to ensure the continuity and integrity of the containment, the ventilation of areas that could be contaminated, the transfer of highly active liquids, and to simplify the maintenance activities for the reprocessing facility. For each application of these standardized designs a thorough assessment should be made to verify that the conditions for the application are appropriate.

4.8. As reprocessing facilities have long operating lifetimes, provisions should be made to allow for anticipated in situ repair of major equipment, as far as reasonably achievable (such as allowing space for operation of remote repair equipment, and the generating and retaining three dimensional design data of the equipment and its location in hot cells).

Design basis accidents and safety analysis

4.9. The definition of a design basis accident\(^8\), in the context of nuclear fuel cycle facilities, can be found in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Annex III, para. III-10. The safety requirements relating to design basis accidents and design basis external events are established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], paras. 6.4–6.9.

\(^8\) “In the context of nuclear fuel cycle facilities, a design basis accident is an accident against which a facility is designed according to established design criteria such that the consequences are kept within defined limits. These accidents are events against which design measures are taken when designing the facility. The design measures are intended to prevent an accident or to mitigate its consequences if it does occur” (para. III-10 of NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1]).
4.10. The specification of a design basis accident or design basis external event (or the equivalent) will depend on the design of the facility, its siting, and national criteria. However, particular consideration should be given to the following hazards in the specification of design basis accidents for reprocessing facilities:

(a) Loss of cooling;
(b) Loss of electrical power;
(c) Nuclear criticality accidents;
(d) Fire (extraction units, Pu glove boxes, organic wastes);
(e) Exothermic chemical reactions (e.g., red oil);
(f) External events including:
   - Internal and external explosion;
   - Internal and external fire;
   - Dropped loads and associated handling events;
   - Natural phenomena (earthquake, flooding, tornadoes, etc.);
   - Aircraft crashes.

Selected postulated initiating events are listed in Annex I of NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1].

4.11. Reprocessing facilities are characterized by a wide diversity of radioactive materials distributed throughout the facility and by the number of potential events that could result in a release of radioactive material to the environment with the potential for public exposure. Therefore the operational states and accident conditions for each process of the reprocessing facility should be assessed on a case by case basis (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], para. 6.9 and Annex III, paras. III-10 to III-11). If an event could simultaneously challenge several facilities at one site, the assessment should address the implications at the site level in addition to the implications for each facility.

**Structures, systems and components important to safety**

4.12. The likelihood of design basis accidents (or equivalent) should be minimized, and any associated radiological consequences should be controlled by means of structures, systems and components important to safety (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], paras. 6.5–6.9 and Annex III). Annex II of this Safety Guide presents examples of structures, systems and components
important to safety and representative events that may challenge the associated safety functions.

SAFETY FUNCTIONS

Prevention of criticality

General

4.13. The requirements for criticality prevention in reprocessing facilities are established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], paras. 6.43-6.51, and Appendix IV, paras. IV.9-IV.20 and general recommendations on criticality prevention are provided in SSG-27 [21].

4.14. Criticality hazards are required to be controlled by design as far as practicable (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], para. 6.43 and Appendix IV, para. IV.10). Where a credible hazard cannot be eliminated, the double contingency principle is the preferred approach for the prevention of criticality by means of design (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], para. 6.45 and SSG-27 [20]).

4.15. Those system interfaces at which there is a change in the state of the fissile material or in the method of criticality control should be specifically assessed (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1]: para. 6.48 and Appendix IV, para. IV.14). Particular care should also be taken to ensure that all transitional, intermediate or temporary states that occur or could reasonably be expected to occur under all operational states or accident conditions are assessed.

4.16. When required by the safety analysis, precipitation of fissile material within solutions should be prevented by, for example, the following methods:

(a) The use of interlocks and the avoidance of any permanent physical connection from units containing reagents to the equipment in which fissile material is located;

(b) The acidification of cooling loops for equipment containing solutions of nuclear material (to prevent precipitation in case of leakage from the cooling loop into the equipment) and consideration of the need for the cooling loops themselves to be meet subcritical design requirements.

4.17. In a number of locations in a reprocessing facility, criticality safety for equipment containing fissile liquid is achieved by the geometry or shape of the containment. The overall design should provide for any potential leakage to a criticality safe (secondary) containment. This should drain or have an emptying route to criticality safe vessels, depending on the exact design. The evaluation of such designs should address the potential for such leaks to
evaporate and crystallize or precipitate either at the leak site or on nearby hot vessels or lines, and should consider the need for:

(a) Localized drip trays to recover and direct potential liquid leaks away from hot vessels to collection vessels of favourable geometry;

(b) Level measurement devices or liquid detectors in the drip trays to provide additional protection;

(c) Frequent inspections, continuous closed circuit television camera surveillance and adequate lighting.

4.18. The need for additional design provisions to detect leaks or similar abnormal occurrences involving liquids containing fissile solids (slurries) or solid (powder) transfer systems should also be carefully considered and appropriate criticality control measures should be put in place.

4.19. In accordance with the criticality safety analysis, instruments specifically intended to detect accumulations and inventories of fissile material should be installed where required. Such instruments should also be used to verify the fissile inventory of equipment during decommissioning.

Criticality safety assessment

4.20. The aim of the criticality safety assessment, as required in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.11 is to demonstrate that the design of equipment and the operating conditions in the reprocessing facility are such that the values of controlled parameters are always maintained in the subcritical range. Further guidance on criticality safety assessment is provided in SSG-27 [20].

4.21. The criticality safety assessment should include a criticality safety analysis, which should evaluate subcriticality for all operational states (i.e. normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences) and for design basis accidents. The criticality safety analysis should be used to identify hazards, both external and internal, and to determine the radiological consequences. The criticality safety analysis should involve the use of a conservative approach with account taken of the following:

(a) Uncertainties in physical parameters, the possibility of optimum moderation conditions and the presence of non-homogeneous distributions of moderators and fissile material;
(b) Anticipated operational occurrences and their combinations, if they cannot be shown to be independent;

c) Facility states that may result from internal and external hazards.

4.22. Computer codes used for the criticality analysis should be qualified, validated and verified (i.e. compared with benchmarks to determine the effects of code bias and code uncertainties on the calculated effective multiplication factor $k_{eff}$). Any codes should be used appropriately and within their applicable range with appropriate data libraries of nuclear reaction cross-sections. Detailed guidance is provided in SSG-27 [20], paras. 4.20-4.25.

4.23. An alternative method of analysis is to specify, for physical parameters such as mass, volume, concentration and geometrical dimensions, a ‘safe value’ as a fraction of their critical value\(^9\). This ‘safe value’ needs to take into account conservative (or worst case values) for other parameters (such as the optimum values for moderation or realistic minimum values for neutron poisons. The assessment has to demonstrate that each of the parameters will always be less than the numerical limits used in the calculation of the ‘safe value’ under all normal, abnormal and design basis accident conditions.

**Mitigatory measures**

4.24. The requirements to be applied in respect of criticality detection systems and associated provisions are established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], para. 6.50.

4.25. The areas containing fissile material for which criticality alarm systems are necessary to initiate immediate evacuation\(^{10}\) should be defined in accordance with the layout of the facility, the process at hand and national safety regulations and by the criticality safety analysis.

4.26. The need for additional shielding, remote operation and other design measures to mitigate the consequences of a criticality accident, if one does occur, should be assessed in accordance with the defence in depth requirements (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], paras. 2.4-2.8 and Appendix IV, para. IV.29).

**Confinement of radioactive material**

**Static and dynamic confinement**

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\(^9\)The critical value of a parameter is its value for $k_{eff} = 1$.

\(^{10}\)To minimize doses to workers in case of repeat or multiple criticality events.
4.27. The requirements for confinement for a reprocessing facility are established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], para. 6.38 and Appendix IV, paras. IV.21-IV.25. “Containment shall be the primary method for confinement against the spread of contamination. Confinement shall be provided by two complementary containment systems — static (e.g. physical barrier) and dynamic (e.g. ventilation). The static containment shall have at least one static barrier between radioactive material and operating areas (workers) and at least one additional static barrier between operating areas and the environment” (NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, paras. IV.21 and IV.22).

4.28. In a reprocessing facility (for most areas), three barriers (or more as required by the safety analysis) should be provided, in accordance with a graded approach. The first static barrier normally consists of process equipment, vessels and pipes or gloveboxes. The second static barrier normally consists of cells around process equipment or, when gloveboxes are the first containment barrier, the rooms around the glovebox(es). The final static barrier is the building itself. The design of the static containment system should take into account openings between different confinement zones (e.g. doors, instruments or pipe penetrations). Such openings should be designed to ensure that confinement is maintained in operational states, especially during maintenance (e.g. by the provision of permanent or temporary, additional barriers) (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, paras. IV.22 and IV.28) and, as far as practicable, in accident conditions.

4.29. Each static barrier should be complemented by a dynamic containment system(s), which should establish a cascade of pressure between the environment outside the building and the contaminated material inside the building, and across all static barriers within the building. The dynamic containment system should be designed to prevent the movement or diffusion of radioactive or toxic gases, vapours and airborne particulates through any openings in the barriers to areas of lower contamination or concentration of these materials. The design of the dynamic containment system should address, as far as practicable:

(a) Operational states and accident conditions;
(b) Maintenance, which may cause localized changes to conditions (e.g. opening access doors, removing access panels);
(c) Where more than one ventilation system is used, protection in the event of a failure of a lower pressure (higher contamination) system, causing pressure differentials and airflows to be reversed;
(d) The need to ensure that all static barriers, including any filters or other effluent control equipment, can withstand the maximum differential pressures and airflows generated by the system.

4.30. The reprocessing facility should be designed to retain and promptly detect any leakage of liquids from process equipment, vessels and pipes and to recover the volume of liquid to the primary containment (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.38). This is particularly important for both design and operation, where the first static barrier provides other safety functions, e.g. favourable geometry for criticality avoidance or exclusion of air for flammable liquids. Great care should be taken when dealing with spills or leaks from liquids streams with high fissile content and effects such as crystallization due to cooling or evaporation of leaked liquors should be considered. The chemical compatibility of liquid streams should also be considered in the design.

4.31. Particular consideration should be given to those sections of the reprocessing facility handling solids (powders) with radioactive, fissile and other hazardous properties. Design for the detection of leaks and of accumulations of leaked powders and for their return to containment or the process is particularly challenging, and care should be taken to ensure this equipment is based upon well proven designs and subject to rigorous qualification. In either case, commissioning should rigorously test the effectiveness of the design solutions. As far as practicable, considering both risk and the optimization of protection and safety, operator intervention should be avoided.

4.32. The ventilation system should include, as a minimum, both a ventilation system for the building (cells and rooms) and a ventilation system for process equipment (e.g. vessels contained in a cell).

4.33. The building ventilation system, including redundant sub-systems\footnote{Which may be provided to ensure continuous availability during, for example, maintenance or filter changes.}, filtration equipment and other discharge control equipment, should be designed and assessed according to the type and design of static barriers (cells, gloveboxes, building), the classification of areas according to the hazards they contain, the nature of potential airborne contamination (i.e. the predicted or actual normal levels of airborne and levels of surface contamination and the risks of additional contamination) and the requirements for maintenance (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, paras. IV.23-IV.25).
4.34. The process equipment ventilation system creates the lowest pressure within the facility and collects and treats most of the radioactive vapours, radioactive gases and particulates generated by the processes. Careful attention should be paid to the need to install effective washing, draining and collection systems to reduce the buildup of contamination and radioactive material and to facilitate future decommissioning.

4.35. All filtration stages of the ventilation systems that require testing should be designed in accordance with relevant standards, such as those of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), (Ref. [1]: Appendix IV: para. IV.25).

4.36. For the portions of the process involving powders, primary filters should be located as close to the source of contamination as practical (e.g. near the gloveboxes), to minimize the potential buildup of powders in the ventilation ducts. Particular care should be taken to avoid accumulations of fissile material in powder form at junctions and connections in ventilation ducts which may be of less favourable geometry (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.25).

4.37. On-line fans and standby fans should be provided in accordance with the results of the safety assessment. Alarm systems should be installed to alert operators to system malfunctions resulting in high or low differential pressures.

4.38. Fire dampers to prevent the propagation of a fire through ventilation ducts and to maintain the integrity of firewalls\(^\text{12}\) should be installed, unless the likelihood of a fire spreading or the consequences of such a fire are acceptably low (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1]: Appendix IV, para. IV.36).

Protection of workers

4.39. The static barriers (at least one is required between radioactive material and working areas) normally protect workers from internal and external exposure. Their design should be specified so as to ensure their integrity and effectiveness. Their design specifications should include, for example, weld specifications, selection of materials, leak-tightness, including specification of penetration seals for electrical and mechanical penetrations, the ability to withstand seismic loads, and, as appropriate, the ease of carrying out maintenance work (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.21).

\(^\text{12}\) A fire wall is an engineered feature specifically designed to prevent, limit or delay the spread of fire.
4.40. For items that need to be regularly maintained or accessed (such as sampling stations and pumps), consideration should be given to their installation in shielded bulges\(^\text{13}\) or gloveboxes, adjacent to the process cells where they are required, depending upon the radiation type and level. Such an approach will reduce the local radioactive inventory and allow for special washing or decontamination features. The provision of such features should be balanced against the need to obtain representative samples (for example, by short sample lines) and the additional waste at decommissioning.

4.41. Where easily dispersible radioactive material is processed and a loss of containment with the potential for contamination or ingestion is a major risk, gloveboxes are often preferred design solutions. Gloveboxes are welded stainless steel enclosures with windows (of suitable materials), arranged either singly or in interconnected groups. Access to equipment inside a glovebox is through holes (ports) fitted with gloves that maintain the containment barrier. Seals on glovebox windows should be capable of testing for leak tightness in operation and gloves should be replaceable without breaking containment. A negative pressure should be maintained inside the glovebox.

4.42. For normal operation, the requirement for the use of personal protective respiratory equipment to be minimized should be achieved mainly by the careful design of the static and dynamic containment systems and the careful design and location of devices for the immediate detection of low levels of airborne radioactive material, careful consideration should also be given to the need to discriminate against natural radioactive species (e.g. radon) (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.21).

4.43. At the design stage, provision should be made for the installation of equipment for monitoring airborne radioactive material (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.26). The system design and the location of monitoring points should be chosen with account taken of the following factors:

(a) The most likely locations of workers;

(b) Airflows and air movement within the facility;

(c) Evacuation zoning and evacuation routes;

(d) The use of mobile units for temporary controlled areas, e.g. for maintenance.

\(^{13}\)A bulge is typically a shielded, stainless steel, windowless, glovebox type enclosure with mechanically sealed openings to allow for the remote removal of items into a shielded transport flask via a shielded docking port.
4.44. To avoid the inadvertent spread of contamination by personnel, control points with personnel contamination monitoring equipment for workers (for exposed skin surfaces, clothing and working suits) should be located at the exit airlocks and barriers from areas that could be contaminated. These should be located close to workplaces with contamination hazards to the extent practical (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], para. 6.42).

4.45. As far as practicable, tools and equipment should not be routinely transferred through air locks or across barriers. Where such transfers are unavoidable, the provisions of para. 4.44 apply to the monitoring of the tools and equipment. Consideration should be given in design to the provision of specific storage locations for lightly contaminated tools and equipment. More heavily contaminated items should be decontaminated for reuse or sent to an appropriate waste route.

Protection of the public and the environment

4.46. To the extent required by safety analyses, all engineered discharge points from the ventilation system should be equipped with equipment for the reduction of airborne activity designed to provide protection in normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences and accident conditions. As far as practicable, the final stage of treatment should be located close to the point at which gaseous discharge to the environment occurs.

4.47. In accordance with national requirements and the authorized limits for discharge from the facility and to ensure optimization of protection and safety (and in accordance with a graded approach), the design of the reprocessing facility should also provide measures for the uninterrupted monitoring and control of the discharge from the stack exhaust(s) and for monitoring of the environment around the facility (See NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.32, and GSR Part 3 [6], Requirements 14, and 32). To ensure early detection of leaks, design for batch-wise transfer should be preferred for the transfer of liquid process effluents to their treatment facilities, where practicable. Equipment should be provided for monitoring for the loss of any containment barrier (e.g. detection of liquid levels and sampling in cell sumps\(^{14}\) or collecting vessels, detection of airborne activity).

4.48. Detailed recommendations for the treatment and monitoring of radioactive liquid effluents are outside the scope of this Safety Guide, but similar considerations to those for airborne discharges (paras. 4.46-4.47) apply to liquid discharge points and to the sampling of liquid effluent discharges and their dispersion in the environment.

\(^{14}\) A designed ‘low-point’ in a (normally stainless steel lined) cell base to collect any liquid arising from leakage or overflow.
Cooling and the removal of decay heat

4.49. Radioactive decay heat, exothermic chemical reactions (e.g. neutralization of acidic or alkaline solution), and physical heating and cooling or evaporation processes may result in the following:

(a) Boiling of solutions;
(b) Changes of state (e.g. melting, concentration, crystallization, changes in water content) relevant to radiological or criticality safety;
(c) Transition to auto-catalytic chemical reactions (e.g. the formation of potentially explosive red oil) or other accelerated or run-away chemical reactions and fires;
(d) Destruction of components of containment barriers;
(e) Degradation of radiation protection shielding;
(f) Degradation of neutron absorbers or neutron decoupling devices.

Cooling systems should be designed to prevent uncontrolled releases of radioactive material to the environment, exposure of workers and the public, and criticality accidents (e.g. for storage vessels for highly active \(^{15}\) liquid waste and PuO\(_2\) containers), (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, paras. IV.4 and IV.6).

4.50. Cooling capacity, the availability and reliability and the need for emergency power supplies for the cooling systems to remove heat from radioactive decay and chemical reactions are required to be defined in the safety analysis (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, paras. IV.4-IV.5). Where practicable, passive cooling should be considered in the design.

Prevention of hazardous concentration levels of gases from radiolysis and other hazardous explosive or flammable materials

4.51. Radiolysis in water (including cooling water) or in organic materials may result in the production and buildup of degradation products. Such products may be flammable or explosive (e.g. H\(_2\), CH\(_4\), organic nitrate or nitrites (red oils), peroxides) or corrosive (e.g. Cl\(_2\), H\(_2\)O\(_2\)) and may damage containment barriers. As far as practicable, dilution systems (air or inert gas) should be provided to prevent explosive gaseous mixtures and the subsequent loss of confinement resulting from radiolysis in vessels. For product containers and other systems, the design should take into account the potential for corrosion and gas (pressure) production.

