PAGE 2 PAGE 1 GSR Part 7 Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency 1. Introduction

See also:

IAEA e-learning course on Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 7 Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency

See also the Safety Guides:

GS-G-2.1 Safety Guide on Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (2007)

GSG-2 Safety Guide on Criteria for Use in Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (2011)

GSG-11 Arrangements for the Termination of a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency

GSG-14 Arrangements for Public Communication in Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency

SSG-65 Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency Involving the Transport of Radioactive Material

SSG-16 (Rev. 1) Establishing the Safety Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power Programme

SSG-44 Establishing the Infrastructure for Radiation Safety

There are also general requirements in GSR Part 3Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources, International BSS (2014)

SSR-1 on Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations also stipulates criteria derived from considerations of population and emergency planning

You may also wish to see

Emergency Preparedness and Response Series of publications available here and the Technical Tools available here

Particularly: Considerations in Emergency Preparedness and Response for a State Embarking on a Nuclear Power Programme (EPR-Embarking)

Lessons Learned from the Response to Radiation Emergencies (1945–2010) (EPR-Lessons learned)

Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency Combined with Other Incidents or Emergencies (EPR- Combined Emergencies)

Background

1.1. This IAEA Safety Requirements publication is governed by the fundamental safety objective and the fundamental safety principles established in the IAEA Safety Standards publication Fundamental Safety Principles (SF-1) [1]. In particular, this publication addresses Principle 9, which is concerned with the arrangements that must be made for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency[1].

1.2. This publication also allows for consistency with Essential Element No. 11 of the IAEA Nuclear Security Fundamentals [2], which is concerned with the planning for, preparedness for and response to a nuclear securityevent. It therefore addresses the emergency arrangements that must be in place irrespective of the initiator of the emergency, which could be a natural event, a human error, a mechanical or other failure, or a nuclear securityevent.

1.3. In 2002, the IAEA published the Safety Requirements publication, Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (GS-R-2)11, jointly sponsored by seven international organizations (the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the IAEA, the International Labour Organization (ILO), the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the World Health Organization (WHO)). This Safety Requirements publication is a revised edition of IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2, updated to take into account developments and experience gained since 2002. In the revision process, due consideration has been given to — but was not limited to — experience gained from the response to the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant and to recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) [3]. The IAEA Safety Guides Criteria for Use in Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (GSG-2) [4] and Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (GS-G-2.1) [5] elaborate on the requirements established in GS-R-2 and provide recommendations and guidance on their implementation. In addition, Planning and Preparing for Emergency Response to TransportAccidents Involving Radioactive Material (TS-G-1.2 (ST-3)) [6] provides guidance on planning and preparing for emergency response to transportaccidents involving radioactive material.

1.4. This Safety Requirements publication addresses the requirements for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency (including requirements for the transition to an existing exposure situation). Other Safety Requirements publications refer to and are consistent with these requirements in relation to emergency preparedness and response.

1.5. The response to a nuclear or radiological emergency may involve many national organizations (e.g. the operating organization and response organizations at the local, regional and national levels) as well as international organizations. The functions of many of these organizations may be the same for the response to a nuclear or radiological emergency as for the response to a conventional emergency. However, the response to a nuclear or radiological emergency might also involve specialized agencies and technical experts. Therefore, in order to be effective, the response to a nuclear or radiological emergency has to be well coordinated, and emergency arrangements have to be appropriately integrated with arrangements for the response to a conventional emergency and with the response measures for a nuclear securityevent.

1.6. Safety measures and security measures have in common the aim of protecting human life and health and protecting the environment. Paragraph 1.10 of Ref. [1] states that “Safety measures and security measures must be designed and implemented in an integrated manner so that security measures do not compromise safety and safety measures do not compromise security.” This emphasizes the importance of effective coordination between safety measures and security measures in relation to the response to a nuclear or radiological emergency.

1.7. This publication also provides guidance for (1) preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency by the relevant international organizations and (2) the inter-agency coordination performed through the Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and NuclearEmergencies (IACRNE).

1.8. It is assumed that States applying these requirements have in place an infrastructure for the purpose of regulating the safety of facilities and activities that could pose radiation risks. This includes laws and regulations governing the safe operation of facilities and the safe conduct of activities, and an independent regulatory body with responsibilities for establishing and enforcing rules for safe operation and safe conduct. In this context, the IAEA has issued General Safety Requirements publications on the Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety (GSR Part 1) [7] and on RadiationProtection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards (GSR Part 3) [8].

1.9. In addition, it is assumed that States applying these requirements have in place an infrastructure for the purpose of regulating the nuclear security of nuclear material and other radioactive material, associated facilities and associated activities, as well as nuclear security measures for nuclear material and other radioactive material out of regulatory control. This also includes an independent regulatory body as well as other competent authorities with responsibilities for regulating nuclear security. In this context, IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications [9, 10, 11] provide recommendations.

Objective

1.10. The present publication establishes the requirements for an adequate level of preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency. The application of these requirements is also intended to mitigate the consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency if such an emergency arises despite all efforts made to prevent it.

1.11. The fulfilment of these requirements will contribute to the harmonization worldwide of arrangements for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency.

1.12. These requirements are intended to be applied by the government at the national level by means of adopting legislation and establishing regulations, and by making other arrangements, including assigning responsibilities (e.g. to the operating organization or the operating personnel of a facility or an activity, local or national officials, response organizations or the regulatory body) and verifying their effective fulfilment.

1.13. The requirements are also intended for use by response organizations, operating organizations and the regulatory body in respect of preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency, as well as by authorities with responsibilities for emergency preparedness and response at the local and regional level and, as appropriate, by relevant international organizations at the international level.

Scope

1.14. The requirements apply for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency in relation to all those facilities and activities, as well as sources, with the potential for causingradiation exposure, environmental contamination or concern on the part of the public warranting protective actions and other response actions.

1.15. The requirements also apply to preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency in relation to off-site jurisdictions that may need to take protective actions and other response actions.

