Terms used in this publication are defined below and are italicized in the text.
access delay.
The element of a physical protection system designed to increase adversary penetration time for entry into and/or exit from the nuclear facility or transport.
central alarm station.
An installation which provides for the complete and continuous alarm monitoring, assessment and communication with guards, facility management and response forces.
competent authority.
Governmental organization(s) or institution(s) that has(have) been designated by a State to carry out one or more nuclear security functions.
contingency plan.
Predefined sets of actions for response to unauthorized acts indicative of attempted unauthorized removal or sabotage, including threats thereof, designed to effectively counter such acts.
conveyance.
For transport (a) by road or rail: any vehicle used for carriage of nuclear material cargo; (b) by water: any seagoing vessel or inland waterway craft, or any hold, compartment, or defined deck area of a seagoing vessel or inland waterway craft used for carriage of nuclear material cargo; and (c) by air: any aircraft used for carriage of nuclear material cargo.
defence in depth.
The combination of multiple layers of systems and measures that have to be overcome or circumvented before physical protection is compromised.
design basis threat.
The attributes and characteristics of potential insider and/or external adversaries, who might attempt unauthorized removal or sabotage, against which a physical protection system is designed and evaluated.
detection.
A process in a physical protection system that begins with sensing a potentially malicious or otherwise unauthorized act and that is completed with the assessment of the cause of the alarm.
force-on-force exercise.
A performance test of the physical protection system that uses designated trained personnel in the role of an adversary force to simulate an attack consistent with the threat or the design basis threat.
graded approach.
The application of physical protection measures proportional to the potential consequences of a malicious act.
guard.
A person who is entrusted with responsibility for patrolling, monitoring, assessing, escorting individuals or transport, controlling access and/or providing initial response.
inner area.
An area with additional protection measures inside a protected area, where Category I nuclear material is used and/or stored.
insider.
One or more individuals with authorized access to nuclear facilities or nuclear material in transport who could attempt unauthorized removal or sabotage, or who could aid an external adversary to do so.
limited access area.
Designated area containing a nuclear facility and nuclear material to which access is limited and controlled for physical protection purposes.
malicious act.
An act or attempt of unauthorized removal or sabotage.
nuclear facility.
A facility (including associated buildings and equipment) in which nuclear material is produced, processed, used, handled, stored or disposed of and for which a specific licence is required.
nuclear material.
Material listed in Table 1, in Section 4 of this publication, including the material listed in its footnotes.
nuclear security culture.
The assembly of characteristics, attitudes and behaviours of individuals, organizations and institutions which serves as means to support, enhance and sustain nuclear security.
nuclear security event.
An event that is assessed as having implications for physical protection.
operator.
Any person, organization, or government entity licensed or authorized to undertake the operation of a nuclear facility.
performance testing.
Testing of the physical protection measures and the physical protection system to determine whether or not they are implemented as designed; adequate for the proposed natural, industrial and threat environments; and in compliance with established performance requirements.
physical barrier.
A fence, wall or similar impediment which provides access delay and complements access control.
physical protection measures.
The personnel, procedures, and equipment that constitute a physical protection system.
physical protection regime.
A State’s regime including:
The legislative and regulatory framework governing the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities;
The institutions and organizations within the State responsible for ensuring implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework;
Facility and transport physical protection systems.
physical protection system.
An integrated set of physical protection measures intended to prevent the completion of a malicious act.
protected area.
Area inside a limited access area containing Category I or II nuclear material and/or sabotage targets surrounded by a physical barrier with additional physical protection measures.
response forces.
Persons, on-site or off-site, who are armed and appropriately equipped and trained to counter an attempted unauthorized removal or an act of sabotage.
sabotage.
Any deliberate act directed against a nuclear facility or nuclear material in use, storage or transport which could directly or indirectly endanger the health and safety of personnel, the public or the environment by exposure to radiation or release of radioactive substances.
shipper.
Any person, organization or government that prepares or offers a consignment of nuclear material for transport (i.e. the consignor).
stand-off attack.
An attack, executed at a distance from the target nuclear facility or transport, which does not require adversary hands-on access to the target, or require the adversary to overcome the physical protection system.
system for nuclear material accountancy and control.
An integrated set of measures designed to provide information on, control of, and assurance of the presence of nuclear material, including those systems necessary to establish and track nuclear material inventories, control access to and detect loss or diversion of nuclear material, and ensure the integrity of those systems and measures.
threat.
A person or group of persons with motivation, intention and capability to commit a malicious act.
threat assessment.
An evaluation of the threats — based on available intelligence, law enforcement, and open source information — that describes the motivations, intentions, and capabilities of these threats.
transport.
International or domestic carriage of nuclear material by any means of transportation, beginning with the departure from a nuclear facility of the shipper and ending with the arrival at a nuclear facility of the receiver.
transport control centre.
A facility which provides for the continuous monitoring of a transport conveyance location and security status and for communication with the transport conveyance, shipper/receiver, carrier and, when appropriate, its guards and the response forces.
two person rule.
A procedure that requires at least two authorized and knowledgeable persons to be present to verify that activities involving nuclear material and nuclear facilities are authorized in order to detect access or actions that are unauthorized.
unacceptable radiological consequences.
A level of radiological consequences, established by the State, above which the implementation of physical protection measures is warranted.
unauthorized removal.
The theft or other unlawful taking of nuclear material.
vital area.
Area inside a protected area containing equipment, systems or devices, or nuclear material, the sabotage of which could directly or indirectly lead to high radiological consequences.