\(^{15}\)Also referred to as high level liquid waste.
(e.g. from PuO₂ powder or from plutonium contaminated waste) (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.33).

4.52. Unstable products from exothermic chemical reactions may result in explosion and loss of confinement. The design requirements (specifications), the relevant guidance in international and national standards and international experience should be taken into account in the process and the facility design with the objective of preventing the buildup of explosive products. The design should ensure that process parameters are monitored and provided with alarm systems and that inventories are minimized in order to prevent chemical explosions (e.g. red oils in evaporators, HN₃ in extraction cycles) (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.33).

4.53. Pyrophoric metals (uranium or Zircaloy particles from fuel shearing or cladding removal) may cause fires or explosion. The design should avoid their unexpected accumulation and should provide an inert environment as necessary (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.33).

4.54. To ensure that hazardous or incompatible mixtures of materials cannot occur in leak collection systems and overflow collection systems, the all relevant factors including following should be fully evaluated in the design assessment:

(a) The routing of overflow systems designed to prevent uncontrolled leaks;
(b) Drip trays for the collection of leaks and their drain routes;
(c) Collecting vessels;
(d) Recovery routes;
(e) The potential for any system passing through a cell to leak into a cell sump;
(f) The potential for any inactive services and reagent feeds to overflow or leak in working areas.

Protection against external exposure

4.55. The aim of protection against external radiation exposure is to maintain doses below the limits established in GSR Part 3 [6], Schedule III, paras. III.1 and III.2, to optimize protection and safety and to meet the requirements and guidance identified in para. 4.5, by use of the following elements, separately or in combination:
(a) Limiting the magnitude of the radiation source (where practicable) during operation and maintenance (e.g. by prior decontamination or washing before maintenance is carried out);

(b) Shielding the radiation source, including temporary shielding;

(c) Distancing the radiation source from personnel (e.g. by means of the position of work stations, remotely controlled operation);

(d) Limiting the exposure time of personnel (e.g. by means of automation of operation, alarmed dosimeters);

(e) Controlling access to areas where there is a risk of external exposure;

(f) Using personal radiation protection (torso shields and organ shields). For normal operation, the need for personal protective equipment is required to be minimized through careful design.

4.56. Optimization of protection and safety in design should also take into account operational constraints on maintenance staff. In addition, the use of time limitation as the main method of dose management should be minimized.

4.57. In high beta-gamma activity facility units, the design of shielding should consider both the strength and the location of the radiation source. In a medium or low activity facility, a combination of radiation source strength and location, exposure time and shielding should be considered for protection of workers for both whole body doses and doses to extremities. As a general guide, shielding should be designed to be as close as possible to the radiation source.

4.58. The need for maintenance, including examination, inspection and testing activities, should be considered in the design of equipment installed in highly active cells, with particular consideration given to radiation levels and contamination levels throughout the lifetime of the reprocessing facility (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.28).

(a) For the mechanical and electrical parts of units containing highly radioactive material, the design of the layout and of the equipment should allow for adequate remote maintenance (e.g. master-slave manipulators);

(b) For transfers of liquids, non-mechanical means (e.g. air lift or jet lift with disentrainment\textsuperscript{16} capabilities, or fluidic devices as appropriate) should be preferred, or

\textsuperscript{16}This is a system or device for separating liquid from a motive air or steam with minimum carry-over (entrainment) of activity into the ventilation system.
mechanical items, such as pumps and valves, should be designed for remote maintenance (e.g. by use of shielded equipment maintenance flasks\textsuperscript{17}).

4.59. Radioactive inventories calculations for design and safety assessment should take into account depositions of material inside pipes and equipment, from processed materials and their daughter products, e.g. particulates, and activity coating\textsuperscript{18} within pipes (sections containing highly radioactive material) and gloveboxes (americium). The potential for the accumulation of radioactive material in process equipment and secondary systems (e.g. ventilation ducting) in operation should be minimized by design, or provision should be made for its removal.

4.60. In a reprocessing facility, process control relies (in part) on analytical data from samples. In order to minimize occupational exposure, automatic and remote operation should be preferred for sampling devices, the sample transfer network to the laboratories and analytical laboratories (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) \[1\], para. 6.40).

4.61. Depending on national and international regulations and the safety assessment, the monitoring system for radiation protection should consist principally of the following:

(a) Fixed gamma/neutron area monitors and stationary ‘sniffers’\textsuperscript{19} for activity monitoring in air (for beta/gamma and alpha radiation) for purposes of access and/or evacuation;

(b) Mobile gamma/neutron area monitors and mobile sniffers for activity monitoring in air (for beta/gamma and alpha radiation) for purposes of personnel protection and evacuation during maintenance and at barriers between normal access areas and controlled areas;

(c) Workers’ (personal) dosimeters consistent with the type(s) of radiation present.

POSTULATED INITIATING EVENTS

Internal initiating events

Fire

4.62. The requirements for fire safety at a reprocessing facility are established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) \[1\], para. 6.55 and Appendix IV, paras. IV.33-IV.36. In a reprocessing facility, fire hazards (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) \[1\], Appendix IV, para. IV.33) are associated with the presence of:

\textsuperscript{17}Such flasks are sometimes referred to as mobile equipment replacement casks.

\textsuperscript{18}This phenomenon is called ‘plate-out’ in some States.

\textsuperscript{19}A sniffer is an air sampling point or device.
(a) Flammable materials such as pyrophoric materials, solvents, reactive chemicals and electrical cabling;

(b) Potentially flammable materials such as polymeric neutron shielding (normally associated with gloveboxes) and process and operational waste (e.g. wipes and protective suits.), including office waste.

4.63. Fire in a reprocessing facility can lead to the dispersion of radioactive and/or toxic materials by breach of the containment barriers. It can also cause a criticality accident by affecting the system(s) used for the control of criticality, by changing the dimensions of processing equipment, altering the moderating or reflecting conditions by the presence of firefighting media or fire suppression media, or destroying neutron decoupling devices.

Fire hazard analysis

4.64. Fire hazard analysis involves the systematic identification of the causes of fires, the assessment of the potential consequences of a fire and, where appropriate, estimation of the probability of the occurrence of fires. Fire hazard analysis should consider, explicitly, potential external and internal fires, including fires involving nuclear material\(^20\), both directly and indirectly. Fire hazard analysis is used to assess the inventory of (flammable) fuels and ignition sources and to determine the appropriateness and adequacy of measures for fire protection. Computer modelling of fires should be used in support of the fire hazard analysis for complex and high hazard applications, as necessary. Fire hazard analyses can provide valuable information on which it is possible to base design decisions or to identify weaknesses that might otherwise have gone undetected. Even if the likelihood of a fire occurring is low, it may have significant consequences with regard to nuclear safety and, as such, appropriate protective measures should be undertaken (e.g. delineating small fire compartment\(^21\) areas) to prevent fires or to prevent the propagation of a fire.

4.65. The analysis of fire hazards should also include a systematic review of the provisions made for preventing, detecting, mitigating and fighting fires.

4.66. An important aspect of the fire hazard analysis for a reprocessing facility is the identification of areas of the facility that require special consideration (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], para. 6.55). In particular, the fire hazard analysis should include the following:

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\(^{20}\) In some States, fires involving nuclear materials (e.g. an actinide loaded solvent fire) and general (internal, conventional) fires (e.g. a control room fire caused by an electrical fault) are considered separately and explicitly in the safety assessment for additional clarity and to help to ensure all potential radiological and non-radiological hazards from both categories of fire are addressed adequately.

\(^{21}\) A room or suite of rooms within a firewall, possibly with separate fire detection and firefighting provisions, inventory controls and evacuation procedures.
(a) Areas where fissile material is processed and stored;
(b) Areas where radioactive material is processed and stored;
(c) Gloveboxes, especially those in which plutonium is processed;
(d) Workshops and laboratories in which flammable or combustible liquids and gas, solvents, resins, reactive chemicals are used and/or stored;
(e) Areas where pyrophoric metal powders are processed (e.g. from Zircaloy or uranium shearing or decladding);
(f) Areas with high fire loads, such as waste storage areas;
(g) Rooms housing systems and components important to safety (e.g. last stages filters of the ventilation system, electrical switch rooms), whose degradation might have radiological consequences or consequences that are unacceptable in terms of criticality;
(h) Process control rooms and supplementary control rooms;
(i) Evacuation routes.

Fire prevention, detection and mitigation

4.67. Prevention is the most important aspect of fire protection. The reprocessing facility should be designed to limit fire risks through the incorporation of measures to ensure that fires do not occur and, if they do occur, to detect, limit and contain their spread. Measures for mitigation should be put in place to reduce to a minimum the consequences of fire in the event that a fire breaks out despite preventive measures.

4.68. To accomplish the dual aims of fire prevention and mitigation of the consequences of a fire, a number of general and specific measures should be taken, including the following:
(a) Minimization of the combustible load of individual areas, including the effects of fire enhancing chemicals such as oxidizing agents;
(b) Segregation of the areas where non-radioactive hazardous material is stored from process areas;
(c) Installation of a fire detection system designed to allow early detection and accurate identification of the location of any fire, rapid dissemination of information on the fire and, where installed, activation of automatic devices for fire suppression;
(d) Selection of materials, including building materials, process and glovebox components and materials for penetrations, in accordance with their functional requirements and fire resistance ratings;

(e) Compartmentalization of buildings and ventilation ducts as far as possible to prevent the spreading of fires;

(f) Avoiding the use of flammable liquids or gases outside their flammability limits;

(g) Suppression or limitation of the number of possible ignition sources, such as open flames, welding or electrical sparks, and their segregation from combustible material;

(h) Insulation of hot or heated surfaces;

(i) Consistency of the fire extinguishing media with the requirements of other safety analyses, especially with the requirements for criticality control (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.17).

4.69. The design and control of ventilation systems for rooms, cells and gloveboxes should accomplish multiple aims in preventing and mitigating fire. The spread of fire should be limited whilst maintaining the dynamic containment system for as long as possible and protecting the final stage of filtration.

4.70. The design of the ventilation system should be given particular consideration with regard to fire prevention, including the following aspects:

(a) The accumulation of flammable dust or other materials should be limited;

(b) Means of removing or washing-out inaccessible ventilation ducts should be provided;

(c) Ventilation ducts should be airtight and resistant to heat and corrosive products that might result from a fire;

(d) Ventilation ducts and filter units for dynamic containment should be of suitable design to ensure they do not constitute weak points in the fire protection system;

(e) Fire dampers should be mounted in the ventilation system, unless the likelihood of a wide spread fire and fire propagation is acceptably low, and their effect on ventilation should be carefully considered;

(f) The fire resistance of the filter medium should be carefully considered and spark arrestors should be used to protect filters as necessary;
(g) The location of filters and fans should be carefully evaluated for their ability to perform during a fire;

(h) Careful consideration should be given to the potential need to reduce or stop ventilation flows in the event of a major fire to aid fire control.

4.71. Lines crossing the boundaries of the compartments and firewalls (e.g. gases, process, electrical and instrument cables and lines) should be designed to ensure that fire does not spread.

4.72. Evacuation routes for fire and criticality events should be considered in design in accordance with national regulations and the safety assessment. These should follow the same routes as far as possible consistent that the aim of reducing the number of different evacuation routes, where this does not impact significantly fire safety or criticality safety.

Explosion

4.73. The requirements relating to explosion for a reprocessing facility are established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], para. 6.54 and Appendix IV, paras. IV.33-IV.36. Explosion due to explosive chemicals can cause a release of radioactive material. The potential for explosion can result from the use of chemical materials (e.g. organic solvents and reactants, hydrogen, hydrogen peroxide and nitric acid), degradation products, pyrophoric materials (e.g. zirconium or uranium particles), the chemical or radiochemical production of explosive materials (e.g. hydrogen, red oil) or the mixing of incompatible chemicals (e.g. strong acids and alkalis).

4.74. To prevent a release of radioactive material resulting from an explosion, in addition to the requirements of NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], para. 6.54, the following provisions should be considered in the design:

(a) The need to maintain the separation of incompatible chemical materials in normal and abnormal situations (e.g. recovery of leaks);

(b) The control of parameters (e.g. concentration, temperature, pressure) to prevent situations leading to explosion;

(c) The use of blow-out panels to mitigate the effects of explosion of non-radioactive materials;

(d) Limitations of the quantity or of the concentration of explosive material;
(e) Design of the ventilation systems to avoid the formation of an explosive atmosphere and/or to maintain the concentration of explosive gases below their lower explosive limit;

(f) Design of the equipment or structures to withstand the effects of an explosion;

(g) Where design options exist, the adoption of processes with a lower potential risk for fire or explosion.

4.75. Chemicals should be stored in well-ventilated locations or racks outside the process areas or laboratory areas.

Handling events

4.76. The requirements relating to handling events for a reprocessing facility are established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.42. Mechanical, electrical or human errors in the handling of radioactive or non-radioactive materials may result in the degradation of criticality controls, confinement, shielding, or other systems important to safety and associated controls, or in a reduction of defence in depth. A reprocessing facility should be designed to:

(a) Eliminate the need to lift loads where practicable, especially within the facility, by using track-guided transport or other stable means of transport;

(b) Limit the consequences of drops and collisions (e.g. by minimization of the heights of lifts, qualification of containers against the maximum drop, design of floors to withstand the impact of dropped loads, installation of shock absorbing features and definition of safe travel paths);

(c) Minimize the failure frequency of mechanical handling systems\textsuperscript{22} (e.g. cranes and carts) by appropriate design, including control systems, with multiple fail-safe features (e.g. brakes, wire ropes, action on power loss and interlocks).

These measures should be supported by ergonomic design, human factor analysis and the definition of appropriate administrative control measures.

Equipment failure

4.77. The requirements relating to equipment failure for a reprocessing facility are established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], para. 2.4 and Appendix IV, para. IV.37. The reprocessing facility should be designed to cope with the failure of equipment that would result in a

\textsuperscript{22}Some regulatory bodies have specific requirements for the design for ‘nuclear loads’ or ‘nuclear lifts’, e.g. requiring the use of multi-roped cranes, or the maximum load to be a smaller fraction of the test load than for non-nuclear lifts.
degradation of confinement, shielding or criticality control or a reduction in defence in depth. As part of the design, the failure state of all structures, systems and components important to safety should be assessed and consideration should be given (in accordance with a graded approach) to the design or procurement of items that fail to a safe state. Where no fail-safe state can be defined, consideration should be given to ensuring that the functionality (safety function) of structures, systems and components important to safety is maintained (by redundancy, separation, diversity and independence, as necessary).

4.78. Special consideration should be given to the failure of computer systems, computerized control and software systems, in evaluating failure and fail-safe conditions, by application of appropriate national or international codes and standards.

Loss of support systems

4.79. The requirements for the loss of support systems for a reprocessing facility are established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], para. 6.28 and Appendix IV, paras. IV.40-IV.41.

4.80. The reprocessing facility should be designed to cope with potential short-term and long-term loss of support systems, such as the supply of electrical power, that may have consequences for safety. The loss of support systems should be considered both for individual items of equipment and for the facility as a whole, and, on multi-facility sites, for the reprocessing facility’s ancillary and support facilities (e.g. waste treatment and storage facilities and other facilities on the site).

4.81. The electrical power supplies to the reprocessing facility should be of high reliability. In the event of a loss of normal power, in accordance with the facility status and the requirements of the safety analysis, a robust emergency electrical power supply should be available to relevant structures, systems and components important to safety, including the following (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.41):

(a) Heat removal systems;

(b) The dilution system for hydrogen generated by radiolysis;

(c) (Some) exhaust fans of the dynamic containment system;

(d) Fire detection systems;

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23Typical support systems in a reprocessing facility, including utilities, are: off-site and on-site electrical power systems, compressed air systems (instrument air and pneumatic power), systems for the supply of steam or cooling water, ventilation systems, emergency electrical power systems, uninterruptable power supply systems (instrument power), battery back-up systems, reagent and chemical supply systems, inert gas supply systems, and all other services and supplies the loss of which may have consequences for safety.

24Contributions to the reliability include the use of diverse and redundant electric power sources, switching and connections, the design of power supplies to withstand external risks, and the use of uninterruptible power sources when necessary.
(e) Monitoring systems for radiation protection;

(f) Criticality alarm systems;

(g) Instrumentation and control associated with the above items;

(h) Lighting.

4.82. Consideration should be given to the need to provide emergency power for an extended period in the event of a major external event to those structures, systems and components important to safety, including selected monitoring and alarm systems and other services, that should be (remain) available in the event of a prolonged utilities outage.

4.83. The chronology for restoring electrical power to the reprocessing facility should be specified during design and should take account of the following:

(a) The ‘current power status’ (off, running on emergency supply, time to loss of back-up power, etc.) of the items;

(b) The safety significance or priority of the item being restored to (normal) service;

(c) The interruptions of supply during switching operations;

(d) The initial power demand of items within the reprocessing facility and supply capabilities and capacity.

Emergency procedures should also be developed during the design (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], paras. 4.2 and 4.21).

4.84. The assessments performed for the loss of electrical power supplies or other support services (e.g. cooling, radiolysis, ventilation) should be part of the overall safety assessment for the reprocessing facility (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.40).

4.85. The loss of general support supplies, such as compressed air for instrumentation and control, cooling water for process equipment, ventilation systems and inert gas supplies, may also have consequences for safety. In the design of a reprocessing facility, suitable measures to ensure such supplies or other means to ensure safety should be provided, including the following:

(a) In accordance with the safety assessment, the design of supply systems25 should be of adequate reliability, with diversity and redundancy as necessary;

25 Examples include air-reservoirs, uninterruptible power supplies, diverse cooling.
(b) The maximum period that a loss of support supplies can be sustained with acceptable levels of safety should be assessed for all supplies and considered in the design;

c) For loss of air supply to pneumatically actuated valves, in accordance with the safety analysis, valves should be used that are designed to be fail-safe, as far as practical;

d) Loss of cooling water may result in the failure of components such as evaporator condensers, diesel generators, and condensers or dehumidifiers in the ventilation system. Adequate back up capacity or independent, redundant supplies should be provided in the design.

Pipe or vessel leaks

4.86. The requirements relating to pipe and vessel leaks for a reprocessing facility are established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], paras. 6.17 and 6.38, and Appendix IV, paras. IV.18, IV.27 and IV.38-IV.39. The materials of the equipment of the reprocessing facility should be selected to cope as far as possible with the risk of corrosion due to the chemical and physical characteristics of the processed gases and liquids. The design of all containment barriers should include an adequate allowance for the combined effects of all degradation mechanisms, with particular attention paid to both general and localized effects due to corrosion, erosion, mechanical wear, temperature, thermal cycling, vibration, radiation and radiolysis, etc.