1.16. The requirements apply for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency irrespective of the initiator of the emergency, whether the emergency follows a natural event, a human error, a mechanical or other failure, or a nuclear securityevent22. The requirements do not cover preparedness for, or response measures that are specific to, nuclear securityevents, for which recommendations are provided in Refs [9, 10, 11]. Such response measures include activities for the identification, collection, packaging and transport of evidence contaminated with radionuclides, nuclear forensics and related actions in the context of investigation into the circumstances surrounding a nuclear securityevent. The requirements established here do provide for a coordinated and integrated approach to preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency arising from a nuclear securityevent that necessitates protective actions and other response actions to be taken for protection of members of the public, workers and emergency workers, helpers in an emergency and patients.

Structure

1.17. This publication comprises six sections. Section 2 provides for the interpretation and entry into force of the requirements. Section 3 establishes the goals of emergency preparedness and response. Section 4 establishes the general requirements that are to be met before effective emergency arrangements can be made, defines by using a graded approach the emergency preparedness categories for which the requirements have been established and elaborates on the development of a protection strategy on the basis of the hazards assessed. Section 5 establishes the requirements to be met for performing the functions critical for an effective emergency response. Section 6 establishes requirements for the infrastructure necessary to develop and maintain adequate arrangements for preparedness. Guidance values for restricting exposure of emergency workers in a nuclear or radiological emergency are provided in Appendix I. Generic criteria for use in emergency preparedness and response are provided in Appendix II. Annex I presents the applicability of paragraphs in the text for each emergency preparedness category.

2. Interpretation, resolution of conflicts and entry into force Definitions

2.1. Terms used in this publication have the meanings given under ‘Definitions’ on page 79. If not otherwise defined under Definitions, terms are used as defined in the IAEA Safety Glossary, 2007 Edition [12].

Interpretation

2.2. Except as specifically authorized by the statutory governing body of a Sponsoring Organization, no interpretation of this standard by any officer or employee of the Sponsoring Organization other than a written interpretation by the Director General of the Sponsoring Organization shall be binding on the Sponsoring Organization.

Resolution of conflicts

2.3. The requirements of this standard are established in addition to and not in place of other applicable requirements, such as those of relevant binding conventions and national laws and regulations.

2.4. In cases of conflict between the requirements of this standard and other applicable requirements, the government or the regulatory body, as appropriate, shall determine which requirements are to be enforced.

2.5. Nothing in this standard shall be construed as restricting any actions that may otherwise be necessary for protection and safety or as relieving the parties referred to in this standard from complying with applicable laws and regulations.

Entry into force

2.6. The Secretariat envisages that, for the IAEA’s own operations and for those operations assisted by the IAEA, arrangements will be made to meet these requirements within a period of no more than one year from the date of publication of this standard.

2.7. This standard shall come into force within a period of no more than one year from the date of publication of this standard for all the Sponsoring Organizations in accordance with their respective mandates.

2.8. If a State decides to adopt this standard, this standard shall come into force at the time indicated in the formal adoption by that State, and preferably within a period of no more than one year from the date of its publication.

3. Goals of emergency preparedness and response Goal of emergency preparedness

3.1. The goal of emergency preparedness is to ensure that an adequate capability is in place within the operating organization and at local, regional and national levels and, where appropriate, at the international level, for an effective response in a nuclear or radiological emergency. This capability relates to an integrated set of infrastructural elements that include, but are not limited to: authority and responsibilities; organization and staffing; coordination; plans and procedures; tools, equipment and facilities; training, drills and exercises; and a management system.

Goals of emergency response

3.2. In a nuclear or radiological emergency, the goals of emergency response are:

  1. To regain control of the situation and to mitigate consequences;

  2. To save lives;

  3. To avoid or to minimize severe deterministic effects;

  4. To render first aid, to provide critical medical treatment and to manage the treatment of radiation injuries;

  5. To reduce the risk of stochastic effects;

  6. To keep the public informed and to maintain public trust;

  7. To mitigate, to the extent practicable, non-radiological consequences;

  8. To protect, to the extent practicable, property and the environment;

  9. To prepare, to the extent practicable, for the resumption of normal social and economic activity.

4. General requirements Requirement 1: The emergency management system

The government shall ensure that an integrated and coordinated emergencymanagement system for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency is established and maintained.

4.1. The government shall ensure that an emergencymanagement system is established and maintained on the territories of and within the jurisdiction of the State for the purposes of emergency response to protect human life, health, property and the environment in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency.

4.2. The emergencymanagement system shall be designed to be commensurate with the results of the hazard assessment (see paras 4.18–4.26) and shall enable an effective emergency response to reasonably foreseeable events (including very low probability events).

4.3. The emergencymanagement system shall be integrated, to the extent practicable, into an all-hazards emergencymanagement system (see paras 5.6 and 5.7).

4.4. The government shall ensure the coordination of and consistency of national emergency arrangements with the relevant international emergency arrangements33.

See also:

GS-G-2.1 Safety Guide on Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (2007)

GSG-11 Arrangements for the Termination of a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency

Method for Developing Arrangements for Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency - updating IAEA-TECDOC-953 (EPR-Method)

Requirement 2: Roles and responsibilities in emergency preparedness and response

The government shall make provisions to ensure that roles and responsibilities for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency are clearly specified and clearly assigned.

See also:

GS-G-2.1 Safety Guide on Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (2007)

GSG-11 Arrangements for the Termination of a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency

You may also wish to read:

Method for Developing Arrangements for Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency - updating IAEA-TECDOC-953 (EPR-Method)

Manual for First Responders to a Radiological Emergency (EPR-First Responders)

Generic Procedures for Medical Response During a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (EPR-Medical)

Communication with the Public in a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (EPR-Public Communication)

General

4.5. The government shall make adequate preparations to anticipate, prepare for, respond to and recover from a nuclear or radiological emergency at the operating organization, local, regional and national levels, and also, as appropriate, at the international level. These preparations shall include adopting legislation and establishing regulations for effectively governing the preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency at all levels (see para. 1.12).

4.6. The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place for effectively governing the provision of prompt and adequate compensation of victims for damage due to a nuclear or radiological emergency.

