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Accident Management (AM)



The objective of the Technical Safety Review of Accident Management (TSR-AM) provides a comprehensive framework for external independent review of the procedures and guidelines to be put in place for all operational activities significant to safety and for responding to anticipated operational occurrences and to accident conditions, including the following accident management programme (AMP) elements:

-        Implementation of organisational measures to prevent and to mitigate consequences of accidents, irrespective of their frequency of occurrence or of the fission product releases considered in the design envelope.

-        Consistency with the plant design and its current configuration. Consideration of all plant states and modes of operation and all fuel locations, including the spent fuel storage, and possible combinations of events that could lead to an accident.

-        Consideration of potential external hazards more severe than those considered in the design, derived from the site hazard evaluation, that could result in significant damage to the infrastructure on the site or off the site which would hinder actions needed to prevent or mitigate significant degradation of the fuel rods.

-        Consideration of potential interactions between units and consideration of concurrent accidents affecting all units for multi-unit sites.

-        Evidence of periodical review and revisions of AMP, when appropriate, to reflect operating experience (including major lessons identified), changes of plant configuration and new results from relevant international research (e.g. the periodic review of the accident management programme may be accomplished as part of the periodic safety review (PSR) of the plant).


Scope of the review

The scope of the review is defined by the Requesting Party in consultation with the IAEA. Scope of TSR-AM, for example, could be defined for the whole AMP including review of:

-        The whole concept of an accident management programme;

-        The main principles and organization;

-        The format and content of accident management guidance;

-        The verification and validation of the accident management programme;

-        The accident management and external hazards;

-        The accident management for multi-unit sites (if applicable);

-        The equipment upgrades (e.g. mobile);

-        The roles and responsibilities;

-        The staffing, qualification, training and working conditions for accident management.


Alternatively, the review could be focused on smaller different areas and AMP elements, such as the review of:

-        Specific types of procedures (EOPs) OR guidelines (SAMGs) (content, credited SSCs, verification and validation, staff response…);

-        The supporting accident analyses or other background bases documents (e.g. set point study, survivability/accessibility analyses, etc.);

-        The Human Machine Interface (HMI) in TSC/ECR;

-        The training, exercise and drills programs and participation/observation on exercises and drills.


In addition to the AMP documentation itself, the Requesting Party should provide appropriate level of background documentation as technical bases for the scope of the AMP to be reviewed. This documentation should describe and explain the rationale of the various parts of the AMP. If generic technical bases were used (e.g. PWROG generic documentation for the development of plant specific EOPs or/and SAMGs), AMP implementation process (e.g. plant specific hazards and vulnerabilities identification, identification of plant capabilities, etc.) should be described and any deviations from plant operating requirements and generic bases identified and justified. Other plant documentation (e.g. FSAR, system flow diagrams and system design descriptions of credited systems/components/structures in AMP, list and description of credited non-permanent (portable or mobile) equipment, Level 1 and Level 2 PSA studies/reports, accident modeling and simulation reports, applicable training and programmes for periodic drills, periodic review of AM, etc.) should be available during the review process, if necessary based on the agreed scope of the review. The Requesting Party can send an executive summary of the technical basis reports (including generic one) used during the development of the AMP, referenced plant specific studies and analyses in advance for better understanding and accelerated review by the IAEA Technical Team.

The framework of TSR-AM review is based on the following set of applicable IAEA Safety Standards:

-        Fundamental Safety Principles (IAEA Safety Standard Series SF-1)

-        Safety Requirements on Leadership and Management for Safety (IAEA Safety Standard Series No. GSR Part 2)

-        Safety Requirements on Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities (IAEA Safety Standard Series No. GSR Part 4 (rev.1))

-        Safety Requirements on Emergency Preparedness and Response (IAEA Safety Standard Series No. GSR Part 7

-        Safety Requirements Safety on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design (Specific Safety Requirements No. SSR-2/1(Rev. 1))

-        Safety Requirements Safety on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation (Specific Safety Requirements No. SSR-2/2(Rev. 1))

-        Specific Safety Guide on Accident Management Programmes for Nuclear Power Plants (SSG-54)




The TSR-PSR offers interested Member States a number of benefits including:

-        Experts invited to carry out the mission are internationally respected and independent with no conflict of interest with the Requesting Party, which ensures respect for the findings and provides assurance that recommendations will be addressed by the Requesting Party.

-        Respected and independent review increases confidence of all stakeholders (including public), both local and international, that the accident management programme, as developed and implemented at the nuclear installation in question meets all relevant international requirements and ensures the highest Safety Standards that can reasonably be achieved.

-        Undertaking the TSR-AM Service ensures that gaps in the addressing of safety requirements within the framework of reviewed accident management programme were identified and adequate attention was paid to available good practices.

-        Results of comprehensive AMP assessment provided by IAEA TSR-AM Service provide reliable and valuable information for use in discussions and justification of the adequacy of accident management programme implemented at the nuclear installation and its enhancements to regulators.

-        The process and results of TSR-AM Service could be useful to Requesting Party to understand the latest interpretation of requirements posed on current accident management programmes and current best practices, in order to meet them and to help entities responsible for AMP at the Requesting Party to avoid false interpretation of relevant AMP concepts and requirements.

-        The TSR-AM Service can be undertaken with an AMP Technical Bases Documentation and potential issues could be identified before the start of the development and implementation of AMP thus avoiding resource losses and threat to deadlines.

-        Follow up missions can be requested to explore identified issues in more depth and provide assurance that actions taken to address the TSR-AM Service results are adequate and that the AMP in place is sound.

AM Reviews Conduceted



Member State



AM programme of Laguna Verde




AM programme of Ignalina




AM programme of KANUPP




AM programme of Chinese PWR




AM programme of CERNAVODA




AM programme of Chasma




AM programme of Chinese PWR




AM programme of KANUPP




AM programme of Krisko