4.87. Where cooling circuits are installed, especially in highly active systems, the effects of ‘water-side’ corrosion, water chemistry, radiolysis (e.g. peroxide production) and stagnant coolant (no cooling required or a redundant cooling system) should be included in design considerations.

4.88. To fulfil requirements regarding confinement, any leaks from the first containment barriers should be collected and recovered (e.g. by means of drip-trays or floor cladding and collecting sumps for active cells). When large volumes of highly active liquid waste are stored, a safety assessment should be made to determine the number of redundant tanks that need to be available in the event of failure of a waste storage vessel. See also NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.38.

4.89. The potential effects of corrosion on the dimensions of equipment containing fissile material should be taken into account in the criticality assessment (e.g. effects on the thickness of the walls of process vessels whose method of criticality control is geometry) (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.18). Consideration should also be given to the
corrosion of support structures for fixed neutron absorbers and, where absorbers are in contact with the process medium, to corrosion of the absorber itself, e.g. the corrosion of packing in the condensers connected to evaporators. Where possible, in accordance with safety and technical requirements, process parameters, e.g. the operating temperature of evaporators and specifications for acceptable use of reagents or feeds recycled from facility effluents, should be optimized to give acceptable corrosion rates balanced with the need to ensure waste is minimized and process performance and efficiency are enhanced.

**Internal flooding**

4.90. The requirements relating to internal flooding for a reprocessing facility are established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, paras. IV.19 and IV.39. Flooding by process fluids (e.g. water, nitric acid) including utility feeds in the reprocessing facility may lead to the dispersion of radioactive material, changes in moderation and/or reflection conditions, the failure of electrically powered safety related devices, the failure of or false activation of alarms and trips, and the slowing or stopping of ventilation flows or fans. The design should address these issues, particularly the potential effect of a large leak on utility feeds and on instrumentation and control connections for structures, systems and components important to safety. Segregation of electrical services, instrumentation and control system and their power supplies, data and control cables and liquid or gaseous feeds should be strictly enforced as far as practicable. All floor penetrations and wall penetrations for electrical power supplies and supplies to instrumentation and control systems should be protected against liquid ingress. Where possible, electrical power supplies and supplies to instrumentation and control systems should be routed at high levels above potential flood levels. Particular care should be taken with the routing of steam and cooling water pipework owing to their potential to release large volumes of vapour or liquid.

4.91. Where vessels or pipes containing liquids pass through rooms containing fissile material, the criticality analysis should take into account the presence of the maximum credible amount of liquid within the considered room as well as the maximum credible amount of liquid that could flow from any connected rooms, vessels or pipework.

4.92. Walls (and floors if necessary) of rooms where flooding could occur should be designed to withstand the liquid load, and any equipment important to safety should not be affected by flooding. The dynamic effects of large leaks and the potential failure of any temporary ‘dams’ formed by equipment or internal structures should also be considered.
4.93. The potential hydraulic pressure and up-thrust on large vessels, ducting and containment structures in the event of flooding should be considered in design.

*Use of hazardous chemicals*\(^{26}\)

4.94. For a reprocessing facility, conservative assessments of chemical hazards to workers and releases of hazardous chemicals to the environment should be made on the basis of the standards used in the chemical industries and the requirements of national regulations, taking into account any potential for radiological or nuclear hazards. Where possible these chemicals should be chosen or used under physical conditions where they are intrinsically safe, by design.

4.95. Based on safety assessments, design should take into account effects of hazardous chemical releases from failures or damage of equipment that can lead to unsafe conditions at the reprocessing facility either by direct action of the chemicals involved (corrosion, dissolution, damage) or, indirectly, by causing the evacuation of control rooms, or by causing toxic effects on workers.

*Use of non-atmospheric pressure equipment*\(^{27}\)

4.96. As far as practicable, provisions for in-service testing of equipment installed in controlled areas and cells should be defined according to national requirements on pressurized and/or sub-atmospheric equipment. If this is not possible, additional safety features should be specified at the design stage (e.g. oversizing with regard to pressure, increased safety margins, special justification for alternative testing regimes) and in operation (e.g. enhanced monitoring of process parameters). A specific safety assessment of any proposed alternative testing and operating regime should be made with the objective of demonstrating that the probability of failure and the consequences or risk, as appropriate, are consistent with the acceptance criteria for the facility. The potential consequences of an explosion, implosion or leak, including during testing, should be assessed, and complementary safety features should be identified to minimize potential consequences, in accordance with a defence in depth approach.

**External initiating events**

*General*

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\(^{26}\)Further guidance on hazardous chemicals is given in Refs [23] and [24].

\(^{27}\)Most equipment in reprocessing plants operates at or close to atmospheric pressure; exceptions are evaporators operating at reduced pressures for safety reasons, possibly some equipment designed to resist potential violent or run-away reactions and service supplies (air, steam, etc.).
4.97. The reprocessing facility should be designed in accordance with the nature and severity of the external hazards, either natural or human induced, identified and evaluated in accordance with the provisions of NS-R-3 (Rev.1) [13] and its associated Safety Guides (see Section 3 of this Safety Guide). The specific hazards for a reprocessing facility are identified in the following paragraphs under appropriate headings.

**Earthquake**

4.98. To ensure that the design provides the required degree of robustness, a detailed seismic assessment (see NS-R-3 (Rev.1) [13] and SSG-9 [14]) should be made of the reprocessing facility design, including the following seismically induced events:

(a) Loss of cooling;
(b) Loss or support services, including utilities;
(c) Loss of containment functions (static and dynamic);
(d) Loss of safety functions for ensuring the return of the facility to a safe state and maintaining the facility in a safe state after an earthquake, including structural functions and functions for the prevention of other hazards (e.g. fire, explosion, load drop, flooding);
(e) The effect on criticality safety functions such as geometry and/or moderation of the following (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.44):
   - Deformation (geometry control);
   - Displacement (geometry control, fixed poisons);
   - Loss of material (geometry control, soluble poisons).

4.99. Supplementary control rooms or emergency control panels (paras. 4.166-4.167) should be accessible and operable by staff after a design basis earthquake. Equipment required to maintain the reprocessing facility in a safe and stable state and to monitor the facility and environment should be tested (as far as practicable) and qualified using appropriate conservative methodologies, including the use of an earthquake simulation platform (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.45).

4.100. Depending on the reprocessing facility site characteristic and facility location, as evaluated in the site assessment (Section 3), the effect of a tsunami induced by an earthquake and other extreme flooding events should be addressed in the facility design (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.46).

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28 Emergency control panels: where justified by the safety assessment, control or monitoring functions required during or after a DBA may not need to be located in a designated supplementary control room.
External fires and explosion

4.101. The design of the reprocessing facility should address external fire and explosion hazards as identified in the site evaluation (see Section 3).

External toxic hazards

4.102. Toxic and asphyxiant hazards should also be assessed to verify that anticipated maximum gas concentrations meet acceptance criteria. It should also be ensured that external toxic or asphyxiant hazards would not adversely affect the control of the facility.

Extreme weather conditions

4.103. The reprocessing facility should be protected against extreme weather conditions as identified in the site evaluation (see Section 3) by means of appropriate design provisions. These should generally include the following (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.46):

(a) The ability to maintain the availability of cooling systems under extreme temperatures and other extreme conditions;

(b) The ability of structures important to safety to withstand extreme weather loads, with particular assessment of parts of the facility structure designed to provide containment with little or no shielding function (e.g. alpha active areas);

(c) Prevention of flooding of the facility;

(d) Safe shutdown of the facility in accordance with the operational limits and conditions and maintaining the facility in a safe and stable state, where necessary;

(e) Keeping the ground water level within the acceptable limits during flooding.

(f) Events consequential to extreme weather conditions should also be considered in the design.

4.104. The design of buildings and ventilation systems should comply with specific national regulations relating to hazards from tornadoes (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.46).

4.105. Tornadoes are capable of lifting and propelling large, heavy objects (e.g. automobiles or telephone poles). The possibility of impacts of such missiles should be taken into consideration in the design stage for the facility, for both the initial impact and the effects of
secondary fragments arising from collisions with concrete walls or from other forms of transfer of momentum (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.46).

Extreme temperatures

4.106. The potential duration of extreme low or high temperatures should be taken into account in the design of cooling systems and support systems, to prevent unacceptable effects such as the following:

(a) Freezing of cooling circuits (including cooling towers and outdoor actuators);
(b) Loss of efficiency of cooling circuits (hot weather);
(c) Adverse effects on building venting, heating and cooling systems, to avoid poor working conditions and humidity excess in the buildings and adverse effects on structures, systems and components important to safety.

Administrative actions to limit or mitigate the consequences of such events can only be relied upon if the operators have the necessary information, sufficient time to respond and the necessary equipment, e.g. portable air conditioning (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.46).

Snowfall and ice storms

4.107. Snow and ice are generally taken into account as an additional load on the roofs of buildings and, for ‘glaze’ ice, on e.g. vertical surfaces and utility cables and pipework. The flooding resulting from snow or ice accumulation and infiltration and the possibility that it could lead to damage of equipment important to safety (e.g. electrical systems) should be considered. The neutron reflecting or moderating effect of snow should be considered if relevant (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.46).

Floods

4.108. For extreme rainfall, attention should be focused on the stability of buildings (e.g. hydrostatic and dynamic effects), the water level and, where relevant, the potential for mud slides. Consideration should be given to the highest flood level historically recorded and to siting the facility above the flood level, at sufficient elevation and with sufficient margin to account for uncertainties (e.g. in postulated effects of global warming), to avoid major damage from flooding.
4.109. For flooding events, attention should be focused on potential leak paths (containment breaks) into active cells and structures, systems and components important to safety at risk of damage. In all cases, equipment containing fissile material should be designed to prevent any criticality accident. Gloveboxes should be designed to be resistant (undamaged and static) to the dynamic effects of flooding and all glovebox penetrations should be above any potential flood levels (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.46). Electrical systems, instrumentation and control systems, emergency power systems (batteries and power generation systems) and control rooms should be protected by design. Where necessary, the design should be such as to ensure continued operation of selected functions in extreme events (defence in depth).

Inundation events (of natural and human induced origin)

4.110. Measures for the protection of the facility against inundation events (dam burst, flash flood, storm surge, tidal wave, seiche, tsunami, etc.), including both static effects (floods) and dynamic effects (run-up and draw-down), will depend on the data collected during site evaluation for the area in which the facility is located. The design of buildings, electrical systems and instrumentation and control systems should comply with specific national regulations for these hazards (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.46), including the recommendations outlined in paras. 4.110-4.111. Particular attention should be given to the rapid onset of these events, the probable lack of warning and their potential for causing wide-spread damage, disruption of utility supplies and common cause failures both within the reprocessing facility and at other facilities on the site, locally and potentially region-wide, depending on the magnitude of the event.

Accidental aircraft crash or hazards from externally generated missiles

4.111. In accordance with the risk identified in the site evaluation (see Section 3), the reprocessing facility should be designed to withstand the design basis impact (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], para. 5.5).

4.112. For evaluating the consequences of impact or the adequacy of the design to resist aircraft or secondary missile impacts, only realistic crash scenarios, rotating equipment scenarios or structural failure scenarios should be considered. Such scenarios require knowledge of such factors as the possible angle of impact or the potential for fire and explosion due to the aviation fuel load. In general, fire cannot be ruled out following an
aircraft crash. Therefore, specific requirements for fire protection and for emergency preparedness and response should be established and implemented as necessary.

*Terrestrial and aquatic flora and fauna*

4.113. The potential for a wide range of interactions with flora and fauna should be considered in the design of the reprocessing facility, including the potential for the restricting or blockage of cooling water and ventilation inlets and outlets, the effect of vermin on electrical and instrument cabling and their ingress into waste storage areas. Where physical control measures or, particularly, chemical control measures for flora and fauna are necessary, these should be made subject to the same level of evaluation as any other chemical used in the process, in accordance with a graded approach based upon the risks.

**INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL**

**Instrumentation and control systems important to safety**

4.114. Instrumentation and control systems important to safety for normal operation should include systems for the following (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.47):

(a) Criticality control:

- Depending on the method of criticality control, the control parameters should include mass, concentration, acidity, isotopic composition or fissile content and quantity of moderators as appropriate (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.11);

- Specific control parameters required from criticality safety analyses, e.g. burnup measurement for spent fuel assemblies and elements before shearing or decladding, for those criticality analyses where burnup credit is taken into account or concentration measurements in reagent feeds where criticality control relies upon soluble poison concentrations (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], para. 6.45 and Appendix IV, para. IV.15);

(b) Process control: the key safety related control systems of concern are those for:

- Removing decay heat;

- Diluting hydrogen due to radiolysis and other sources;

- Monitoring liquid levels in vessels;

- Controlling temperature and other conditions to prevent explosions of e.g. red oil;
(c) Fire detection systems;

(d) Glovebox controls and cell controls:
   - Monitoring the dynamic containment for cells and gloveboxes (see bullet (e), below);
   - Monitoring cell and glovebox sump levels (leak detection systems);

(e) Control of ventilation:
   - Monitoring and control of differential pressure to ensure that air in all areas of the reprocessing facility is flowing in the correct direction, i.e. towards areas that are more contaminated;
   - Ventilation (stack) flows for monitoring of environmental discharges;

(f) Control of occupational radiation exposure:
   - External exposure:
     i. Sensitive dosimeters with real-time displays and/or alarms should be used to monitor occupational radiation doses;
     ii. Portable equipment and installed equipment should be used to monitor whole body exposures and exposures of the hands to gamma radiation and neutron emissions.
   - Internal exposure, due to the specific hazards of airborne radioactive material:
     i. Continuous air monitors to detect airborne radioactive material should be installed as close as possible to the working areas to ensure the early detection of any dispersion of airborne radioactive material;
     ii. Devices for detecting surface contamination should be installed or located close to the relevant working areas and also close to the exits of rooms in which relevant working areas are located;
     iii. Detectors and interlocks associated with engineered openings (i.e. access controls) should be used;

(g) Control of liquid and gaseous discharges:
   - Monitoring of liquid and gaseous discharges;
   - Monitoring (the operation of) sample system for environmental discharges;
- Site environmental monitoring systems for the environment around the facility.

4.115. Instrumentation should be provided to monitor the variables and systems of the facility over their respective ranges for:

(1) Normal operation;

(2) Anticipated operational occurrences;

(3) Design basis accidents;

(4) Design extension conditions, as far as practicable.

The aim should be to ensure that adequate information can be obtained on the status of the facility and correct responses can be planned and taken in accordance with normal operating procedures or emergency procedures or accident management guidelines, as appropriate, for all facility states (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.47).

4.116. Adequate and reliable controls and appropriate instrumentation should be provided for monitoring and controlling all the main variables that can affect the safety of the process and the general conditions at the facility. These variables include radiation levels, airborne contamination conditions, effluent releases, criticality conditions, fire conditions and ventilation conditions. Instrumentation should also be provided for obtaining any other information about the facility necessary for its reliable and safe operation. Provision should be made for the automatic measurement and recording of relevant values of parameters important to safety (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.47).

4.117. According to the requirements of the safety analysis and any defence in depth consideration, instrumentation and control systems should incorporate redundancy and diversity to ensure an appropriate level of reliability and availability. This should include the requirement for a reliable and uninterruptable power supply to the instruments, as necessary.

Local instrumentation

4.118. In a reprocessing facility, many areas may be impossible or very difficult to access, with short working times due to high radiation levels and/or contamination levels. As far as possible, the need to access such areas to operate, view or maintain instruments, local indicators or control stations should be avoided. Where location in such environments is unavoidable, separate enclosures or shielding should be used to protect instruments or personnel as appropriate (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.47).
Sample taking and analysis

4.119. The preference in reprocessing facilities should be for measurement by:

1) In-line instruments;

2) At-line instruments\(^{29}\);

3) Sampling with local analysis (e.g. checking the dilution of reagents from concentrated stock solutions to the concentration required by the process);

4) Sampling with analysis at a distant laboratory, for example at a site, central laboratory.

4.120. In choosing the type of instrument to install the following factors should be considered:

(a) The availability of capable equipment and its precision and accuracy, reliability and stability;

(b) The availability of suitable points in the process including, for sampling and analyses important to safety, the following:
   - Diversity and redundancy considerations;
   - The requirement for assurance of the delivery and measurement of samples that are ‘representative and fresh’\(^{30}\);

(c) Realistic calibration and testing options (e.g. in-situ, on-line or off-line calibration and testing);

(d) The ergonomics of maintenance and replacement, including dose considerations and timeliness issues.

4.121. In a reprocessing facility, the safety of many chemical processes relies on the quality and the timeliness of chemical and radiochemical analysis performed on samples taken from vessels and equipment at strategic points in the processes, e.g. measurement of plutonium concentration, plutonium isotopic composition or solution acidity. For such strategic sample points, all the aspects relating to the quality of sample taking and labelling, its safe transfer to analytical laboratories, the quality of the measurements and their reporting to the facility operators should be documented and justified as part of the management system (see NS-R-5

\(^{29}\)At-line instruments are devices that remove a small sample or flow (proportional sampling) from a process flow or vessel for measurement rather than measuring in the bulk material directly.

\(^{30}\)In this context ‘representative and fresh’ means that, where the main process or flow is not being measured directly, it has to be demonstrated (to the same reliability as specified for the system, structure or component by the safety assessment) that the sample is fully representative of the main flow in composition at the time of sampling and measurement (with allowable deviation as specified in the safety assessment) and is delivered to the point of measurement reliably.
(Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.47, GSR Part 2 [4]). The use of bar-coding or similar systems should be considered to reduce the opportunity for error.

4.122. Where applicable, sampling systems should be automated. The use of completely automated systems (from the request for sampling to the receipt of results) for frequent analytical measurements should be considered where beneficial to safety for minimizing operational exposure and avoiding the potential for human error (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], para. 6.16 and Appendix IV, para. IV.28).

**Control systems**

4.123. The recommendations in paras. 2.10-2.13 apply to all control systems in a reprocessing facility. In particular, the hierarchy of design measures established in para. 6.6 of NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1] (application of passive design features, in preference to application of active design features, in preference to administrative controls (operator action)) should be applied in accordance with a graded approach and the available reaction time (grace period). Application of the defence in depth principle of avoiding challenges to safety features or safety controls should also be considered.