4.7. The government shall ensure that all roles and responsibilities for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency are clearly allocated in advance among operating organizations, the regulatory body and response organizations44.

4.8. The government shall ensure that response organizations, operating organizations and the regulatory body have the necessary human, financial and other resources, in view of their expected roles and responsibilities and the assessed hazards, to prepare for and to deal with both radiological and non-radiological consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency, whether the emergency occurs within or beyond national borders.

4.9. The government shall ensure that operating organizations, response organizations and the regulatory body establish, maintain and demonstrate leadership in relation to preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency[14].

Coordinating mechanism

4.10. The government shall establish a national coordinating mechanism55 to be functional at the preparedness stage, consistent with its emergencymanagement system, with the following functions:

  1. To ensure that roles and responsibilities are clearly specified and are understood by operating organizations, response organizations and the regulatory body (see para. 4.7);

  2. To coordinate the hazard assessment within the State (see paras 4.18–4.26) and periodic reviews of the assessed hazards (see para. 4.25);

  3. To coordinate and ensure consistency between the emergency arrangements

    of the various response organizations, operating organizations and the regulatory body at local, regional and national levels under the all-hazards approach, including those arrangements for response to relevant nuclear securityevents, and, as appropriate, those arrangements of other States and of international organizations;

  4. To ensure consistency among requirements for emergency arrangements, contingency plans and security plans of operating organizations specified by the regulatory body and by other competent authorities with responsibilities for regulating nuclear security, as relevant, and to ensure that these arrangements and plans are integrated (see para. 4.14(b));

  5. To ensure that appropriate emergency arrangements are in place, both on the site and off the site, as appropriate, in relation to facilities and activities under regulatory control, both within the State and, as relevant, beyond its borders, and also for sources that are not under regulatory control66;

  6. To coordinate arrangements made for enforcing compliance with the national requirements for emergency preparedness and response as established by legislation and regulations (see paras 1.12, 4.5 and 4.12);

  7. To coordinate a subsequent analysis of an emergency, including analysis of the emergency response (see Requirement 19);

  8. To ensure that appropriate and coordinated programmes of training and exercises are in place and implemented, and that training and exercises are systematically evaluated;

  9. To coordinate effective communication with the public in preparedness for a nuclear or radiological emergency.

Regulatory body

4.11. The government shall ensure that arrangements for preparedness and response to a nuclear or radiological emergency for facilities and activities under the responsibility of the operating organization are dealt with through the regulatory process.

4.12. The regulatory body is required to establish or adopt regulations and guides to specify the principles, requirements and associated criteria for safety upon which its regulatory judgements, decisions and actions are based [7]. These regulations and guides shall include principles, requirements and associated criteria for emergency preparedness and response for the operating organization (see also paras 1.12 and 4.5).

4.13. The regulatory body shall require that arrangements for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency be in place for the on-sitearea for any regulated facility or activity that could necessitate emergency response actions. Appropriate emergency arrangements shall be established by the time the source is brought to the site, and complete emergency arrangements shall be in place before the commencement of operation of the facility or commencement of the activity. The regulatory body shall verify compliance with the requirements for such arrangements.

4.14. Before commencement of operation of the facility or commencement of the activity, the regulatory body shall ensure, for all facilities and activities under regulatory control that could necessitate emergency response actions, that the on-siteemergency arrangements:

  1. Are integrated with those of other response organizations as appropriate;

  2. Are integrated with contingency plans in the context of Ref. [9] and with security plans in the context of Ref. [10];

  3. Provide, to the extent practicable, assurance of an effective response to a nuclear or radiological emergency.

4.15. The regulatory body shall ensure that the operating organization is given sufficient authority to promptly take necessary protective actionson the site in response to a nuclear or radiological emergency that could result in off-site consequences.

Operating organization

4.16. The operating organization shall establish and maintain arrangements for on-site preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency for facilities or activities under its responsibility, in accordance with the applicable requirements (see paras 1.12, 4.5 and 4.12).

4.17. The operating organization shall demonstrate that, and shall provide the regulatory body with an assurance that, emergency arrangements are in place for an effective response on the site to a nuclear or radiological emergency in relation to a facility or an activity under its responsibility.

Requirement 3: Responsibilities of international organizations in emergency preparedness and response

Relevant international organizations shall coordinate their arrangements in preparedness for a nuclear or radiological emergency and their emergency response actions.77

See also:

GS-G-2.1 Safety Guide on Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (2007)

You may also wish to read:

Joint Radiation Emergency Management Plan of the International Organizations EPR-JPLAN (2017)

Operations Manual for Incident and Emergency Communication, EPR–IEComm 2019

International Radiation Monitoring Information System, User Manual IRMIS Version 3.0.0, EPR-IEComm 2019

International Radiological Information Exchange (IRIX) Format, Reference Description IRIX Version 1.0, EPR–IEComm 2019 ATTACHMENT 3

Operations Manual for IAEA Assessment and Prognosis during a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, EPR-A&P 2019

Requirement 4: Hazard assessment

The government shall ensure that a hazard assessment is performed to provide a basis for a graded approach in preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency.

4.18. Hazards shall be identified and potential consequences of an emergency shall be assessed to provide a basis for establishing arrangements for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency. These arrangements shall be commensurate with the hazards identified and the potential consequences of an emergency.

4.19. For the purposes of these safety requirements, assessed hazards are grouped in accordance with the emergency preparedness categories shown in Table 1. The five emergency preparedness categories (hereinafter referred to as ‘categories’) in Table 1 establish the basis for a graded approach to the application of these requirements and for developing generically justified and optimized arrangements for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency.

