2.1.
As stated in SF-1 [1]: “The fundamental safety objective is to protect people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation.” Paragraph 2.1 of SF-1 [1] states:
“This fundamental safety objective of protecting people — individually and collectively — and the environment has to be achieved without unduly limiting the operation of facilities or the conduct of activities that give rise to radiation risks. To ensure that facilities are operated and activities conducted so as to achieve the highest standards of safety that can reasonably be achieved, measures have to be taken:
To control the radiation exposure of people and the release of radioactive material to the environment;
To restrict the likelihood of events that might lead to a loss of control over a nuclear reactor core, nuclear chain reaction, radioactive source or any other source of radiation;
To mitigate the consequences of such events if they were to occur.”
2.2.
Paragraph 2.2 of SF-1 [1] states:
“The fundamental safety objective applies for all facilities and activities, and for all stages over the lifetime of a facility or radiation source, including planning, siting, design, manufacturing, construction, commissioning and operation, as well as decommissioning and closure. This includes the associated transport of radioactive material and management of radioactive waste.”
2.3.
This Safety Requirements publication establishes requirements for application of the principles of SF-1 [1], in particular Principles 8 and 9:
“All practical efforts must be made to prevent and mitigate nuclear or radiation accidents” (Principle 8 of SF-1 [1]).
“The primary means of preventing and mitigating the consequences of accidents is ‘defence in depth’. Defence in depth is implemented primarily through the combination of a number of consecutive and independent levels of protection that would have to fail before harmful effects could be caused to people or to the environment” (para. 3.31 of SF-1 [1]).
“Defence in depth is provided by an appropriate combination of [inter alia] … [a]dequate site selection and the incorporation of good design and engineering features providing safety margins, diversity and redundancy” (para. 3.32 of SF-1 [1]).
“Arrangements must be made for emergency preparedness and response for nuclear or radiation incidents” (Principle 9 of SF-1 [1]).
2.4.
To address Principle 8 of SF-1 [1], site evaluation for a nuclear installation shall characterize the natural and human induced external hazards that could affect the safety of the nuclear installation (see Requirement 1). The site evaluation shall provide adequate input to the design and safety assessment for demonstration of protection of people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation.
2.5.
To address Principle 9 of SF-1 [1], site evaluation for a nuclear installation shall provide adequate input for demonstration of protection of people and the environment from the consequences of radioactive releases. The site evaluation shall identify the site characteristics that could affect the feasibility of planning effective emergency response actions in the external zone.