4.124. Appropriate information should be made available to the operator for monitoring the actuation of, and facility response to, remote actions and automatic actions. The preference should be for independent indication showing, as far as practicable, the actual effect of an action, for example a flow meter showing a flow stopping or starting rather than merely a valve position indicator. As far as practical, all displays (instrument, computer, facility and process schematics or mimic displays) and all control rooms and control stations should follow good ergonomic practice. The layout of instrumentation and the manner of presentation of information should provide workers with a clear and comprehensive view of the status and performance of the facility, to assist the operators in comprehending the facility status rapidly and correctly, in making informed decisions and in executing those decisions accurately.

4.125. Devices should be installed that provide, in an effective manner, visual and, as appropriate, audible indications of operational states that have deviated from normal conditions and that could affect safety. Specifically, information should be displayed in such a way that operators can easily determine if a facility is in a safe state and, if it is not, can readily determine the appropriate course of action to return the facility to a safe and stable state (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.47).
4.126. For radioactive material and important reagent transfers in addition to any specific safety measures, the following measures should be applied, as far as practicable, to allow early detection of operational occurrences as part of defence in depth (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], para. 2.7 and Appendix IV, para. IV.47):

1) The use of transfers by batch between units, buildings or facilities (see para. 4.47);

2) Characterization of a batch before transfer;

3) The use of an authorization procedure allowing the receiving installation to authorize the start of transfer and to monitor the transfer process.

Where transfers are initiated automatically, especially if such transfers are frequent, consideration should be given to appropriate automatic means of detecting failures to start or stop transfers.

Control rooms

4.127. Control rooms should be provided to centralize the main data displays, controls and alarms for general conditions at the facility. Occupational exposure should be minimized by locating the control rooms in parts of the facility where the levels of radiation are low. For specific processes, it may be useful to have dedicated, local control rooms to allow the remote monitoring of operations, thereby reducing exposures and risks to operators. Particular consideration should be paid to identifying those events, both internal and external to the control rooms, that may pose a direct threat to the workers, to the operation of the control room and to the control of the reprocessing facility itself (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], para. 2.7 and Appendix IV, para. IV.47).

HUMAN FACTOR CONSIDERATIONS

4.128. The facility should be designed for high reliability of human operator action. The requirements relating to the consideration of human factors are established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], paras. 6.15 and 6.16. Human factors should be considered at the design stage and should include:

(a) Provide operators with awareness of the facility status and configuration;

(b) Possible effects on safety of human errors (with account taken of ease of intervention by the operator and the system tolerance of human error);

(c) The potential for occupational exposure.
4.129. In the design of the reprocessing facility, all work locations should be evaluated under normal facility states, including maintenance, and situations should be identified where and when human intervention is required under abnormal conditions and accident conditions, with the aim of facilitating the workers’ activities and ensuring resistance to human error. This should include optimization of the design to prevent or reduce the likelihood of operator error (e.g. locked valves, segregation and grouping of controls, fault identification, logical displays and segregation of displays and alarms for processes and safety systems). Particular attention should be paid to situations where, in accident conditions, workers need to make rapid, fault free and fault tolerant identification of the problem and select an appropriate response or action.

4.130. Human factor experts and experienced operators should be involved from the earliest stages of the design. Areas that should be considered include:

(a) Application of ergonomic requirements to the design of working conditions:
   - The worker–process interface, e.g. well laid-out electronic control panels displaying all the necessary information and no more;
   - Reliability and ease of access and use for sampling systems;
   - The working environment, e.g. good accessibility to, and adequate space around, equipment, good lighting, including emergency lighting, and suitable finishes to surfaces to allow areas to be kept clean easily;

(b) Provision of fail-safe equipment and automatic control systems for accident sequences for which reliable and rapid protection is required;

(c) Allocation of function, considering the advantages and drawbacks of automatic action vs operator (i.e. manual) action in particular applications

(d) Design provisions that accommodate and promote good task design and job organization, particularly during maintenance work when automated control systems may be disabled;

(e) Determination of the facility minimum safety staffing levels and combination of skills by task analysis of operator responses required during the most demanding occurrences;

(f) Consideration of the need for additional space and of access needs during the lifetime of the facility;

(g) Provision of dedicated storage locations for all special tools and equipment;
(h) Choice of location and clear, consistent and unambiguous labelling of equipment and utilities so as to facilitate maintenance, testing, cleaning and replacement;

(i) Minimization of the need to use additional means of personal protective equipment and, where it remains necessary, careful attention to the selection and design of such equipment.

4.131. Consideration should be given to providing computer aided tools to assist operators in detecting, diagnosing and responding to events.

4.132. In the design and operation of gloveboxes, the following specific ergonomic considerations should be taken into account:

(a) In the design of equipment inside gloveboxes, account should be taken of the potential for conventional industrial hazards that may result in injuries to workers, including internal radiation exposure through cuts in the gloves and/or wounds on the operator’s skin, and/or the possible failure of confinement;

(b) Ease of physical access to gloveboxes and adequate space and good visibility in the areas in which gloveboxes are located;

(c) Consideration of the requirements for the maintenance of glovebox seals and glovebox window seals, including the need for personal protective equipment during these operations;

(d) Careful consideration of the number and location of glove and posting ports in relation to all the operating and maintenance activities within the glovebox;

(e) Consideration of employing mock-ups and conducting extensive testing of glovebox ergonomics at the manufacturer before finalizing the design;

(f) The potential for damage to gloves and the provisions for glove change, and, where applicable, filter changing.

SAFETY ANALYSIS

4.133. The safety analysis of the reprocessing facility should assess the variety of hazards and places where radioactive material are located (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], paras. 2.6, 2.10-2.15, 4.2 and 4.24) to ensure a comprehensive risk assessment for the whole facility and all activities and all credible postulated initiating events in accordance with the requirements of

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31Engineered provision for the transfer of items into, out of and between gloveboxes.
Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 4 (Rev.1) [25].

4.134. The list of hazards defined in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Annex III should be developed by identifying all postulated initiating events and the resulting event scenarios and by carrying out detailed analyses to define appropriate structures, systems and components important to safety and operational limits and conditions (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Annex III, step 3.A).

4.135. For reprocessing facilities, the safety analysis should be performed iteratively with the development of the design (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Annex III) with the objectives of achieving the following:

(a) That the doses to workers and the public during operational states that are within acceptable and operational limits for those states and consistent with the optimization of protection and safety\(^{32}\) (see GSR Part 3 [6], Requirements 11 and 12);

(b) That the radiological and chemical consequences of design basis accidents (or equivalent) to the public that are within the limits specified for accident conditions and consistent with the optimization of protection and safety (see GSR Part 3 [6]);

(c) The development of the final operational limits and conditions.

4.136. The use of bounding cases (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Annex III, para. III-10) has limited application in reprocessing facilities, owing to the variety of equipment used, the materials handled and the processes employed. The approach should be used only where the accidents grouped together can be demonstrated by a thorough analysis to be within a representative bounding case. The use of such bounding cases is nevertheless important in reducing unnecessary duplication of safety analyses and should be used when practicable and justified.

**Safety analysis for operational states**

*Occupational radiation exposure and exposure of the public*

4.137. At the design stage of a new reprocessing facility, radiation doses to workers should be estimated early in the design process and should be iteratively re-calculated and refined as the design proceeds, as this maximizes opportunities for the optimization of protection and safety. A common initial approach is first to allocate an (estimated) internal dose on the basis of  

\(^{32}\)Optimization of protection (and safety) is the process of determining what level of protection and safety makes exposures, and the probability and magnitude of potential exposures, “as low as reasonably achievable, economic and social factors being taken into account” (ALARA), as required by the International Commission on Radiological Protection System of Radiological Protection (Ref. [8]). See also Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1 [26], Principles 5 and 6.
of engineering judgement and then to assess the provisions for external radiation protection (e.g. shielding, layout). The assessment of occupational external exposure should be carried out on the basis of conservative assumptions including the following:

1) External exposure calculations using a bounding radiation source term established on the basis of:
   - The maximum inventory including activity, energy spectrum and neutron emission of all radioactive material;
   - Accumulation factors (e.g. accounting for the deposition of radioactive material inside pipes and equipment);

2) Two approaches are possible to assess external exposure (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], paras. 2.6, 2.10-2.12 and 4.24):
   i. The specification of a limit for dose that will allow any worker to be present without time constraints, and irrespective of the distance between the (shielded) radiation source and the worker; or
   ii. Determination of the type of work activity to be performed by each worker, the time required for the work activity and the distance between the worker and the (shielded) radiation source;

3) Calculations to determine the shielding requirements for case 2) i or 2) ii, as appropriate.

4.138. The calculation of estimated dose to the public should include all the radiological contributions originating in the facility, i.e. external exposure through direct or indirect radiation (e.g. skyshine, cloud shine or ground shine\textsuperscript{33}), and internal exposure through intake of radioactive material and doses received through the food chain as a result of authorized discharges of radioactive material. Where a range is calculated, the maximum values for each contribution should be used for the dose calculation. Conservative models and parameters should be used to estimate doses to the public. The dose should be estimated for the representative person(s).

Releases of hazardous chemical material

4.139. This Safety Guide addresses only those chemical hazards that can give rise to radiological hazards (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], para. 2.2). Facility specific, realistic, robust (i.e. conservative) estimations of purely chemical hazards to workers and releases of hazardous

\textsuperscript{33} Skyshine is radiation reflected from the sky, the other forms of shine are defined in the IAEA glossary.
chemicals to the environment should be performed, in accordance with the standards applied in the chemical industry (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], paras. 2.6, 2.10-2.12 and 4.24, and Refs [23] and [24]).

**Safety analysis for accident conditions**

**Methods and assumptions for safety analysis for accident conditions**

4.140. The acceptance criteria associated with the accident analysis should be defined in accordance with GSR Part 4 (Rev.1) [25], Requirement 16 and with respect to any national regulations and relevant criteria.

4.141. To estimate the on-site and off-site consequences of an accident, the range of physical processes that could lead to a release of radioactive material to the environment or to a loss of shielding should be considered in the accident analysis and the bounding cases\(^{34}\) encompassing the worst consequences should be determined (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], paras. 2.6, 2.10-2.12 and 4.24).

4.142. Accident consequences should be assessed in accordance with the requirements established in GSR Part 4 (Rev.1) [25] and with relevant parts of its supporting Safety Guides.

**Assessment of possible radiological or associated chemical consequences**

4.143. Safety assessments should address the consequences associated with possible accidents. The main steps in the development and analysis of accident scenarios should include the following (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], paras. 2.6, 2.10-2.12 and 4.24):

(a) Analysis of the actual site conditions (e.g. meteorological, geological and hydro-geological site conditions) and conditions expected in the future;

(b) Identification of workers and members of the public who could possibly be affected by accidents, i.e. representative person(s) living in the vicinity of the facility;

(c) Specification of the accident configurations, with the corresponding operating procedures and administrative controls for operations;

(d) Identification and analysis of conditions at the facility, including internal and external initiating events that could lead to a release of material or of energy with the potential for adverse effects, the time frame for emissions and the exposure time, in accordance with reasonable scenarios;

\(^{34}\) Sometimes referred to as limiting cases or enveloping cases.
(e) Specification of the structures, systems and components important to safety that are credited to reduce the likelihood and/or to mitigate the consequences of accidents. These structures, systems and components important to safety that are credited in the safety assessment should be qualified to perform their functions reliably in the accident conditions;

(f) Characterization of the source term (material, mass, release rate, temperature, etc.);

(g) Identification and analysis of intra-facility transport pathways for material that is released;

(h) Identification and analysis of pathways by which material that is released could be dispersed in the environment;

(i) Quantification of the consequences for the representative person(s) identified in the safety assessment.

4.144. Analysis of the actual conditions at the site and the conditions expected in the future involves a review of the meteorological, geological and hydrological conditions at the site that may influence facility operations or may play a part in transporting material or transferring energy that is released from the facility (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Section 5).

4.145. Environmental transport of material should be calculated using qualified codes and using data derived from qualified codes, with account taken of meteorological and hydrological conditions at the site that would result in the highest exposure of the public.

4.146. The identification of workers and members of the public (the representative person) who may potentially be affected by an accident should involve a review of descriptions of the facility, of demographic information and of internal and external exposure pathways (e.g. patterns of food consumption).

MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE

General

Radioactive Waste, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-G-3.3 [29]. Recommendations are provided in the following paragraphs on aspects that are particularly relevant or specific to reprocessing facilities.

4.148. The requirements and recommendations on facility design in the relevant IAEA standards (see GSR Part 5 [2] and DS447 [11]) apply fully to the wastes streams (solid, liquid and gaseous) and effluents resulting from the operation of reprocessing facilities and from their eventual decommissioning. However, associated waste treatment and conditioning processes and facilities that are not integral to the reprocessing facility are excluded from the scope of this Safety Guide (see para. 1.8 of this Safety Guide and NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV).

4.149. For safety, environmental and economic reasons, an essential objective of radioactive waste management is to minimize the generation of radioactive waste (in both activity and volume) from reprocessing (see GSR Part 5 [2], Requirement 8 and SF-1 [26], Principle 7).

4.150. Owing to the nature and diversity of the composition of spent fuel (structural parts, spectrum of fission products, activation products and actinides) and to the chemical processes involved, the commissioning, operation and eventual decommissioning of a reprocessing facility result in waste with a wide variation in type, radiological characteristics, chemical composition and quantity. The design of the reprocessing facility should try, as far as practicable, to ensure that all wastes anticipated to be generated throughout the lifetime of the facility have designated disposal routes. Where necessary and practicable, process options should be chosen or design provisions should be made to facilitate the disposal of such waste by existing routes. The identification of disposal routes should take into account not only the radionuclides present in the waste but also its chemical and physical characteristics (e.g. flammable or heat generating waste).

4.151. The recovery and recycling of reagents and chemicals, especially those that are contaminated, contributes significantly to the minimization of effluent arisings and the maximization of process efficiency, as does the decontamination of process equipment for reuse or disposal. The design of the reprocessing facility should maximize such recovery, recycling and reuse to optimize protection and safety, with account taken of occupational exposure and technological constraints on the use of recycled materials. The design should include appropriate facilities for carrying out recovery and recycling and should include consideration in the overall waste strategy of the need for minimization of the secondary waste generated.
4.152. Where waste is intended for identified and existing disposal routes, the reprocessing facility designers should establish the characteristics for each. Equipment and facilities should be provided (or existing equipment and facilities identified) for characterizing, pretreating, treating, and transporting, as necessary, waste to the appropriate identified disposal route, interim storage location or further waste treatment facility.

4.153. For waste for which there is no identified disposal route, an integrated approach should be taken in the design that gives consideration to optimization of protection and safety, local and national regulations and regulatory limits and the best available information for potential disposal routes in accordance with GSR Part 5 [2], paras. 1.6 and 1.8 and Requirements 4 and 6. As disposal is the final step of radioactive waste management, any interim waste processing techniques and procedures applied should provide waste forms and waste packages compatible with the anticipated waste acceptance requirements for disposal, with care paid to the retrievability of waste destined for interim storage.

4.154. The design should accommodate, as far as practicable, provisions for the rerouting of effluents and waste to allow for the future use of emerging technologies, improved knowledge and experience, or regulatory changes. This applies particularly to gaseous and volatile waste from reprocessing facilities that pose particular challenges in both capturing the waste and its disposal.

4.155. The design should incorporate, or have provision to provide incrementally, sufficient intermediate waste storage capacity for the lifetime of the facility including, as necessary, decommissioning. This should include, in accordance with the safety assessment, the provision of ‘spare’ capacity if necessary, as part of a defence in depth strategy, in case of, for example, the failure of a waste storage tank.

MANAGEMENT OF GASEOUS AND LIQUID DISCHARGES

4.156. Facilities should be designed so that effluent discharge limits can be met in normal operation and accidental discharges to the environment are prevented.

4.157. The activity of gaseous effluent discharged from a reprocessing facility should be reduced by process specific ventilation treatment systems. These should include, where necessary, equipment for reducing the discharges of radioiodine and other radioactive volatile or gaseous species. The final stage of treatment normally consists of dehumidification, spark arrestors and debris guards to protect filters, then filtration by a number of high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters in series.
4.158. Equipment for monitoring the status and performance of filters should be installed, including:

(a) Differential pressure gauges to identify the need for filter changes;

(b) Activity or gas concentration measurement devices and discharge flow measuring devices with continuous sampling;

(c) Test (aerosol) injection systems and the associated sampling and analysis equipment (filter efficiency).

4.159. Liquid effluents to be discharged to the environment should be treated to reduce the discharge of radioactive material and hazardous chemicals. The use of filters, ion-exchange beds or other technology should be considered where appropriate to optimize protection and safety. Analogous provisions to those in para. 4.158 should be made to allow the efficiency of these systems to be monitored.

4.160. The design and location of effluent discharge systems should be chosen to maximize the dilution and dispersal of discharged effluents (Ref. [2]; para. 4.3) and to eliminate, as far as practicable, the discharge of particulates and insoluble liquid droplets that could compromise the intended dilution of effluents containing radioactive material.

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

4.161. A comprehensive hazard assessment should be performed in accordance with Requirement 4 of GSR Part 7 [10] prior to commissioning. The results of the hazard assessment should provide a basis for identifying the emergency preparedness category relevant to the facility and the on-site areas and, as relevant, off-site areas where protective actions and other response actions may be warranted in case of a nuclear or radiological emergency (see GSR Part 7 [10] and Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-G-2.1 [30]).

4.162. The operating organization of the reprocessing facility should develop on-site emergency arrangements including an emergency plan that takes into account the identified hazards associated with the facility and the potential consequences (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], para. 9.62 and GSR Part 7 [10]). The content, features and extent of the plan should be commensurate with the assessed hazards (paras. 4.144-4.150). The plan should be coordinated.
and integrated with those of off-site response organizations (see GSR Part 7 [10]) and submitted to the regulatory body for approval.

4.163. The emergency plan should address and elaborate all the functions to be performed in an emergency response (see GSR Part 7 [10]) as well as the infrastructural elements (including training, drills and exercises) that are necessary in support of these functions. Reference [31] provides an outline of emergency plans that may be used in the development of specific emergency plans for a reprocessing facility.