See also:

GS-G-2.1 Safety Guide on Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (2007)

GSG-2 Criteria for Use in Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency

GSG-10 Prospective Radiological Environmental Impact Assessment for Facilities and Activities

You may also wish to read:

Method for Developing Arrangements for Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency - updating IAEA-TECDOC-953 (EPR-Method)

Dangerous Quantities of Radioactive Material (EPR-D-Values)

Development of an Extended Framework for Emergency Response Criteria: Interim Report for Comments (IAEA/WHO) (TECDOC-1432)

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fo:word-like="text-run" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142489">a, b</sup> (including those not considered in the design<sup id="sup_bbe0e4f5-bb3e-40bd-e11e-d3def62d2e41" foss:font-size="9" foss:vertical-align="super" foss:border-top="0 solid #000000" foss:border-bottom="0 solid #000000" foss:border-left="0 solid #000000" foss:border-right="0 solid #000000" fo:style-reference="textSup" fo:word-like="text-run" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142490">c</sup>) are postulated that could give rise to severe deterministic effects<sup id="sup_e98b25fa-4008-4338-c6ca-4155fbd0d49f" foss:font-size="9" foss:vertical-align="super" foss:border-top="0 solid #000000" foss:border-bottom="0 solid #000000" foss:border-left="0 solid #000000" foss:border-right="0 solid #000000" fo:style-reference="textSup" fo:word-like="text-run" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142491">d</sup><glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/682" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_1e36c8a7-805e-4b85-b7c0-def8834dd902" fo:word-like="text-run">off the site</glossaryDefinitionRef> that would warrant <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/635" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_86b34ff5-9451-4eef-b0cd-b898471293d8" fo:word-like="text-run">precautionary urgent protective actions</glossaryDefinitionRef>, <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/292" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_cfee7967-c36a-4999-8b6e-fca545f77eaf" fo:word-like="text-run">urgent protective actions</glossaryDefinitionRef> or <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/633" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_102f048e-d381-43fc-b2ca-1241869cd233" fo:word-like="text-run">early protective actions</glossaryDefinitionRef>, and <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/894" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_91b06b1d-f84c-434c-e065-2bd12435740e" fo:word-like="text-run">other response actions</glossaryDefinitionRef> to achieve the goals of <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/892" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_64ddbee5-7868-4f39-872e-1423a11a43d5" fo:word-like="text-run">emergency response</glossaryDefinitionRef> in accordance with international standards<sup id="sup_b2013979-89de-4a99-8b77-da716a1fab29" foss:font-size="9" foss:vertical-align="super" foss:border-top="0 solid #000000" foss:border-bottom="0 solid #000000" foss:border-left="0 solid #000000" foss:border-right="0 solid #000000" fo:style-reference="textSup" fo:word-like="text-run" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142492">e</sup>, or for which such <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/923" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_b432ad1a-6af5-4027-fdfd-d251b251cc9d" fo:word-like="text-run">events</glossaryDefinitionRef> have occurred in similar <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/946" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_77885eec-7f1a-48e8-ffa0-6af280ef04c5" fo:word-like="text-run">facilities</glossaryDefinitionRef>.</p> </td> </tr> <tr id="row_ec7a9c17-a184-403c-afc6-aec0ada8849e" fo:word-like="row" fo:normalized="true"> <td foss:border-bottom="1 solid #000000" foss:border-left="1 solid #000000" foss:border-right="1 solid #000000" foss:border-top="1 solid #000000" colname="column-0" colsep="1" id="entry_4e720b4e-2a81-49eb-eb9c-8709e6030332" nameend="column-0" namest="column-0" rowsep="1" fo:word-like="cell" fo:word-like-cell-colspan="1" fo:word-like-cell-rowspan="1" fo:normalized="true" colspan="1" rowspan="1" fo:first-column="true" width="50%" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142494"> <p xmlns="" id="p_d7754adf-6130-4fba-c24f-c3c57f0a410e" fo:style-reference="TableListText" fo:word-like="paragraph">II</p> </td> <td foss:border-bottom="1 solid #000000" foss:border-left="1 solid #000000" foss:border-right="1 solid #000000" foss:border-top="1 solid #000000" colname="column-1" colsep="1" id="entry_4d607b2a-f05f-456c-daed-666aa6f57168" nameend="column-1" namest="column-1" rowsep="1" fo:word-like="cell" fo:word-like-cell-colspan="1" fo:word-like-cell-rowspan="1" fo:normalized="true" colspan="1" rowspan="1" fo:last-column="true" width="50%" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142497"> <p xmlns="" id="p_fe94ab57-95d8-4f94-9f00-60b3e7085e85" fo:style-reference="TableListText" fo:word-like="paragraph"> <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/946" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_7590b699-17a1-42ee-d3c3-77fa55d13f75" fo:word-like="text-run">Facilities</glossaryDefinitionRef>, such as some types of <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/511" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_7a97a7bc-f00a-40c6-be73-af61fe49e675" fo:word-like="text-run">research reactor</glossaryDefinitionRef> and <noGlossaryTerm id="noGlossaryTerm_fe1d44ee-e967-4f63-b7fd-effa170095bc" fo:word-like="text-run">nuclear</noGlossaryTerm> reactors used to provide power for the propulsion of <noGlossaryTerm id="noGlossaryTerm_1b1a0d8a-3bc8-4a1b-8bfa-8e42838ad32c" fo:word-like="text-run">vessels</noGlossaryTerm> (e.g. ships and submarines), for which <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/684" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_4875a81e-5b70-43f3-9b2e-8580776e515e" fo:word-like="text-run">on-site</glossaryDefinitionRef> events<sup id="sup_e27d2baa-b48b-4081-a884-ccae9a4c32b8" foss:font-size="9" foss:vertical-align="super" foss:border-top="0 solid #000000" foss:border-bottom="0 solid #000000" foss:border-left="0 solid #000000" foss:border-right="0 solid #000000" fo:style-reference="textSup" fo:word-like="text-run" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142495">a, b</sup> are postulated that could give rise to <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/1096" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_b021d551-24cf-46d8-bd93-d6339abc7c43" fo:word-like="text-run">doses</glossaryDefinitionRef> to people <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/682" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_02fe979d-da20-40ea-a428-0054ad063a77" fo:word-like="text-run">off the site</glossaryDefinitionRef> that would warrant <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/292" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_1fa6974d-1af9-49fe-fe4f-b8709dccedc2" fo:word-like="text-run">urgent protective actions</glossaryDefinitionRef> or <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/633" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_f48093b7-a05f-4a0c-8837-0760ade29ca7" fo:word-like="text-run">early protective actions</glossaryDefinitionRef> and <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/894" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_36fdb04f-2028-4c64-c754-d72783d3e451" fo:word-like="text-run">other response actions</glossaryDefinitionRef> to achieve the goals of <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/892" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_2f168f2f-96b4-4a2e-e24d-10c2cf8082aa" fo:word-like="text-run">emergency response</glossaryDefinitionRef> in accordance with international standards<sup id="sup_7d01a143-7c3d-4885-ab5b-1eb6b5f37300" foss:font-size="9" foss:vertical-align="super" foss:border-top="0 solid #000000" foss:border-bottom="0 solid #000000" foss:border-left="0 solid #000000" foss:border-right="0 solid #000000" fo:style-reference="textSup" fo:word-like="text-run" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142496">e</sup>, or for which such <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/923" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_197f509d-b502-4302-e858-b7237dd60be5" fo:word-like="text-run">events</glossaryDefinitionRef> have occurred in similar <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/946" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_d02d5007-7bca-4156-989d-12f4f2904fd2" fo:word-like="text-run">facilities</glossaryDefinitionRef>. Category II (as opposed to category I) does not include <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/946" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_db7cdbcc-5dcf-4822-8e8d-0af85ba2179b" fo:word-like="text-run">facilities</glossaryDefinitionRef> for which <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/684" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_b673c82a-9b43-4145-b764-526a0aaa315d" fo:word-like="text-run">on-site</glossaryDefinitionRef><glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/923" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_d9b91da3-ce90-4998-a3eb-e77c934b4997" fo:word-like="text-run">events</glossaryDefinitionRef> (including those not considered in the <noGlossaryTerm id="noGlossaryTerm_fba5c0c2-7e7c-410c-e123-598593b30b70" fo:word-like="text-run">design</noGlossaryTerm>) are postulated that could give rise to <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/368" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_2cb67aef-9a3d-4153-91b8-bafe298e2e50" fo:word-like="text-run">severe deterministic effects</glossaryDefinitionRef><glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/682" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_53af0c60-abb0-4cf6-c6f5-577d9d7c4d34" fo:word-like="text-run">off the site</glossaryDefinitionRef>, or for which such <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/923" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_34a50e0a-54b3-4036-beea-c15e9cdf1af8" fo:word-like="text-run">events</glossaryDefinitionRef> have occurred in similar <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/946" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_16af4944-8c68-4e47-f05b-225e1e8d00d3" fo:word-like="text-run">facilities</glossaryDefinitionRef>.</p> </td> </tr> <tr id="row_231fabf2-ab01-4354-d3cd-c52a2a0f6bb1" fo:word-like="row" fo:normalized="true"> <td foss:border-bottom="1 solid #000000" foss:border-left="1 solid #000000" foss:border-right="1 solid #000000" foss:border-top="1 solid #000000" colname="column-0" colsep="1" id="entry_c56fda6c-8906-48f3-c62c-13d1afcdc6f9" nameend="column-0" namest="column-0" rowsep="1" fo:word-like="cell" fo:word-like-cell-colspan="1" fo:word-like-cell-rowspan="1" fo:normalized="true" colspan="1" rowspan="1" fo:first-column="true" width="50%" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142498"> <p xmlns="" id="p_080b8a39-71f7-4bc3-8c7a-0116b945ff53" fo:style-reference="TableListText" fo:word-like="paragraph">III</p> </td> <td foss:border-bottom="1 solid #000000" foss:border-left="1 solid #000000" foss:border-right="1 solid #000000" foss:border-top="1 solid #000000" colname="column-1" colsep="1" id="entry_c7d8d095-d88b-431b-9694-666a753bd3cd" nameend="column-1" namest="column-1" rowsep="1" fo:word-like="cell" fo:word-like-cell-colspan="1" fo:word-like-cell-rowspan="1" fo:normalized="true" colspan="1" rowspan="1" fo:last-column="true" width="50%" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142501"> <p xmlns="" id="p_9732e5f3-bcac-4e39-e102-cf2f01e03ebe" fo:style-reference="TableListText" fo:word-like="paragraph"> <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/946" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_1ccfa744-78f3-4c6e-a676-a5c0e0972572" fo:word-like="text-run">Facilities</glossaryDefinitionRef>, such as industrial irradiation <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/946" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_de7f7d6e-ba6d-4ef1-cc35-c27dfc746094" fo:word-like="text-run">facilities</glossaryDefinitionRef> or some hospitals, for which <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/684" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_dcd4702c-3b79-4317-c1a0-2dcdc32f474f" fo:word-like="text-run">on-site</glossaryDefinitionRef> events<sup id="sup_b37f6a04-b73e-41e8-e963-5f8d6e8b9a85" foss:font-size="9" foss:vertical-align="super" foss:border-top="0 solid #000000" foss:border-bottom="0 solid #000000" foss:border-left="0 solid #000000" foss:border-right="0 solid #000000" fo:style-reference="textSup" fo:word-like="text-run" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142499">b</sup> are postulated that could warrant <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/632" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_074d174a-729e-4ac0-d897-8d84e0a33870" fo:word-like="text-run">protective actions</glossaryDefinitionRef> and <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/894" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_83df9058-14a5-41db-a6f2-3785f072cd7b" fo:word-like="text-run">other response actions</glossaryDefinitionRef><noGlossaryTerm id="noGlossaryTerm_832c4c5b-3f70-4c41-8299-12842d5a1790" fo:word-like="text-run">on the site</noGlossaryTerm> to achieve the goals of <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/892" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_b55e4f5e-9808-413e-e428-5e94f101120b" fo:word-like="text-run">emergency