4.164. The design of the reprocessing facility should take into account the requirements for the on-site infrastructure that is necessary for an effective emergency response (including the emergency response facilities, suitable escape routes and logistical support), as defined in GSR Part 7 [10] and elaborated in GS-G-2.1 [30]. The design should also take account of the need for on-site and off-site discharge and environmental monitoring in the event of accident (see GSR Part 3 [6], GSR Part 7 [10] and GS-G-2.1 [30]).

4.165. The reprocessing facility should be capable of being brought to a safe and long-term stable state, including maintaining availability of the necessary information on the status of the facility and monitoring information in and following abnormal conditions and accident conditions (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], paras. 2.6, 6.22-6.24, 9.26, and GSR Part 7 [10], para. 5.25). As far as practicable, the control room(s) should be designed and located so as to remain habitable during postulated emergencies (e.g. separate ventilation, low calculated dose in case of a criticality event).

4.166. For events that may affect control rooms themselves, for example fire or, externally generated releases of hazardous chemicals, the control of selected (on the basis of safety assessments) safety functions of the reprocessing facility should be provided by the use of appropriately located supplementary control rooms or alternative arrangements, e.g. emergency control panels.

4.167. The need for infrastructure for off-site emergency response (e.g. emergency centres, medical facilities) should be considered in accordance with the site characteristics and the location of the reprocessing facility (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], para. 9.63 and Requirement 24 of GSR Part 7 [10]).
5. CONSTRUCTION

5.1. General guidance on the construction and construction management of nuclear installations is provided in Construction for Nuclear Installations, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSG-38 [32].

5.2. A construction project for a fuel reprocessing facility will involve large number of designers and contractors, over a considerable span of time, with the likelihood that design, construction and early commissioning will be taking place simultaneously in different sections of the facility. The operating organization should ensure that the relevant recommendations in SSG-38 [32] are followed, and that adequate procedures are put in place to minimize potential problems and deviations from the design intent as design and construction proceeds, as part of the management system.

5.3. The operating organization should consider minimizing the number of designers and contractors, as far as practicable, for consistency and standardization to support safe and effective operation and maintenance. Fewer external organizations (particularly fewer layers of sub-contractors) will ease the process of control and communication between the operating organization and external designers and contractors. It will also facilitate the transfer of knowledge to the operating organization and allow the operating organization to benefit more effectively from the experience of external designers and contractors. This approach should be balanced by the need to use specialist designers for some design elements (e.g. criticality alarm systems) the need to make safety improvements and other improvements using proprietary designs and equipment justified (see para. 2.8), and the need to have access to the necessary expertise for expert review. In all cases, the management system should include provisions to ensure that the necessary information is transferred to the operating organization.

5.4. Reprocessing facilities are large and complex chemical and mechanical facilities, and, as such, modularized, standardized components should be used in their construction as far as practical. In general this approach will allow better control of quality and testing before delivery to site. This practice will also aid commissioning, operation, maintenance and decommissioning.

5.5. As recommended in SSG-38 [32], equipment should be tested and proven at manufacturers’ shops and/or on the site before its installation at the reprocessing facility, as
far as possible. Testing and verification of specific structures, systems and components important to safety should be performed before construction and installation when appropriate (e.g. verification of shielding efficiency, testing of neutron decoupling devices, verification of geometry for criticality purposes, testing of welding), since this may not be possible or be limited after installation.

5.6. The operating organization should put in place effective processes to prevent the installation of counterfeit, fraudulent or suspect items, as well as non-conforming or sub-standard components. Such items or components can have an impact on safety even years after commissioning of the facility (e.g. sub-standard stainless steel used for vessel construction).

5.7. The recommendations in SSG-38 [32] relevant to the care of installed equipment should also be strictly followed, particularly those with respect to the exclusion of foreign material and the proper care of installed equipment.

**Existing facilities**

5.8. Major construction work or refurbishment at an existing reprocessing facility presents a wide range of potential hazards to operating personnel, construction personnel, the public and the environment. Where major refurbishment or construction work is taking place, areas where construction works are in progress should be isolated from other parts of the reprocessing facility in operation or already constructed, as far as practicable, to prevent negative effects on and from the operating part of the facility and possible events in either area (see Section 7 of this Safety Guide and SSG-38 [32]).

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35Foreign material can cause breakdowns, blockages or flow restrictions, either in-situ or by displacement to a more restricted location (e.g. a pump, valve, ejector nozzle). Foreign material may also cause or promote corrosion by forming electrochemical cells or crevices or impeding heat transfer.
6. COMMISSIONING

6.1. This Safety Guide addresses only the commissioning of safety related aspects of reprocessing facilities. Demonstration of performance and optimization of processes, except in so far as these support the safety case, structures, systems and components important to safety or operational limits and conditions, are outside the scope of this Safety Guide. For fuel reprocessing facilities, the verification process established in Section 8 of NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1] should be followed rigorously, owing to the high hazard potential and complexity of the facilities. Where possible, lessons from the commissioning and operation of similar reprocessing facilities should be sought out and applied.

6.2. The commissioning process, as established in Section 8 of NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], should be completed prior to the operation stage. Commissioning should be conducted, as far as practical, as if the facility were fully operational. In particular, the requirements for good operational practices, housekeeping and access to supervised and controlled areas should be increasingly applied through commissioning.

6.3. The operating organization should make the best use of the commissioning stage to become completely familiar with the facility. It should also be an opportunity to develop a strong safety culture, including positive behaviours and attitudes, throughout the entire organization. In becoming familiar with the facility, consideration should be given to the full range of operations:

(a) Campaigns of fuel reprocessing;
(b) Start-up and run-down periods;
(c) Work conducted between campaigns, including maintenance work, such as significant modifications or equipment repair or replacement projects not possible or too hazardous during normal operation;
(d) Emergency responses.

6.4. Senior management36 has responsibility for safety throughout the reprocessing facility. A safety committee, which should report to senior management, is required to be established

36 ‘Senior management’ means the person or persons who are accountable for meeting the terms established in the licence, and/or who direct, control and assess an organization at the highest level. Several different terms are used, including, for example: board of directors, chief executive officer (CEO), director general, executive team, plant manager, top manager, chief regulator, site vice-president, managing director and laboratory director. See GS-R-3.
at this stage (if one has not already been established) to provide advice on commissioning. The safety committee should consider the following:

(a) Any changes or modifications to the design required for, or as a result of, commissioning;
(b) The results of commissioning;
(c) The safety case of the facility;
(d) Any modifications to the safety case as a result of commissioning.

6.5. Prior to commissioning, the expected values for parameters important to safety to be measured during commissioning should be established. These values, along with any uncertainties in their determination and maximum and minimum allowable variations (as appropriate), should determine the acceptability of commissioning results. Any measurements during commissioning that fall outside the acceptable range should be the subject of retest (and safety assessment, if necessary).

6.6. During commissioning, operational limits and normal values for safety significant parameters should be confirmed as established in the safety assessment and should be validated where they are set by the regulatory body. In addition, any limits (margins) required owing to measurement precision or uncertainties and any acceptable variation in values (range) owing to facility transients or other small perturbations should also be validated and/or confirmed. Considerations in this area should include changing from one facility state to another (e.g. at the start and end of a campaign). Such limits and values may include the type, quantity and state of the fuel to be accepted (including such factors as the burnup and the duration expired since the fuel was discharged from the reactor). These limits and values should be embedded in any instructions relating to safety, including emergency instructions.

6.7. Where necessary (and in accordance with a graded approach\footnote{In commissioning, grading should be applied in accordance with the potential hazard or risk associated with the item being commissioned (or temporarily modified) failing to deliver its safety function on demand at any time in its anticipated operational (qualified) life.}), commissioning tests should be repeated a sufficient number of times under varying conditions, to verify their reproducibility. Particular attention should be applied to the detection, control and exclusion of foreign material, examples of which include spent welding rods, waste building materials and general debris. Such material may be inadvertently introduced during construction and one of the objectives of the commissioning process is to confirm that all such foreign material has been removed, whilst enhancing controls to limit any further introduction.
6.8. Commissioning typically requires the use of temporary works (such as utility supplies, supports for items and access openings in building structures) or devices (temporary electrical or instrument supplies and connections to allow the testing of items in isolation or the injection of test signals). The operating organization should establish suitable controls to control the use of temporary works and devices (including the use of the modification process as required). These controls should include a process for registration of all such works and devices, the appointment of an individual with responsibility for overseeing the application of the controls, a process for approval of the introduction of such works and devices and a process for verification that all such works and devices have either been removed at the end of commissioning or are properly approved to remain in place (as a modification) and included in the safety case for operation.

6.9. Commissioning also often necessitates the temporary modification of equipment, the removal or reduction of protective barriers (both physical barriers and administrative barriers), the bypassing of trip and control systems including those associated with structures, systems and components important to safety, and the use of procedures and training of personnel to support these non-routine activities. The operating organization should introduce controls as described in para. 6.8 to control these activities and all such procedures should be included in the management system as for all operational procedures. Particular care should be taken that all temporary procedures are withdrawn as soon no longer necessary and that none remain in place at the end of commissioning.

6.10. Where inactive simulates or temporary reagent supplies are introduced for commissioning purposes, care should be taken that they have identical characteristics (for achieving the commissioning purpose) to material to be used during operations as far as practicable. If the characteristics are not identical, before approval for use, the effect of any differences should be analysed to determine the potential effects of any constituents or contaminants that might affect the integrity of the facility over its lifetime. This analysis should also identify any effects on the validity of commissioning results arising from these differences. Similar controls should be introduced to ensure that readily available supplies are not substituted in place of the specified facility feeds, e.g. normal, potable water for demineralized water, unless a full evaluation of the potential effects has been made.

6.11. Some stages of commissioning may require regulatory approval in accordance with national regulations, both prior to starting and at completion. The regulatory body should define hold points and witness points commensurate with the complexity and potential hazard
of the activity and facility, as appropriate, to ensure proper inspection during commissioning. The purpose of these hold points should be principally to verify compliance with regulatory requirements and license conditions. The operating organization should establish and maintain effective communications with the regulatory body, so as to ensure full understanding of the regulatory requirements and to maintain compliance with those requirements.

6.12. The commissioning programme may vary according to national practices. Nevertheless, the following activities should be performed, as a minimum:

(a) Confirmation of the performance of the shielding and the performance of the containment/confine ment;

(b) Demonstration of the availability of the criticality detection and alarm systems;

(c) Emergency drills and exercises to confirm that emergency plans and arrangements are adequate and deliverable;

(d) Demonstration and confirmation of the satisfactory training and assessment of personnel;

(e) Demonstration of the availability of other detection and alarm systems (e.g. fire detection and alarm system).

6.13. Clear communications between management, supervisors and workers and between and within different shifts of workers under normal and abnormal circumstances and with the relevant emergency services is a vital component of overall facility safety. Commissioning provides the opportunity, not only to commission and exercise these lines of communication and associated equipment, but also to become familiar with their use. Personnel should be trained in the use of a range of human performance techniques to aid communication (e.g. use of a phonetic alphabet, three-way communications, pre-job briefings, post-job reviews, a questioning attitude, peer review). Commissioning should also be used to develop a standard format for log books and shift handover procedures, to train personnel in their use and to assess the use of such standard formats and procedures.

COMMISSIONING PROGRAMME

Commissioning of the facility by section

6.14. Because of the complexity and size of reprocessing facilities, it may be appropriate to commission the facility by sections. If this is the case, the operating organization should ensure that sections already commissioned are suitably maintained and that the knowledge and experience gained during the commissioning of each section is retained.
6.15. The reassurance or verification testing of (commissioned) structures, systems and components important to safety should also be included in the commissioning programme, in accordance with the likelihood or risk of their being altered in any way during subsequent construction or installation, and the extent of testing possible.

6.16. The safety committee should provide advice on the safety of arrangements for controlling such section by section commissioning and the arrangements for communications between the commissioning team and other groups in the facility. The safety committee should also advise on whether any structures, systems and components important to safety and their support systems tested earlier in the programme require reassurance testing prior to the next stage of commissioning (as a check on arrangements in para. 6.15). This may also apply to recently commissioned sections if there is a significant delay in proceeding to the next stage of commissioning, owing to, for example, and the need for modifications or for revision of the safety case.

6.17. Consideration should be given to the need to sequence the commissioning so that facilities required to support the section being commissioned are able to provide such support at the appropriate time (or suitable alternative arrangements are made). This should involve considerations of ‘upstream’ sections of the facility (including supplies of utilities such as electrical power, steam, reagents, cooling water and compressed air), ‘downstream’ sections of the facility (including waste treatment, aqueous and aerial discharges, and environmental monitoring) and ‘support’ sections of the facility (including automatic sampling benches, the sample transfer network and analytical laboratories). The safety committee should provide advice on the safety of arrangements for any such sequencing, particularly with respect to any environmental issues if downstream sections of the facility are not available.

COMMISSIONING STAGES

6.18. For a reprocessing facility, the commissioning is required to be divided into a number of distinct stages, according to the objectives to be achieved. Typically, this may involve four stages:

**Stage 1: Construction testing:**

i. For some structures, systems and components important to safety, where verification of compliance may not be possible after construction and installation is complete, testing
should take place during construction and installation. This testing should be observed by a representative of the operating organization and the outcome should be reported with the first stage of commissioning. Examples of typical items for construction testing include seismically qualified supports or restraints, homogeneity of walls (shielding or barrier), pipe welding, vessels and other passive structures, systems and components important to safety. In many cases this should involve both direct observation of activities, including testing, and the examination of quality control records for procurement, installation, testing and, where relevant, maintenance;

ii. When the direct testing of safety functions is not practically possible, alternative methods of adequately demonstrating the performance of systems, structures and components important to safety should be made in agreement with the national authority, before later stages of commissioning commence. Such methods may include the verification and audit of materials or suppliers’ training records. This further emphasizes the importance of an effective integrated management system;

iii. Testing of other structures, systems and components may be performed at this stage, in accordance with national requirements;

iv. Further recommendations are provided in relevant sections of SSG-38 [32].

Stage 2: Inactive or ‘cold processing’ commissioning:

i. At this stage, the facility’s systems are systematically tested, both individual items of equipment and the systems in their entirety. As much verification and testing as practicable should be carried out because of the relative ease of taking corrective actions in this stage, unimpeded by the introduction of radioactive material;

ii. In this stage, operators should take the opportunity to further develop and finalize the operational documentation and to learn the details of the systems. Such operational documentation should include procedures relating to the operation and maintenance of the facility and those relevant to any anticipated operational occurrences, including emergencies;

iii. The completion of inactive commissioning also provides the last opportunity to examine the facility under inactive conditions. This is a valuable opportunity to simulate transients or the complete failure of support systems, e.g. ventilation, electrical power, steam, cooling water and compressed air systems. Such tests and simulations should be used to
improve the responses available by comparing the outcomes and responses to those identified in calculations of simulated events;

iv. This is also a final opportunity to ensure that all required maintenance can be completed once the facility is active. This is particularly applicable to all hot cells and items of equipment that can be maintained only by remote means. As maintenance is known to be a major contributor to worker doses in reprocessing facilities, the opportunity should also be taken to verify active maintenance procedures and controls, enhance the arrangements for the control of doses and identify any aids necessary to simplify or speed up maintenance;

v. Reprocessing facilities are complex facilities and, to avoid any potential error, the clear, consistent and unambiguous labelling of rooms, pieces of equipment, systems, components, cables and pipes, consistent with training materials and operational documentation should be checked and finalized during inactive commissioning;

vi. Particular attention should also be paid to confirming that all physical connections have been made as expected. This should involve confirmation that all process lines, service connections and utility lines start and end in the expected places and that they follow the expected routes, as defined in the design documentation. Exceptions that occur should be assessed for their safety consequences and should then either be corrected or accepted, with suitable approvals and updating of documentation.

**Stage 3: Trace active or uranium commissioning:**

i. Natural or depleted uranium should be used\(^{41}\) at this stage, to avoid criticality risks, to minimize doses due to occupational exposure and to limit possible needs for decontamination. This stage provides the opportunity to initiate the control regimes that will be necessary during active commissioning, when fission products and fissile material are introduced. Safety tests performed at this commissioning stage should mainly be devoted to confinement checking. This should include: (i) checking for airborne radioactive material; (ii) smear checks on surfaces; and (iii) checking for gaseous discharges and liquid releases. Unexpected accumulations of material should also be checked for;

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\(^{41}\)In some States, this may require regulatory approval.
ii. For the timely protection of workers, all local and personal dosimetry should be operational with supporting administrative arrangements when radioactive material is introduced into the facility;

iii. This stage should also be used to provide some measurable verification of parameters that had previously been calculated only theoretically (particularly discharges). The use of tracers\(^{42}\) should also be considered to enhance or allow such verification;

iv. Prior to active commissioning, emergency arrangements (on-site and off-site) should be put in place, including procedures, training, sufficient numbers of trained personnel, emergency drills and exercises, and demonstration of capabilities on and off the site, e.g. simulated, large scale public warning and evacuation exercises (see GSR Part 7 [10]).

**Stage 4: Active or ‘hot processing’ commissioning:**

i. Regulatory permission to operate the facility is generally issued to the operating organization before the start of this stage. In this case, ‘hot processing’ commissioning will be performed under the safety procedures and organization of the operating organization as for a fully operational facility;

ii. In any case, during active commissioning, and as far as defined and applicable, the safety requirements valid for the operation stage of the facility should be applied in full, unless a safety assessment is made to suspend or modify the regime and any required approval by the regulatory body has been granted;

iii. The full requirements of the operational radiation protection programme should also be implemented (if not already in place), including personnel monitoring;

iv. Compared to inactive commissioning, active commissioning requires major changes in the facility control arrangements and staff skills, for example those relating to confinement, criticality, cooling and radiation. The management of the facility should ensure that both the facility and the workers are fully ready for the change to active commissioning before it is implemented. The safety culture should be enhanced at this stage, so as to further contribute to safe operation;

\(^{42}\) Tracers are small quantities of very low active (or inactive) materials that mimic the behaviour of the operational material and are used to determine process parameters.
v. This stage enables the process to be progressively brought into full operation by steadily increasing both the quantity and activity of the spent fuel fed into the facility, as far as such an incremental approach is practicable;

vi. This stage provides further measurable verification of items that had previously only been calculated (particularly for radiation levels, airborne activity levels and the external and internal exposure of the workers and the environmental discharges). The feedback from such measurable verification should be used to inform corrective actions accordingly and to update the assumptions in any estimates and calculations;

COMMISSIONING REPORT

6.19. The requirements for a commissioning report are established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.57.

6.20. A commissioning report should be prepared for each stage of commissioning. The objective of the commissioning report is to provide a comprehensive record of the commissioning stage completed and to provide evidence of both the facility’s and the operating organization’s readiness to proceed safely to the next stage of commissioning.

6.21. The commissioning report should describe the safety commissioning tests carried out to demonstrate the facility’s compliance with the design, the design intent and the safety assessment, or should summarize the necessary corrective actions. Such corrective actions may include making changes to the safety case or adding or changing safety features or work practices. All such changes should be treated as modifications. If commissioning tests are brought forward from subsequent stages to the reported stage or put back to a subsequent stage, this should also be described and justified in the commissioning report for the reported stage.

6.22. The commissioning report should include a review of the results of facility radiation and contamination surveys, sampling and analytical measurements, particularly those relating to waste, effluent and environmental discharges.

6.23. To demonstrate the operating organization’s readiness, the commissioning report should also describe the following:

(a) The numbers, specialties, training, development and assessment of the facility staff, including managers;

(b) The development of the management system for the facility and the necessary procedures and instructions;

43In some States, the format and content of commissioning report may be defined by the regulatory body.
(c) Internal and external dose data, aggregated by work group, summarizing any dose investigations carried out;

(d) Audits and summaries of feedback from the operating organization and of feedback from workers on facility activities such as:
- The organization of activities and tasks;
- Briefings, procedures, work methods, ergonomics and human factors;
- Equipment and tools;
- Support activities (such as radiation and contamination surveys, decontamination, the use of personal protective equipment, and responses to issues arising during tasks);
- Human factor reviews and ergonomics reviews carried out on selected activities;
- Emergency drills and exercises;
- Safety culture.

6.24. Any incidents or events that have occurred during the commissioning stage should also be summarized in the commissioning report and any learning from experience should be identified. Consideration should be given to using the guidelines of the IAEA/NEA Fuel Incident Notification and Analysis System (Ref. [33]) to categorize and analyse events.

6.25. Detailed findings from commissioning, including the results of all tests, calibrations and inspections, may be provided in supporting documents, but the commissioning report should list all structures, systems and components important to safety and operational limits and conditions commissioned and tested (including surveillance and maintenance activities). In addition any assumptions or data relating to the safety assessment that had to be confirmed during plant commissioning should be reported.

6.26. The commissioning report should be reviewed by the safety committee and by the senior management of the facility in accordance with the management system and made subject to approval by senior management before submission to the regulatory body, as required by national regulations.
7. OPERATION

ORGANIZATION OF REPROCESSING FACILITIES

7.1. Given the large scale and complexity of fuel reprocessing facilities, there is a particular need for rigorous control, planning and co-ordination of the work to be undertaken in the facility, whether for operation, routine maintenance, non-routine maintenance – such as may be conducted between fuel reprocessing campaigns – and projects (modifications). The operating organization and the management system of the reprocessing facility should provide for this need, through a consistent and systematic method of approving, planning and coordinating such work. Provision of accurate and timely information to all those involved should be a further characteristic of the management system. Section 4 of NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1] establishes the requirements for the organizational provisions for reprocessing facilities.

7.2. The requirements for staff training and minimum staffing are established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], paras. 9.3-9.14, 9.52, 9.53 and Appendix IV, para. IV.67.

7.3. Suitable arrangements should be made to gather, assess and propagate any lessons learned during the commissioning stage of the facility and, on an ongoing basis, during the operations stage. Similar arrangements should be put in place to adopt lessons learned from other organizations that operate reprocessing facilities or other hazardous facilities (e.g. chemical plants).

7.4. Round the clock continuity of organization should be provided in order to ensure that the appropriate authority is present on the site, with appropriate access to suitably qualified and experienced personnel (whether on the site or available to be called in, commensurate with the grace time for manual intervention). This should include operations personnel, engineering personnel, radiation protection personnel, emergency management personnel and other personnel as necessary.

7.5. The operating organization:

(a) Should establish and maintain appropriate interfaces (in particular, the application of communication procedures in the field) between:

- Shift staff and day operations staff (especially maintenance personnel and radiation protection personnel) within the reprocessing facility (reprocessing facilities typically operate on a 24 hours/365 days a year basis even when not processing material);
- The reprocessing facility and other site facilities, particularly waste treatment facilities and utility supplies that are closely coupled to the reprocessing facility; for example, to ensure the effective management of the timing, quality (content) and quantity of transfers, as well as to confirm the availability of storage capacity for the receipt of transfers or to ensure that facility operators have the latest information on the continuity of utility supplies;

- The reprocessing facility and the organizational unit responsible for on-site transport of radioactive material, if any;

- The reprocessing facility and any organization engaged to make modifications to the facility (e.g. projects to improve throughput or to provide additional capacity);

- The reprocessing facility and wider emergency services involved in emergency response functions at the reprocessing facility (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], paras. 9.62-9.67);

(b) Should review periodically the operational management structure, training, experience and expertise of reprocessing facility staff (individually and collectively) to ensure that, as far as reasonably foreseeable, sufficient knowledge and experience is available at all times, and will be available in reasonably foreseeable circumstances (e.g. staff absences). The requirement in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], para. 9.19 for control of organizational change should be extended to include key safety personnel and other posts, on the basis of this analysis.

7.6. The safety committee(s) in a reprocessing facility, as defined in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], para. 9.15, should be developed from the safety committee established for commissioning. Its function should be specified in the management system, it should be adequately staffed and it should include diverse expertise and have appropriate independence from the direct line management of the operating organization.

QUALIFICATION AND TRAINING OF PERSONNEL

7.7. The safety requirements for the qualification and training of facility personnel are established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], paras. 9.8-9.13. Further guidance can be found in Application of the Management System for Facilities and Activities, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-G-3.1 [34], paras. 4.6-4.25.
7.8. The safety risks and hazards for operators, maintenance staff and other personnel, such as the decontamination team, should be carefully considered when establishing the training programme. In particular, all staff handling fissile material, including waste containing fissile material, should have a sound understanding of criticality safety and the relevant physical phenomena.

7.9. The need for training all levels of management should be considered so that personnel involved in the management and operation of the facility understand the complexity and the range of hazards present at the reprocessing facility at a level of detail consistent with their level of responsibility.

7.10. Comprehensive training should cover both automatic operations and manual operations. Dedicated training facilities should be established as necessary, with the training emphasis on activities according to their potential safety consequences.

7.11. For manual activities, training should include, but not be limited to, the following:

(a) Use of master-slave manipulators and other remote equipment (in highly active areas);

(b) Maintenance, cleaning activities and project activities that may involve intervention in the active parts of the facility and/or changes to the facility configuration;

(c) Sampling of materials from the facility;

(d) Work within gloveboxes, glove changes and glovebox ‘posting’ activities;

(e) Decontamination, preparation of work areas, erection and dismantling of temporary enclosures and waste handling;

(f) Procedures for breaching barriers, self-monitoring and the use of personal protective equipment;

(g) Responses to be taken in situations that are outside normal operation (including emergency response actions).

7.12. For automatic modes of operation, training should include, but not be limited to, the following:

(a) Comprehensive training for the control room;

(b) The response to alarms;

(c) Alertness to the possibility of errors in automatic and remote system;
(d) Alertness to unexpected changes (or lack of changes) in key parameters;

(e) The particular differences in operation that may occur during the ramp-up and ramp-down of a campaign;

(f) Responses to be taken in situations that are outside normal operation (including emergency response actions).

**FACILITY OPERATION**

**Operational documentation**

7.13. For reprocessing facilities the requirements for operating instructions established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], paras. 9.21-9.27 should be strictly adhered to.

7.14. In order to ensure that, under normal circumstances, the reprocessing facility operates well within its operational limits and conditions, a set of operational sub-limits should be defined at lower levels by the operating organization. The margins should be derived from the design considerations and from experience of operating the facility (both during commissioning and in operation). The objective should be to maximize the safety margin whilst minimizing breaches of the sub-limits.

7.15. Authority to make operating decisions should be assigned to management at suitable levels in accordance with the operational limits and conditions, the operational sub-limits and the potential safety implications of the decision. The management system should specify the authority and responsibilities at each management level and, where necessary, of individual post-holders. If a sub-limit or an operational limit or condition is exceeded, the appropriate level of management should be informed (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, para. IV.63). Where immediate decisions or responses are necessary for safety reasons, the circumstances should be defined, as far as practicable, in procedures following guidance provided by the management system and the appropriate shift staff or day staff should be trained and authorized to make the necessary decisions.

7.16. Any excursion outside the set of operational sub-limits should be adequately investigated by the operating organization and the lessons learned should be applied to prevent a recurrence. As required by national regulations, the regulatory body should be notified in a timely manner of such excursions and any immediate actions taken, and should be kept informed of the subsequent investigations and their outcome.
7.17. Operational documentation should be prepared that lists all the limits and conditions, and defines the procedures to restore the process to within the limits and sub-limits (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], paras. 9.22 and 9.26). Annex II gives examples of parameters that can be used for defining operational limits and conditions.

7.18. All limits and conditions should be clearly identified in procedures and in directly relevant procedural steps. In particular, procedures and procedural steps relevant to operational limits and conditions should be highlighted in a consistent manner. Provision should be made in the management system to ensure that such identification and highlighting is carried out comprehensively and consistently.

7.19. Operating procedures should be developed to directly control process operations. To maximize the benefit of the robust design of a reprocessing facility, operating procedures should be user-friendly and accurate, and should cover all operational states, including ramp-up and ramp-down. Procedures for non-operational conditions, abnormal states and accident conditions should also be put in place. Operators should be fully trained and assessed, using simulations or exercises where appropriate, in these procedures.

7.20. The documents prepared should also systematically link to the safety case and operational limits and conditions, either directly or through interface documents, to ensure that safety requirements are fully met through the instructions.

Specific provisions

7.21. The development and maintenance of a feed programme (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], para. IV.58) is important to safety in a reprocessing facility. The operating organization should allocate responsibilities within the organization for the feed programme, establish clear procedures that specify how the feed programme should be managed and establish provisions for independent verification.

7.22. Reprocessing facilities are generally designed to accept a specific range of fuel types, with given characteristics such as the range of burnup. The feed programme should take into account fuel parameters (e.g. irradiation data, initial enrichment, duration of cooling following discharge from the reactor) and safety related constraints at the facility.

7.23. Process control at a reprocessing facility generally relies on a combination of instrument readings and analytical data from samples. The activities relating to obtaining and analysing data from samples should be managed and conducted so as to minimize doses to workers. The waste resulting from such activities should be managed in accordance with
established procedures. Analytical instruments and methods should be used in accordance with the provisions of the management system and should be subject to suitable calibration and verification. Decisions made on the basis of sample analysis should take proper account of the accuracy of the sampling process, the analytical methods used and, where relevant, the delay between sampling and the result being available.

7.24. Operation of a reprocessing facility is often divided into campaigns (driven by operational, commercial or safety related constraints) and inter-campaigns period (for modifications to equipment, performing maintenance and purposes of nuclear material accounting and control). Maintenance is safer during inter-campaign periods but increased interventions result in higher contamination and dose risks. Intensive maintenance periods often require the use of less experienced personnel. The operating organization should take action to address the specific risks of intensive maintenance during inter-campaigns periods, which may include specific training, the allocation of more experienced workers to teams of less experienced personnel and additional supervision of work.

7.25. The management system should include provision for a programme of internal audits whose purpose, among other aspects, is to confirm periodically that the facility is being operated in accordance with operating procedures (including its operational limits and conditions, safety case and license conditions). Suitably qualified and experienced persons should carry out such audits and consideration should be given to using personnel who are independent of the direct line management. See also NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], para. 9.71.

7.26. Operator walk-arounds, including walk-arounds by senior management, should be specified and scheduled with the aim of ensuring that, as far as practicable, all areas of the facility are subject to regular surveillance, with particular attention paid to the recording, evaluating and reporting of abnormal conditions. This programme of walk-arounds should include a suitable level of independence (for example, including personnel from other facilities on the site or off the site). Examples of conditions to be observed should include the following:

(a) Local instrument readings and visual indications relevant to liquid levels or leaks, including sump levels, containment and ventilation failure;
(b) Safety checks having been completed within the specified range of dates (e.g. on access equipment\textsuperscript{45}, lifting equipment, fire extinguishers and electrical equipment);

(c) Conditions at access points to supervised and controlled areas;

(d) The number and condition of temporarily restricted access (radiation or contamination) areas;

(e) The availability and functioning of personal dosimeters;

(f) The accumulation of waste;

(g) The proper storage of materials and equipment;

(h) The ready availability of emergency equipment;

7.27. After the batch transfer of process liquids, operators should confirm, as far as practicable, that the volume transferred from the sending vessel corresponds to the volume received (see paras. 4.47 and 4.126).

**Exclusion of foreign material**

7.28. Suitable controls should be established to ensure, as far as is practicable, that foreign material is excluded from the process. These controls should build upon those developed during commissioning and are particularly relevant for maintenance activities and for the supply and delivery of process reagents.

**Maintenance, calibration, periodic testing and inspection**

*Maintenance (including periodic testing and inspection)*

7.29. As reprocessing facilities are large and complex facilities, maintenance should be coordinated and managed to ensure that unanticipated interactions, either with operation or between two maintenance activities, will not result in negative safety consequences.

7.30. The management system should ensure that all maintenance activities are reviewed for evidence of reliability or performance issues. Higher risk, complex or extended maintenance tasks should be regularly reviewed to benefit from lessons learned and for optimization of protection and safety. The safety committee should routinely review the reports generated for the most significant structures, systems and components important to safety and any other significant findings with consideration of their implications on facility safety.

\textsuperscript{45}For example, ladders, scaffolding, access platforms and powered access equipment (hydraulic platforms).
7.31. Prior to any maintenance activities, consideration should be given to radiological checks of the work areas, the need for decontamination and the need for periodic surveys during the period of maintenance and before return to service.

7.32. Maintenance (and any preparatory operations) that involves temporary changes to confinement and/or shielding should always be thoroughly analysed beforehand, including any temporary or transient stages, to ensure that contamination and doses will be acceptable, and to specify appropriate compensatory measures, where possible, and monitoring requirements (see paras. 7.70-7.71).

7.33. During maintenance, isolation between the equipment being maintained and the plant in operation or other facilities with a radioactive inventory should be ensured as far as practicable.

7.34. Hands-on maintenance should be performed after equipment drain down and wash-out or decontamination, as far as practicable, with the objective of removing radioactive material and reducing radiation risks and contamination risks.

7.35. For maintenance tasks with high anticipated doses or dose risk, consideration should be given to provision of mock-up and/or electronic models of the area, or other training methods, to develop familiarity with the task, develop operator aids and allow work techniques to be optimized, including through the development of ‘stand-off’ tools where practicable.

 Calibration

7.36. The accurate and timely calibration of equipment is important for the safe operation of a reprocessing facility. Calibration procedures and standards should cover equipment used by facilities and by organizations that support the reprocessing facility, such as analytical laboratories, suppliers of radiation protection equipment and reagent suppliers. The operating organization should satisfy itself that such externally supplied or located equipment is properly calibrated at all times. Where necessary, traceability to national or international standards should be provided.

7.37. The frequency of calibration and periodic testing of instrumentation important to safety, i.e. part of the structures, systems and components important to safety, (including instrumentation located in analytical laboratories) should be defined (from the safety analyses) in the operational limits and conditions.
CONTROL OF MODIFICATIONS

7.38. The management system for a reprocessing facility should include a standard process for all modifications (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], para. 9.35). The process should use a modification control form or equivalent management tool. The operating organization should prepare procedural guidelines and provide training to ensure that the responsible personnel have the necessary training and authority to ensure that projects are carefully considered for potential hazards during installation (e.g. the hazards associated with non-routine lifting with cranes), commissioning and operation, and that modification control forms are employed and the safety of the modification assessed as necessary. Decision making relating to modifications should be conservative.

7.39. The modification control form should contain (or have appended) a description of what the modification is and why it is being made. The modification control form should be used to identify all the aspects of safety that may be affected by the modification (including procedures and emergency arrangements), and to demonstrate that adequate and sufficient safety provisions are in place to control the potential hazards both during and after the modification, with any temporary or transient stages clearly identified and assessed. The modification control form should also identify any (potential) need for the revision or renewal of a licence by the regulatory body.

7.40. Modification control forms should be scrutinized by and be subject to approval by qualified and experienced persons to verify that the arguments used to demonstrate safety are suitably robust. This should be considered particularly important if the modification could have an effect on the exposure of workers or the public, on the environment or on criticality safety. The depth of the safety arguments and the degree of scrutiny to which they are subjected should be commensurate with the safety significance (potential hazard) of the modification (a graded approach). Review of modification control forms should be carried out by the safety committee (or an equivalent committee) with suitable expertise and the capability for independent examination of the proposal; suitable records should be kept of their recommendations. Senior management of the reprocessing facility should grant specific personnel the responsibility for the approval and control of modifications. Such authorizations should be regularly reviewed and withdrawn or confirmed as still valid, as appropriate.

7.41. The modification control form should also specify which documentation and training will need to be updated as a result of the modification (e.g. training plans, specifications,
safety assessment, notes, drawings, engineering flow diagrams, process instrumentation diagrams and operating procedures).

7.42. Procedures for the control of documentation and training should be put in place to ensure that, where necessary (as specified in the modification control form), training has been given and assessed and documentation has been changed before the modification is commissioned and that all changes in (the remaining) documentation and training requirements are completed within a reasonable time period following the modification.

7.43. The modification control form should specify the functional checks (commissioning checks) that are required before the modified system may be declared fully operational again.

7.44. The modifications made to a facility should be reviewed on a regular basis to ensure that the combined effects of a number of modifications with minor safety significance do not have unforeseen effects on the overall safety of the facility. This should be part of (or additional to) periodic safety review or an equivalent process.

7.45. No modifications affecting operational limits and conditions or structures, systems and components important to safety should be put into operation unless all the requirements specified on the modification control form are confirmed to be in place and the required number of operators are have been trained in their use, including their maintenance.

CRITICALITY CONTROL DURING OPERATION

7.46. The requirements for criticality safety in a reprocessing facility are established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], paras. 9.49-9.50 and Appendix IV, paras. IV.66-IV.76 and general recommendations are provided in SSG-27 [2]. The procedures and measures for controlling criticality hazards should be strictly applied.