response</glossaryDefinitionRef> in accordance with international standards<sup id="sup_84a5a606-099e-4cc2-c32e-d8af7766eb67" foss:font-size="9" foss:vertical-align="super" foss:border-top="0 solid #000000" foss:border-bottom="0 solid #000000" foss:border-left="0 solid #000000" foss:border-right="0 solid #000000" fo:style-reference="textSup" fo:word-like="text-run" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142500">e</sup>, or for which such <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/923" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_03c12195-d2df-4c47-c2fb-5db4b26d2438" fo:word-like="text-run">events</glossaryDefinitionRef> have occurred in similar <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/946" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_a5754aa4-760a-4efe-cc20-4c32539a412d" fo:word-like="text-run">facilities</glossaryDefinitionRef>. Category III (as opposed to category II) does not include <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/946" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_97a85e26-5d27-43e1-ec58-640f4aa44162" fo:word-like="text-run">facilities</glossaryDefinitionRef> for which <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/923" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_68e39d90-d68d-4c91-c4c3-5289e2059e86" fo:word-like="text-run">events</glossaryDefinitionRef> are postulated that could warrant <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/292" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_1176a11a-b305-470e-98c1-9e14eb57cb8f" fo:word-like="text-run">urgent protective actions</glossaryDefinitionRef> or <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/633" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_04a7f4d0-cabe-4dba-d07f-d2b453ec2614" fo:word-like="text-run">early protective actions</glossaryDefinitionRef><noGlossaryTerm id="noGlossaryTerm_bba9d608-ccb5-403f-a6c5-b7f9bc3e5e7c" fo:word-like="text-run">off the site</noGlossaryTerm>, or for which such <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/923" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_4ec313c9-fade-4df2-a044-765366292ae7" fo:word-like="text-run">events</glossaryDefinitionRef> have occurred in similar <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/946" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_f9cb51fb-b547-4320-ca57-4da311768416" fo:word-like="text-run">facilities</glossaryDefinitionRef>.</p> </td> </tr> <tr id="row_99bf2769-f35d-4a83-9b5c-8b1f6fcfac1e" fo:word-like="row" fo:normalized="true"> <td foss:border-bottom="1 solid #000000" foss:border-left="1 solid #000000" foss:border-right="1 solid #000000" foss:border-top="1 solid #000000" colname="column-0" colsep="1" id="entry_5d1eaa8a-85eb-4d7e-fd72-92654811c438" nameend="column-0" namest="column-0" rowsep="1" fo:word-like="cell" fo:word-like-cell-colspan="1" fo:word-like-cell-rowspan="1" fo:normalized="true" colspan="1" rowspan="1" fo:first-column="true" width="50%" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142502"> <p xmlns="" id="p_ce087ce0-f79f-4312-bdde-c64352694313" fo:style-reference="TableListText" fo:word-like="paragraph">IV</p> </td> <td foss:border-bottom="1 solid #000000" foss:border-left="1 solid #000000" foss:border-right="1 solid #000000" foss:border-top="1 solid #000000" colname="column-1" colsep="1" id="entry_411c62c0-35c7-4ec9-97ef-1bca09b2a77a" nameend="column-1" namest="column-1" rowsep="1" fo:word-like="cell" fo:word-like-cell-colspan="1" fo:word-like-cell-rowspan="1" fo:normalized="true" colspan="1" rowspan="1" fo:last-column="true" width="50%" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142505"> <p xmlns="" id="p_58ab3af1-3bbb-4961-fbfe-c738f94aa1ad" fo:style-reference="TableListText" fo:word-like="paragraph"> <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/947" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_94698fa2-0cf5-4a60-f1fd-5cd2e5b9700c" fo:word-like="text-run">Activities</glossaryDefinitionRef> and acts that could give rise to a <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/676" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_e34513bf-3b64-47fa-b85d-dd3105e876bb" fo:word-like="text-run">nuclear or radiological emergency</glossaryDefinitionRef></p> <p xmlns="" id="p_4a5285c3-b8f2-4c7a-ed83-26dea2d62938" fo:style-reference="TableListText" fo:word-like="paragraph">that could warrant <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/632" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_465a8c42-8fb3-493c-91d3-b21aa069a019" fo:word-like="text-run">protective actions</glossaryDefinitionRef> and <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/894" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_c7c688b0-5bef-4630-b6d4-5676f4a1dac7" fo:word-like="text-run">other response actions</glossaryDefinitionRef> to achieve the goals of <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/892" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_0e7843e2-c944-4c55-ced6-ed2549ea06c0" fo:word-like="text-run">emergency response</glossaryDefinitionRef> in accordance with international standards<sup id="sup_268b2f93-78eb-4b1b-e5a2-148ea8d8d4be" foss:font-size="9" foss:vertical-align="super" foss:border-top="0 solid #000000" foss:border-bottom="0 solid #000000" foss:border-left="0 solid #000000" foss:border-right="0 solid #000000" fo:style-reference="textSup" fo:word-like="text-run" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142503">e</sup> in an unforeseen location. These <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/947" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_15b97b22-90eb-4ad1-b801-250a6a040836" fo:word-like="text-run">activities</glossaryDefinitionRef> and acts include: (a) <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/315" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_735dcfbe-3ab4-426d-d74c-f06a93e01c4f" fo:word-like="text-run">transport</glossaryDefinitionRef> of <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/664" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_902af1cc-a61e-472f-d33f-5adde8f854a0" fo:word-like="text-run">nuclear</glossaryDefinitionRef> or <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/461" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_11df2c0e-ea66-42e5-81da-b8d8eb0a6d44" fo:word-like="text-run">radioactive material</glossaryDefinitionRef> and other <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/183" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_6e1d8b2c-dd29-41a2-ccc0-c09140c7de74" fo:word-like="text-run">authorized activities</glossaryDefinitionRef> involving mobile <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/1220" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_5cf57c82-b5f1-4da9-8345-7ef25c57cd22" fo:word-like="text-run">dangerous sources</glossaryDefinitionRef> such as industrial