7.47. Operational aspects of the control of criticality hazards in a reprocessing facility should include the following:

(a) Rigid adherence to the pre-determined feed programme;

(b) Watchfulness for unexpected changes in conditions that could increase the risk of a criticality accident;

(c) Training of personnel in the factors affecting criticality as well as in facility procedures relating to the avoidance and control of criticality;

(d) Management of moderating materials, particularly hydrogenated materials;
(e) Management of mass in transfers of fissile material, where mass control is used;

(f) Reliable methods for detecting the onset of any of the deviations from normal conditions, particularly those parameters relied upon for the avoidance of criticality;

(g) Periodic calibration or testing of systems for the control of criticality hazards;

(h) Evacuation drills to prepare for the occurrence of a criticality and/or the actuation of a criticality alarm.

7.48. For each reprocessing campaign, prior to starting fuel feeding to the dissolver, the settings of criticality alarm parameters should be checked and changed if necessary, depending on the feed programme of the campaign. The feed programme should be supported by appropriate fuel monitoring instruments, as far as possible, and by administrative controls, to confirm that the fuel characteristics match the feed programme. All software used to support calculations for the feed programme should be suitably validated and verified.

7.49. When burnup credit is used in the criticality safety analysis, appropriate burnup measurements are required and care should be taken to allow for the associated measurement uncertainties.

7.50. In chemical cycles, particular care should be given in the control and monitoring of those stages of the process where fissile material is concentrated or may become concentrated (e.g. by evaporation, liquid/liquid extraction, or other means such as precipitation or crystallization). A specific concern for reprocessing facilities is the creation of plutonium polymers, which can arise from hydrolysis in high plutonium and low acid concentration conditions in solution. This can potentially lead to precipitation and local high concentrations of plutonium (in contactor stages), resulting in the retention of plutonium in the contactor and/or the loss of plutonium to uranium product streams or waste streams, with implications for criticality and/or internal doses.

7.51. If identified by the safety analysis, the following issues should be addressed in facility procedures:

(a) Isolation, often by means of disconnection of and/or suitable locking devices on water or other reagent wash lines;

(b) Normal and allowable fissile concentration(s);

(c) The feed setting and the control of flows of reagents (solvent and aqueous);
(d) The conditioning of fissile solutions (for example, by heating or cooling) according to the facility flow sheet (the technical basis).

These requirements should be supported by appropriate alarm settings on the instruments used for monitoring the feeds and solutions.

7.52. Where there are any uncertainties in the characteristics of fissile material, conservative values should be used for parameters such as fissile content and isotopic composition. Particular issues may be encountered when carrying out maintenance work and during inter-campaign periods when material or residues from different campaigns may become mixed.

7.53. The requirements for criticality avoidance and conservative decision making may necessitate, in some circumstances (e.g. loss of reagent feed) that the transfer of fissile material within a separation process has to be brought to a sudden stop in accordance with the operational limits and conditions, whilst the situation is assessed and recovery is planned. As far as possible, all such situations should have been anticipated, assessed and included within appropriate procedures, including step by step recovery procedures to return the facility to a safe and stable state. Nevertheless, criticality staff should be involved in all such decisions and should subsequently analyse the event for feedback and learning.

RADIATION PROTECTION

7.54. The requirements for radiation protection in operation are established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], paras. 9.36-9.45 and Appendix IV, paras. IV.77-IV.78 and GSR Part 3 [6]; recommendations are provided in DS453 [7]. The operating organization should have a policy to optimize protection and safety, and is required to ensure doses are below national dose limits and within any dose constraints set by the operating organization. The policy should address the minimization of exposure to radiation by all available physical means and by administrative arrangements, including the use of time and distance during operations and maintenance activities.

7.55. The operational radiation protection programme should take into account the large inventories, the variety of sources, the complexity and the size of the reprocessing facility.

7.56. The operational radiation protection programme should include provisions for detecting changes in the radiation status (e.g. hot spots, slow incremental increases or reductions of radiation or contamination levels) of equipment (e.g. pipe, vessel, drip-trays, filters) or rooms (e.g. contaminated deposits, increase of airborne activity), including by means of monitoring of effluents or environmental monitoring. It should also ensure prompt
definition of the problem and the identification and implementation of timely corrective
and/or mitigatory actions.

7.57. Workplace monitoring for purposes of radiation protection inside and outside the
reprocessing facility buildings should be complemented by regular, routine monitoring by
trained personnel. These should be organized to provide, as far as practicable, regular
workplace monitoring of the whole reprocessing facility site. Particular attention should be
paid to the recording, labelling or posting where necessary, evaluating and reporting of
abnormal radiation levels or abnormal situations. The frequency of workplace monitoring
should be related to the relative risk of radiation or contamination in the individual areas.
Radiation protection personnel should give consideration to assigning a frequency for
monitoring of each facility area based upon easily identified boundaries. The use of
photographs or drawings of the area or equipment should be considered for reporting the
findings.

7.58. Radiation protection personnel should be part of the decision making processes
associated with application of the requirements for minimization of exposure (e.g. for the
early detection and mitigation of hot spots) and proper housekeeping (e.g. waste segregation,
packaging and removal).

**Protection against exposure**

7.59. During operation (including maintenance), protection against internal and external
exposure should be provided. Limitation of exposure time and the use of additional shielding
and remote operations and the use of mock-ups should be considered, as necessary, for
personnel training and optimization of complex or high dose tasks, to minimize exposure
times and exposure rates and minimize risks.

7.60. A high standard of housekeeping should be maintained within the facility. Cleaning
techniques should be used that do not cause airborne contamination. Waste arising from
maintenance or similar interventions should be segregated by type (i.e. disposal route),
collected and directed to interim storage or a disposal route as appropriate, in a timely
manner.\(^{46}\)

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\(^{46}\)Allowing waste (including industrial waste material that is suspected to contain radioactive material) to accumulate in work areas contributes to worker doses, both directly as sources and indirectly by impeding work progress, causing delays and complicating the identification of (new) sources of contamination, particularly airborne contamination; it can also lead to action levels for decontamination being raised (owing to an increase in background levels of radiation).
7.61. Regular contamination surveys of facility areas and equipment should be carried out to confirm the adequacy of facility cleaning programmes. Prompt investigations should be carried out following increased radiation or contamination levels. Performing additional cleaning and providing additional shielding could result in additional radiation exposure which should be balanced against the normal exposure from routine operations.

7.62. To aid operators in assessing the risk of any task and in setting the frequency of routine contamination or radiation surveys (rounds), consideration should be given to assigning facility areas a contamination and/or radiation classification. The class assigned should be based initially on the classification used in the facility design and should be developed on advice from radiation protection personnel, as necessary. Such contamination zone and the boundaries between them should be regularly checked and adjusted to match current conditions or other actions taken. Continuous air monitoring should be carried out to alert facility operators if levels of airborne radioactive material exceed predetermined action levels. The action levels should be set as near as possible to the level normal for the area. Mobile air samplers should be used near sources of contamination and at the boundaries of contamination zones as necessary, e.g. during maintenance or other operations, when there is a risk of contamination spreading. Prompt investigation should be carried out in response to readings of high levels of airborne radioactive material.

7.63. Newly identified contamination zones should be delineated with proper posting and barriers provided where required by facility procedures. Temporary confinement should be used to accommodate higher levels of contamination (e.g. a temporary enclosure with contamination check at entry points and a dedicated, local ventilation system). A register should be maintained of such contamination zones, barriers and enclosures.

7.64. The register of temporary contamination zones should be reviewed regularly by an appropriate level of management. The objective should be to reduce the number of temporary contamination zones either by decontamination or, where possible, by the elimination of the root cause, which may necessitate modifications to the facility or its procedures.

7.65. Good communications between operators, radiation protection personnel, maintenance staff and senior management should be established and maintained to ensure timely corrective actions.

7.66. Personnel should be trained to adopt the correct behaviour during operational states, for example training on general requirements and local radiation protection requirements.
7.67. Personnel should be trained in the use of dosimeters and personal protective equipment (i.e. lead gloves and apron), including dressing and undressing, and in self-monitoring. Personal protective equipment should be maintained in good condition, periodically inspected and kept readily available.

7.68. Personnel and equipment should be checked for contamination and should be decontaminated, if necessary, prior to their leaving contamination zones.

7.69. Careful consideration should be given to the possible combination of radiological hazards and industrial hazards (e.g. oxygen deficiency, heat stress), with particular attention paid to the balance of risks and benefits associated with the use of personal protective equipment, especially air-fed systems.

**Intrusive maintenance**

7.70. Intrusive maintenance is considered a normal or regular occurrence in reprocessing facilities. The procedures for such work should include the following:

(a) The estimation of expected doses for all staff (including decontamination workers) prior to the work starting;

(b) Preparatory activities to minimize individual and collective doses for all staff, including:
   - The identification of specific risks due to the intrusive maintenance;
   - Operations to minimize the radiation source (inventory), e.g. flushing out and rinsing of parts of the process;
   - Consideration of the use of mock-ups, remote devices, additional shielding or personal protective equipment, monitoring devices and dosimeters;
   - The identification of relevant procedures within the work permit, including procedures for meeting requirements for protection of individuals and the staff as a whole, e.g. personal protective equipment, monitoring devices and dosimeters, time and dose limitations;

(c) The measurement of doses during the work:
   - If doses (or dose rates) are significantly higher than anticipated, consideration should be given to withdrawing personnel to re-evaluate the work;

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47 Intrusive maintenance is maintenance involving a significant reduction in shielding, the breaking of static containment or a significant reduction of dynamic containment, or a combination of these.
(d) The use of feedback to identify possible improvements:

- For extended maintenance activities, feedback should be applied to the ongoing task.

7.71. Procedures that address the following aspects should be developed and applied according to level of risk\(^{48}\):

(a) A temporary controlled area should be created that includes the work area. Depending on the assessed risk, this may include, as necessary:

- An enclosure\(^{49}\) with temporary ventilation system with filtration and/or exhaust to the facility’s ventilation system;
- Barriers with appropriate additional radiation and/or airborne contamination monitors;
(b) Personal protective equipment (e.g. respirators, over-suits), as specified, should be provided at the entry points and used when dealing with any release of radioactive material;
(c) In accordance with the assessed risk, a dedicated trained person, usually the radiation protection officer, should be present at the work place to monitor the radiological conditions and other safety related conditions; this individual should have the authority to halt the work and withdraw personnel in case of unacceptable risk (e.g. oxygen deficiency, if air fed equipment is in use). This dedicated individual should also provide assistance to the maintenance staff in dressing, monitoring and undressing from personal protective equipment;

These recommendations are applicable when the normal containment barrier is to be reduced or removed as part of a maintenance or modification activity.

**Monitoring of occupational exposure**

7.72. There should be appropriate provisions for the measurement of radiation and contamination to ensure compliance with regulatory and operational limits controlling doses to individuals. Instrumentation should be provided, where appropriate, to give prompt,

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\(^{48}\)Where the level of risk is difficult to determine (e.g. for new tasks, or initial breaking of containment following a fault), the precautions taken should initially be cautious, based on the assessed hazard and operational experience, until the risk assessment can be reviewed in the light of new data.

\(^{49}\)An enclosure is a (usually temporary) combination of a static barrier (containment) supplemented by a dynamic barrier (ventilation) with appropriate entry facilities, completely enclosing (boxing-in) a work area and sealed, as far as practical, to local surfaces (walls, floors, etc.) to limit and minimize the spread of contamination. Where possible, enclosures should be modular with a rigid or heavy duty plastic outer ‘skin’ (that is resistant to damage), and a lighter-weight (thinner), easily de-contaminable, inner skin to allow for maximum recycling and reuse and to minimize waste volumes. In some States the inner skin is called a ‘tent’ or ‘greenhouse’.
reliable and accurate indications of airborne radiation and direct radiation in normal operation and accident conditions.

7.73. Doses to personnel should be estimated in advance and should be monitored during work activities, using suitably located devices and/or personal dosimeters (preferably alarmed) where appropriate.

7.74. The extent and type of workplace monitoring should be commensurate with the expected level of airborne activity, contamination, radiation type, or the potential for these to change, at the workplaces.

7.75. Personal dosimeters should be used as necessary, with, where available, alarms set for both cumulative dose and dose rate.

7.76. The selection and use of personal dosimeters and mobile radiation detectors should be adapted to the expected spectrum of radiation energies (alpha, beta/gamma, neutron) and the physical states (solid, liquid and/or gaseous forms) of radioactive material.

7.77. Equipment for monitoring local dose rates and individual doses and airborne activity for reprocessing facilities should include, as necessary, the following;

(a) Film dosimeters, solid trace dosimeters or electronic beta/gamma and neutron dosimeters, criticality ‘lockets’ or belts, TLDs (thermoluminescent dosimeters) and indium foil criticality event detectors;

(b) TLD extremity dosimeters (e.g. to measure doses to fingers).

(c) Mobile airborne activity monitors with immediate, local alarms (for maintenance work areas, tents and temporary enclosures and air locks);

(d) Mobile air samplers for low level monitoring.

7.78. The methodology for assessing doses due to internal exposure should be based on in-vivo and in-vitro monitoring, supplemented by the timely collection of data from air sampling in the workplace, in combination with worker occupancy data. Where necessary, the relationship between fixed detectors and individual doses should be verified by the use of personal air samplers in sampling campaigns of, preferably, limited duration.

7.79. In the event of abnormal radiation or contamination being detected in a room or area, checks of the staff that had been present in the area should be carried out and the appropriate
decontamination or medical intervention should be implemented in accordance with the results. The details of such interventions are outside the scope of this Safety Guide.

7.80. In addition to personal monitoring and workplace monitoring, routine in-vivo monitoring and biological sampling should be implemented in accordance with national regulations. The effects of hazardous chemicals and the radiological effects should be taken into account in monitoring programmes as necessary.

7.81. Further guidance on occupational radiation protection and the assessment of internal and external exposure to radiation can be found in DS453 [7].

MANAGEMENT OF FIRE SAFETY, CHEMICAL SAFETY AND INDUSTRIAL SAFETY

7.82. The potential for fire or exposure to chemical and other industrial hazards is significant for reprocessing facilities owing to their size and complexity, the nature of the materials processed and stored and the processes used.

7.83. The list of conventional non-nuclear hazards found in reprocessing facilities is extensive due to the factors identified and could include the following:

(a) Conventional hazardous chemicals in the process or in storage;
(b) Electrical works;
(c) Fire and explosion;
(d) Superheated water and steam;
(e) Asphyxiation hazard;
(f) Dropped loads;
(g) Falls from elevated working places;
(h) Noise;
(i) Dust.

Chemical hazards

7.84. Reprocessing facilities should be designed and operated to protect workers from the hazards associated with the use of strong acids and hazardous chemicals, particularly at elevated temperatures, throughout the process, and from the hazards associated with the use of organic solvents in the extraction stages.
7.85. In the reprocessing facility and analytical laboratories, the use of reagents should be controlled by written procedures (that set out the nature and quantity of authorized chemicals) to prevent explosion, fire, toxicity and hazardous chemical interactions. Where necessary, eye protection and local ventilation should be specified and provided. Consideration should be given to the need for breathing apparatus, equipment for dealing with chemical spills and suitable protective wear for chemical emergencies.

7.86. Chemicals should be stored in well aerated locations or dedicated, secure storage arrays outside the process or laboratories areas, preferably in low occupancy areas. Containers used to store chemicals should be clearly marked, including the potential hazards that the chemical poses.

7.87. Personnel should be informed about the chemical hazards that exist. Operators should be properly trained in respect of the hazards associated with the process chemicals in order to adequately identify and respond to the problems that may lead to chemical accidents.

7.88. As required by national regulations, a health surveillance programme should be set up for routinely monitoring the health of workers who may be exposed to harmful chemicals.

**Fire and explosion hazards**

7.89. Flammable, combustible, explosive and strongly oxidizing materials are used in reprocessing facilities (e.g. organic solvents in the extraction stage, and nitric acid and other materials and reagents throughout the process). Emergency systems and arrangements to prevent, minimize and detect the hazards associated with such materials should be properly maintained, and regularly exercised, to ensure that a rapid response can be deployed to any incident and its impact can be minimized.

7.90. To minimize the fire hazard of pyrophoric metals (zirconium or uranium particles), periodic checking and cleaning of shearing hot cells or other locations where such materials could accumulate should be applied. In some cases routine flushing out (i.e. high flow rate washing) of equipment may be necessary.

7.91. The procedures and training for responses to fires in areas containing fissile material should pay particular attention to the prevention of a criticality and preventing any unacceptable reduction of criticality safety margins.

7.92. The work permit and facility procedures and instructions should include an adequate assessment of and, as necessary, a check-sheet on the potential radiological consequences of
fires resulting from activities that involve potential ignition sources, e.g. welding, and should define the precautions necessary for performing the work.

7.93. The prevention and control of waste material accumulations (contaminated material and ‘clean’ material) should be rigorously enforced to minimize the fire load (fire potential) in all areas of the reprocessing facility. Auditing for waste accumulations should be an important element in all routine inspection and surveillance activities by all levels of personnel. Periodic inspections by fire safety professionals should be part of the audit programme.

7.94. To ensure the efficiency and operability of fire protection systems, suitable procedures, training and drills should be implemented, including the following:

(a) Periodic testing, inspection and maintenance of the devices associated with fire protection systems (fire detectors, extinguishers, fire dampers);
(b) General and detailed (location specific) instructions and related training for firefighters;
(c) Firefighting plans;
(d) Fire drills, including the involvement of off-site emergency services;
(e) Training for operating staff and emergency teams.

MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE

7.95. A strategy for the management of radioactive waste should be established by the licensee (see paras 4.147 to 4.155) and implemented on the site of the reprocessing facility in accordance with the types of waste to be processed and the national waste management policy and strategy.

7.96. Waste minimization should be an important objective for managers and for operators at the reprocessing facility. As part of the management system, an integrated waste management plan and supporting procedures should be developed, implemented, regularly reviewed and updated as necessary. All facility personnel should be trained in the waste management hierarchy (namely; eliminate, reduce, reuse, recycle and dispose), the requirements of the waste management plan and the relevant procedures. Waste minimization targets should be set and regularly reviewed and a system for continuous improvement (minimization of waste volumes and waste activity in relation to work carried out) should be put in place (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1]. paras. 9.5-4-9.56).
7.97. All waste is required to be treated and stored in accordance with pre-established criteria and the national waste classification scheme. Waste management is required to take into consideration both on-site and off-site storage capacity, as well as disposal options and available disposal facilities. Every effort should be made to characterize the waste as fully as possible, especially waste without a recognized disposal route. Where a disposal facility is in operation, waste characterization should be performed in such a way that compliance with the waste acceptance requirements can be demonstrated. The available information characterizing the waste is required to be held in secure and recoverable archives (see NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], Appendix IV, paras. IV.80 and IV.82).

7.98. Operational arrangements should be such so as to avoid the generation of radioactive waste or reduce to a practical minimum the radioactive waste generated (by reducing the generation of secondary waste and by the reuse, recycling and decontamination of materials). Trends in the generation of radioactive waste should be monitored and the effectiveness of the waste reduction and minimization measures applied should be demonstrated. Equipment, tools and consumable material entering hot cells, shielded boxes and gloveboxes should be minimized as far as practicable.

7.99. The accumulation of radioactive waste on the site should be minimized, as far as practicable. All accumulated waste should be stored in dedicated storage facilities that are designed and operated to standards equivalent to those of the reprocessing facility itself.

7.100. Any waste generated at reprocessing facility should be characterized by physical, chemical and radiological properties to allow its subsequent optimum management, i.e. appropriate pretreatment, treatment, conditioning and selection or determination of an interim storage or disposal route. To the extent possible the management of waste should ensure than all waste will meet the specifications for existing interim storage and / or disposal routes. For future disposal options (i.e. if a disposal route is not available), a comprehensive waste characterization should be performed in order to provide a data base for future waste management steps. Particular care should be taken to segregate waste containing fissile material and ensure criticality safety for such waste.

7.101. Consideration should be given to segregating solid waste according to its origin, which can be indicative of its potential radioactive ‘fingerprint\(^{50}\)’ and thus can provide information on routes for processing, storage and disposal. The radioactive fingerprint, in conjunction with

\(^{50}\)The radioactive fingerprint is the mixture of radioactive nuclides and their ratios that characterize the waste. The radioactive fingerprint may be estimated from the material processed in the area and then confirmed during initial operation of the facility.
rapid, limited, local radiometric measurements (e.g. total beta/gamma activity), should be used as sorting criteria at the location where the waste is generated. This permits rapid segregation of the waste and the choice of appropriate waste handling techniques, and should be considered in relation to optimizing protection and safety both in the initial handling of the waste and in the subsequent detailed characterization and, if necessary, waste sorting in dedicated waste handling areas. Remote or automatic equipment should be used to the extent possible.

7.102. The collection and further processing of the waste (i.e. pretreatment, treatment and conditioning) is required to be organized according to pre-established criteria, and procedures should be defined to meet the requirements for established or planned routes for storage and disposal.

7.103. Facility decontamination methods should be adopted that minimize the generation of primary and secondary waste and facilitate the subsequent treatment of the waste, e.g. by ensuring the compatibility of decontamination chemicals with available waste treatment routes.

7.104. As far as reasonably achievable, decontamination should be used for reducing and/or minimizing the environmental impact and maximizing the recovery of nuclear material. Decontamination of alpha contaminated (e.g. plutonium) waste should be as complete as economically practicable to reduce and/or minimize the impact of long lived emitters on the environment, provided recovery routes are available for the decontamination waste stream.

7.105. Exemption and clearance procedures for waste should be provided in accordance with national regulations. These procedures should be used as fully as practicable, to minimize the volumes of material going to active disposal routes and thus the size of disposal facility necessary.

7.106. Information about the radioactive waste that is necessary for its safe management and eventual disposal now and in the future should be collected, recorded and preserved in accordance with the management system (see GS-G-3.3 [29]).

Effluent management

7.107. Reprocessing facilities usually have a number of discharge points corresponding either separately or collectively to the specific authorized discharges. The operation organization should establish an appropriate management structure to operate and control each of these discharge points and the overall discharges from the reprocessing facility.
7.108. For reprocessing facilities, discharge streams should be measured where possible before discharge or, where not, in real time at the point of discharge. When used, sampling devices and procedures should provide representative and timely results corresponding to the actual flows or batch releases to the environment.

7.109. The operating organization should ensure that all discharges are minimized and within, as a minimum, authorized limits. The personnel involved should have the authority to shutdown processes and facilities, subject to safety considerations, when they have reason to believe that these aims may not be met.

7.110. The operating organization should establish a list of performance indicators to assist in the monitoring and review of the programmes for minimization of discharges. The indicators should be related to maximum upper limits, e.g. monthly goals for discharges to the environment.

7.111. Periodic estimates of the impact on the public (the representative person(s)) should be made using data on effluent releases and standard models agreed with the national authorities.

**Gaseous discharges**

7.112. Radioactive gaseous discharges should be treated, as appropriate, by dedicated off-gas treatment systems and by means of HEPA filters.

7.113. After a filter change, testing and/or verification of the change procedure should be carried out to ensure that filters are correctly seated and provide at least the removal efficiency used or assumed in the safety analyses.

7.114. The efficiency of the last stage of filtration before stack release (or as otherwise required by the safety analysis) should be tested as defined in the operational limits and conditions.

**Liquid discharges**

7.115. All liquids collected from the site of the reprocessing facility (e.g. from rain water, underground water around buildings and process effluents) that have to be discharged into the environment should be assessed and managed in accordance with authorizations.

7.116. The liquid effluent system (i.e. collection and discharge piping, temporary storage if any) should be correctly operated, and its effectiveness should be maintained as part of the reprocessing facility.
7.117. Authorizations for liquid discharges from a reprocessing facility usually specify an annual quantity of particular radionuclides and if necessary, physical and chemical characteristics of the effluent. They may also prescribe further conditions designed to minimize the environmental impact, e.g. discharge at high tide, or above a minimum river flow. Operational procedures should be implemented to meet the requirements of the authorization.

7.118. Where possible, the reprocessing facility should be operated, as far as the design allows, in a manner that accommodates batch wise discharges, which allows verification of the necessary parameters by sampling and timely analysis prior to release.

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

7.119. The scale, complexity and the level of potential hazards of reprocessing facilities mean that arrangements for emergency preparedness (for protecting workers, the public and the environment in the event of an accidental release) and maintaining and updating the emergency plan are particularly important. The requirements are established in NS-R-5 (Rev.1) [1], paras. 9.62-9.67 and GSR Part 7 [10], and recommendations are provided in GS-G-2.1 [30] and Criteria for Use in Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSG-2 [35]) and elaborated on in paras. 4.161 to 4.167 in this Safety Guide.

7.120. The operating organization is required to carry out regular emergency exercises, some of which should involve off-site resources\(^{51}\), to check the adequacy of the emergency arrangements, including the training and preparedness of on-site and off-site personnel and services including communications.

7.121. The emergency arrangements are required to be periodically reviewed and updated (see GSR Part 7 [10] and GS-G-2.1 [30]), with account taken of any lessons learned from operating experience at the facility and at similar facilities, emergency exercises, modifications, periodic safety reviews, emerging knowledge and changes to regulatory requirements.

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\(^{51}\) Even for small facilities, off-site resources may be called upon to provide public reassurance and for on-site response to localised events.
8. PREPARATION FOR DECOMMISSIONING

8.1. Requirements for the decommissioning of nuclear fuel cycle facilities are established in GSR Part 6 [21] and recommendations are provided in WS-G-2.4 [22]. GSR Part 6 [21] requires, inter alia, that:

(a) The initial decommissioning strategy is selected in accordance with the national policy on the management of radioactive waste;
(b) The decommissioning strategy, the decommissioning plan and the supporting safety assessment (appropriate to the development stage of the decommissioning strategy and plan) are produced early in design;
(c) Decommissioning is included in the optimization of protection and safety by iteration of the facility design, the decommissioning strategy and plan and the safety assessment;
(d) Adequate financial resources are identified and allocated to carry out decommissioning, including the management of the resulting radioactive waste.

8.2. The decommissioning plan and the safety assessment should be developed and periodically reviewed throughout the reprocessing facility’s commissioning and operation stages (see GSR Part 6 [21], Requirements 8 and 10) to take account of new information and emerging technologies to ensure that:

(a) The (updated) decommissioning plan is realistic and can be carried out safely;
(b) Updated provisions are made for adequate resources and their availability, when needed;
(c) The radioactive waste anticipated remains compatible with available (or planned) interim storage capacities and disposal routes.

8.3. The reprocessing facility should be sited, designed, constructed and operated (maintained and modified) to facilitate eventual decommissioning, as far as practicable. Owing to their size, complexity and the diverse waste arising during operation and decommissioning, particular care should be taken that the following aspects are addressed throughout the lifetime of the reprocessing facility:

(a) Design features to facilitate decommissioning (e.g. measures to minimize contamination penetrating in the structures, installed provisions for decontamination);
(b) Physical and procedural methods to prevent the spread of contamination;
(c) Consideration of the implications for decommissioning when modifications to the facility and experiments at the facility are proposed;
(d) Identification of practicable changes to the facility design to facilitate or accelerate decommissioning;

(e) Comprehensive preparation of records for all significant activities and events at all stages of the facility’s lifetime, archived in a secure and readily retrievable form and indexed in a documented, logical and consistent manner;

(f) Minimizing the eventual generation of radioactive waste during decommissioning.

8.4. General requirements in the event of decommissioning being significantly delayed after a reprocessing facility has permanently shut down or has been shut down suddenly (e.g. as a result of a severe process failure or accident) are established in GSR Part 6 [21] and include the potential need to revise the decommissioning strategy, the decommissioning plan and the safety assessment.

8.5. For any period between a planned or unplanned shutdown and prior to decommissioning starting, safety measures should be implemented to maintain the reprocessing facility in safe and stable state, including measures to prevent criticality, the spread of contamination and fire, and to maintain appropriate radiological monitoring. Consideration should be given to the need for a revised safety assessment for the facility in its shutdown state and the application of knowledge management methods to retain the knowledge and experience of operators in a durable and retrievable form. Wherever practicable, hazardous and corrosive materials should be removed from process equipment to safe storage locations before the reprocessing facility is placed into a prolonged shutdown state.
REFERENCES


Annex I
MAIN PROCESS ROUTES AT A REPROCESSING FACILITY

Fig. I-1. Main process routes at the head end of a reprocessing facility.
Fig. 1-2. Separation of uranium and plutonium at a reprocessing facility.
Fig. 1-3. Uranium finishing at a reprocessing facility.
Fig. I-4. Plutonium finishing at a reprocessing facility.
Annex II
STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY
POSSIBLE CHALLENGES TO SAFETY FUNCTIONS AND
EXAMPLES OF PARAMETERS FOR DEFINING OPERATIONAL LIMITS AND CONDITIONS FOR REPROCESSING FACILITIES

Main safety functions:
(1) Prevention of criticality;
(2) Confinement of radioactive material:
   2a. Integrity of barriers;
   2b. Cooling and the removal of decay heat;
   2c. Prevention of radiolysis and of generation of other hazardous explosive or flammable materials;
(3) Protection against external radiation exposure.

TABLE II-1. HEAD-END PROCESS (see Fig. I-1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process area</th>
<th>Structures, systems and components important to safety</th>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Safety function initially challenged</th>
<th>Parameters for defining operational limits and conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feeding</td>
<td>Camera, detector</td>
<td>Safety concerns in the process</td>
<td>1, 2 and 3</td>
<td>Identification of the fuel assembly (feed programme)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spent fuel burnup measurement system</td>
<td>Criticality event</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Burnup value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shearing/decladding</td>
<td>Shearing machine</td>
<td>Zirconium fire</td>
<td>2c</td>
<td>Cleanness of the shearing machine (accumulation of material)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Criticality event</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissolution</td>
<td>(See Vessel)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Measurement systems for temperature, density and acidity of the solution</td>
<td>Criticality event</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Temperature, density, acidity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>System for control of solution poisoning (if required)</td>
<td>Criticality event</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Neutron poison concentration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarification</td>
<td>(See Vessel)</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process area</td>
<td>Structures, systems and components important to safety</td>
<td>Events</td>
<td>Safety function initially challenged</td>
<td>Parameters for defining operational limits and conditions</td>
</tr>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Analytical measurement system</td>
<td>Criticality event in the final storage vessel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hydrogen/plutonium ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Filter cleaning/centrifuge cleaning systems</td>
<td>Potential release of radioactive material</td>
<td>2b</td>
<td>Cleaning system parameters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditioning of hulls and end-pieces</td>
<td>Measurement system for fissile material of contents in hulls</td>
<td>Non-acceptance by the hulls conditioning facility</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Residual fissile material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vessel</td>
<td>Vessels containing radioactive solution</td>
<td>Leakage of active solution</td>
<td>2a</td>
<td>Detection of leakage (level measurement/sampling in drip trays or sumps, contamination measurements in cells and rooms)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cooling supply system (if any)</td>
<td>Overheating/boiling/crystallization/corrosion</td>
<td>2b</td>
<td>Flow rate of cooling water, temperature of active solution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Heating supply system (if any)</td>
<td>Overheating/boiling/crystallization/corrosion</td>
<td>2a, 2b, 2c</td>
<td>Flow rate of heating fluid, temperature of active solution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supply system in air for dilution of radiolysis gases (if any)</td>
<td>Explosion (hydrogen)</td>
<td>2c</td>
<td>Flow rate of diluting air for dilution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Level measurement system</td>
<td>Overflowing</td>
<td>2a</td>
<td>Leakage (and safety issues in downstream process)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pressure measurement system (where necessary)</td>
<td>Vessel failure</td>
<td>2a</td>
<td>Leakage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>System for measurement of parameters relating to criticality control (if necessary)</td>
<td>Criticality event</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Specific operational limits and conditions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE II-2. SEPARATION PROCESS (see Fig. I-2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process area</th>
<th>Structures, systems and components important to safety</th>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Safety function initially challenged</th>
<th>Parameters for defining operational limits and conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extraction/scrubbing</td>
<td>(See Vessel in Table II-1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Solution temperature in mixer settlers or columns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temperature control system</td>
<td>Fire (organic material)</td>
<td>2a</td>
<td>Diluent/solvent ratio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organics content measurement system</td>
<td>Loss of defence in depth for downstream process</td>
<td>2a</td>
<td>Diluent/solvent ratio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reagent feeding system</td>
<td>Leakage of plutonium with fission products</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Reagent flow rate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uranium/plutonium partitioning</td>
<td>Temperature control system</td>
<td>Fire (organic material)</td>
<td>2a</td>
<td>Solution temperature in mixer settlers or columns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organics content measurement system</td>
<td>Loss of defence in depth for downstream process</td>
<td>2a</td>
<td>Diluent/solvent ratio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reagent feeding system</td>
<td>Leakage of plutonium with uranium</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Reagent flow rate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System for neutron measurement at the column</td>
<td>Criticality event (prevention)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Neutron measurement along the column</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critically event detection system</td>
<td>Criticality event (mitigation)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Criticality alarm system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stripping/concentration of uranium</td>
<td>Temperature control system</td>
<td>Explosion (red oil)</td>
<td>2c</td>
<td>Temperature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process parameters control system</td>
<td>Explosion (red oil)</td>
<td>2c</td>
<td>Administrative controls</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solvent regeneration</td>
<td>Temperature control system</td>
<td>Explosion (hydrazine)</td>
<td>2c</td>
<td>Temperature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fire (organic material)</td>
<td>2a</td>
<td>Administrative controls</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Analytical measurement system</td>
<td>Explosion (hydrazine)</td>
<td>2c, 2a</td>
<td>Administrative controls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fire (organic material)</td>
<td>2a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE II-3. URANIUM PRODUCT TREATMENT PROCESS (see Fig. I-3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process area</th>
<th>Structures, systems and components important to safety</th>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Safety function initially challenged</th>
<th>Parameters for defining operational limits and conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High level liquid waste concentration</td>
<td>(See Vessel in Table II-1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Temperature control system</td>
<td>Explosion (red oil)</td>
<td>2c</td>
<td>Temperature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control system for the destruction of nitrates</td>
<td>Overpressure</td>
<td>2c</td>
<td>Administrative controls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uranium extraction/scrubbing</td>
<td>Temperature control system</td>
<td>Fire (organic material)</td>
<td>2a</td>
<td>Temperature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Process parameters control system</td>
<td>Fire (organic material)</td>
<td>2a</td>
<td>Administrative controls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uranium stripping</td>
<td>Temperature control system</td>
<td>Fire (organic material)</td>
<td>2a</td>
<td>Temperature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Process parameters control system</td>
<td>Fire (organic material)</td>
<td>2a</td>
<td>Administrative controls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uranium concentration</td>
<td>Temperature control system</td>
<td>Explosion (red oil)</td>
<td>2c</td>
<td>Temperature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Process parameters control system</td>
<td>Explosion (red oil)</td>
<td>2c</td>
<td>Administrative controls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uranium concentration</td>
<td>(See Vessel in Table II-1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uranium oxide storage</td>
<td>(See Vessel in Table II-1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solvent regeneration</td>
<td>Temperature control system</td>
<td>Fire (organic material)</td>
<td>2a</td>
<td>Temperature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Analytical measurement system</td>
<td>Fire (organic material)</td>
<td>2a</td>
<td>Administrative controls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acid recovery</td>
<td>Temperature control system</td>
<td>Explosion (red oil)</td>
<td>2c</td>
<td>Temperature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Process parameters control system</td>
<td>Explosion (red oil)</td>
<td>2c</td>
<td>Administrative controls</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE II-4. PLUTONIUM PRODUCT TREATMENT PROCESS (see Fig. I-4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process area</th>
<th>Structures, systems and components important to safety</th>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Safety function initially challenged</th>
<th>Parameters for defining operational limits and conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plutonium extraction/scrubbing/striping</td>
<td>(See Vessel in Table II-1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1, 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temperature control system</td>
<td>Fire (organic material)</td>
<td>2a</td>
<td>Temperature</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process parameters control system</td>
<td>Fire (organic material)</td>
<td>2a</td>
<td>Administrative controls</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plutonium concentration</td>
<td>Process parameters control system</td>
<td>Criticality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plutonium conversion</td>
<td>Process parameters control system</td>
<td>Criticality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Temperature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plutonium oxide storage</td>
<td>Control system for thermal criteria for storage</td>
<td>Potential release of radioactive material</td>
<td>2a</td>
<td>Temperature, ventilation flowrate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storage rack</td>
<td>Storage rack</td>
<td>Criticality</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Geometry (Design, Commissioning)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solvent regeneration</td>
<td>Temperature control system</td>
<td>Fire (organic material)</td>
<td>2a</td>
<td>Temperature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Analytical measurement system</td>
<td>Fire (organic material)</td>
<td>2a</td>
<td>Administrative controls</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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