radiography <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/1215" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_5578c427-917e-45d3-b603-f071bd410576" fo:word-like="text-run">sources</glossaryDefinitionRef>, <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/664" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_d23e0bed-5229-4719-f138-483a4978dae9" fo:word-like="text-run">nuclear</glossaryDefinitionRef> powered satellites or radioisotope thermoelectric generators; and (b) theft of a <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/1220" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_1b37773e-17cc-4f6e-bbab-881ecd0a7e15" fo:word-like="text-run">dangerous source</glossaryDefinitionRef> and use of a radiological <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/1089" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_56c5e23f-2aa8-4fc9-a9a6-0d786d3419c8" fo:word-like="text-run">dispersal</glossaryDefinitionRef> device or radiological <noGlossaryTerm id="noGlossaryTerm_c368f0a0-89e6-4765-9677-d80f2f916769" fo:word-like="text-run">exposure</noGlossaryTerm> device<sup id="sup_c4fdf1e8-0ad6-4794-e976-8ce54f3f9a65" foss:font-size="9" foss:vertical-align="super" foss:border-top="0 solid #000000" foss:border-bottom="0 solid #000000" foss:border-left="0 solid #000000" foss:border-right="0 solid #000000" fo:style-reference="textSup" fo:word-like="text-run" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142504">f</sup>. This category also includes: (i) detection of elevated <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/449" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_500469dd-4039-4f95-bb9b-bc0e7ab7eac1" fo:word-like="text-run">radiation levels</glossaryDefinitionRef> of unknown origin or of commodities with <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/1128" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_af03f20c-8ca3-437e-910a-f16f06c6b812" fo:word-like="text-run">contamination</glossaryDefinitionRef>; (ii) identification of clinical symptoms due to <noGlossaryTerm id="noGlossaryTerm_c35843f0-0e8e-4093-deb9-43496841aecd" fo:word-like="text-run">exposure</noGlossaryTerm> to <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/443" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_27e6640b-7d3f-428f-a42c-8cf6c34ca702" fo:word-like="text-run">radiation</glossaryDefinitionRef>; and (iii) a transnational <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/872" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_17660875-2148-4a9a-8e00-630be0df01d9" fo:word-like="text-run">emergency</glossaryDefinitionRef> that is not in category V arising from a <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/676" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_06a82d42-87c8-491a-b21f-2f43a6b8828f" fo:word-like="text-run">nuclear or radiological emergency</glossaryDefinitionRef> in another State. Category IV represents a level of hazard that applies for all States and jurisdictions.</p> </td> </tr> <tr id="row_f6f485f2-d37b-4979-b331-8597dc1964e2" fo:word-like="row" fo:normalized="true" fo:last-row="true"> <td foss:border-bottom="1 solid #000000" foss:border-left="1 solid #000000" foss:border-right="1 solid #000000" foss:border-top="1 solid #000000" colname="column-0" colsep="1" id="entry_4ca02f38-ad80-422b-83b3-a8fb55c748af" nameend="column-0" namest="column-0" rowsep="1" fo:word-like="cell" fo:word-like-cell-colspan="1" fo:word-like-cell-rowspan="1" fo:normalized="true" colspan="1" rowspan="1" fo:first-column="true" fo:south-west-cell="true" width="50%" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142506"> <p xmlns="" id="p_91a605ee-f734-44fc-9c31-1575982bfee1" fo:style-reference="TableListText" fo:word-like="paragraph">V</p> </td> <td foss:border-bottom="1 solid #000000" foss:border-left="1 solid #000000" foss:border-right="1 solid #000000" foss:border-top="1 solid #000000" colname="column-1" colsep="1" id="entry_a37b3bf3-35c4-429e-bd6b-c303a471e1f4" nameend="column-1" namest="column-1" rowsep="1" fo:word-like="cell" fo:word-like-cell-colspan="1" fo:word-like-cell-rowspan="1" fo:normalized="true" colspan="1" rowspan="1" fo:last-column="true" fo:south-east-cell="true" width="50%" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142508"> <p xmlns="" id="p_3cbd65df-4eb4-4c66-b814-3b0d36b492c6" fo:style-reference="TableListText" fo:word-like="paragraph"> <noGlossaryTerm id="noGlossaryTerm_b7b8e2bc-a019-4270-8ea1-ca1ed516f7ec" fo:word-like="text-run">Areas</noGlossaryTerm> within <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/886" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_31874f39-d8eb-44dd-946c-6e057cc73fcf" fo:word-like="text-run">emergency planning zones</glossaryDefinitionRef> and <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/881" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_59f4d8a0-3a2e-4bdd-82ef-97252fae7751" fo:word-like="text-run">emergency planning</glossaryDefinitionRef> distances<sup id="sup_4398122f-2a6c-43e9-e8f8-e40d4b674aee" foss:font-size="9" foss:vertical-align="super" foss:border-top="0 solid #000000" foss:border-bottom="0 solid #000000" foss:border-left="0 solid #000000" foss:border-right="0 solid #000000" fo:style-reference="textSup" fo:word-like="text-run" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142507">g</sup> in a State for a <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/946" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_ee9b2f5c-63b7-48b7-c4ec-fe85c608ee97" fo:word-like="text-run">facility</glossaryDefinitionRef> in category I or II located in another State.</p> </td> </tr> </table> </table> <p id="p_1be4e9a1-52b1-454f-bd9b-d1fbf3e6b45e" fo:style-reference="Normal" fo:word-like="paragraph"> <sup id="sup_e511a212-f0b8-4305-c41b-4ff31c946105" foss:font-size="9" foss:vertical-align="super" foss:border-top="0 solid #000000" foss:border-bottom="0 solid #000000" foss:border-left="0 solid #000000" foss:border-right="0 solid #000000" fo:style-reference="textSup" fo:word-like="text-run" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142509">a</sup> That is, <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/684" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_27958059-66d7-4c52-fb18-c368ebcc87ea" fo:word-like="text-run">on-site</glossaryDefinitionRef><glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/923" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_049cfd8a-26e0-4c57-a241-e58aea7f1118" fo:word-like="text-run">events</glossaryDefinitionRef> involving an atmospheric or aquatic <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/497" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_d4d5d4b7-de30-4200-cc10-1b047e9c135d" fo:word-like="text-run">release</glossaryDefinitionRef> of <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/461" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_7b883eae-8d49-4d3f-ebbc-1ec7d03d30ed" fo:word-like="text-run">radioactive material</glossaryDefinitionRef>, or <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/1159" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_477accbb-16c4-45d1-d75b-53f1fbf8098f" fo:word-like="text-run">external exposure</glossaryDefinitionRef> (due, for example, to a loss of shielding or a <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/1052" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_354eb7c1-a42e-4396-b584-ebf0e26d996d" fo:word-like="text-run">criticality</glossaryDefinitionRef><glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/923" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_b4c24c71-1d1e-4d69-8e7d-f3173fc89f55" fo:word-like="text-run">event</glossaryDefinitionRef>), that originates from a location <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/684" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_f5e109cc-1bcc-47a8-b5b0-76943e3c39e1" fo:word-like="text-run">on the site</glossaryDefinitionRef>.</p> <p id="p_147adcc2-f56b-445d-c74f-a07666e31144" fo:style-reference="Normal" fo:word-like="paragraph"> <sup id="sup_677b1793-9de2-4ea8-cda6-39eeaf58f0a7" foss:font-size="9" foss:vertical-align="super" foss:border-top="0 solid #000000" foss:border-bottom="0 solid #000000" foss:border-left="0 solid #000000" foss:border-right="0 solid #000000" fo:style-reference="textSup" fo:word-like="text-run" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142510">b</sup> Such <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/923" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_83094fff-040c-41af-da3e-25e74066b6f9" fo:word-like="text-run">events</glossaryDefinitionRef> include <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/1185" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_b60b0c10-367d-47c1-d15a-25dccdb85804" fo:word-like="text-run">nuclear security</glossaryDefinitionRef><glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/923" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_82099623-0d97-402b-f877-ed5be5b98248" fo:word-like="text-run">events</glossaryDefinitionRef>.</p> <p id="p_b7fff6aa-c515-43bb-b737-36282e409a8c" fo:style-reference="Normal" fo:word-like="paragraph"> <sup id="sup_cc027584-cc31-41ff-826d-28827f2cab48" foss:font-size="9" foss:vertical-align="super" foss:border-top="0 solid #000000" foss:border-bottom="0 solid #000000" foss:border-left="0 solid #000000" foss:border-right="0 solid #000000" fo:style-reference="textSup" fo:word-like="text-run" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142511">c</sup> This includes <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/923" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_085b0a49-eba3-45a3-f59f-cc78e686a451" fo:word-like="text-run">events</glossaryDefinitionRef> that are beyond the <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/96" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_9541a6c5-2d8c-4683-9af6-683002052cc9" fo:word-like="text-run">design basis accidents</glossaryDefinitionRef> and, as appropriate, conditions that are beyond <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/596" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_2c99dab1-3a73-499f-f724-828ce127e4a4" fo:word-like="text-run">design extension conditions</glossaryDefinitionRef>.</p> <p id="p_f58996cb-ac7c-4e07-91ca-ddc448f05205" fo:style-reference="Normal" fo:word-like="paragraph"> <sup id="sup_8fc6ecdc-b631-4485-d3f9-abacb4b7c834" foss:font-size="9" foss:vertical-align="super" foss:border-top="0 solid #000000" foss:border-bottom="0 solid #000000" foss:border-left="0 solid #000000" foss:border-right="0 solid #000000" fo:style-reference="textSup" fo:word-like="text-run" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142512">d</sup> See ‘<glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/850" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_e45b0881-8cbe-4681-85dd-8624100ce4c7" fo:word-like="text-run">deterministic effect</glossaryDefinitionRef>’ under Definitions.</p> <p id="p_4af74d08-a97a-498c-b259-81ad3ae2062a" fo:style-reference="Normal" fo:word-like="paragraph"> <sup id="sup_ff76f172-de3f-4c0f-bd64-6c03bf224616" foss:font-size="9" foss:vertical-align="super" foss:border-top="0 solid #000000" foss:border-bottom="0 solid #000000" foss:border-left="0 solid #000000" foss:border-right="0 solid #000000" fo:style-reference="textSup" fo:word-like="text-run" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142513">e</sup> See the goals of <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/892" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_4e496964-bc5e-448e-a1dc-0621bbe44f7e" fo:word-like="text-run">emergency response</glossaryDefinitionRef> in para. 3.2 and the <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/831" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_3d33eb78-186f-4ecd-c2fe-ba5a425f2e3f" fo:word-like="text-run">generic criteria</glossaryDefinitionRef> in Appendix II.</p> <p id="p_a1161beb-9b3c-4812-c549-8c97e22aa8b8" fo:style-reference="Normal" fo:word-like="paragraph"> <sup id="sup_df8f994e-c589-4e81-ee4e-dfd217e871fd" foss:font-size="9" foss:vertical-align="super" foss:border-top="0 solid #000000" foss:border-bottom="0 solid #000000" foss:border-left="0 solid #000000" foss:border-right="0 solid #000000" fo:style-reference="textSup" fo:word-like="text-run" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142514">f</sup> A radiological <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/1089" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_d2d9581c-de28-4ec9-d986-f62bda243b22" fo:word-like="text-run">dispersal</glossaryDefinitionRef> device is a device to spread <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/461" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_bf871258-dfad-4c8a-aafb-a726dfb46419" fo:word-like="text-run">radioactive material</glossaryDefinitionRef> using conventional explosives or other means. A <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/1158" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_976940b6-08ef-492c-967e-01b2763c2a85" fo:word-like="text-run">radiation exposure</glossaryDefinitionRef> device is a device with <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/461" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_cc58c759-341d-48b4-b2e9-ba66296cd773" fo:word-like="text-run">radioactive material</glossaryDefinitionRef><noGlossaryTerm id="noGlossaryTerm_a040530a-813d-415d-d6dd-721905ef0aba" fo:word-like="text-run">designed</noGlossaryTerm> to intentionally expose members of the public to <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/443" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_48c03fec-9e87-4fda-c0f0-5864953170be" fo:word-like="text-run">radiation</glossaryDefinitionRef>. They could be fabricated, modified or improvised devices.</p> <p id="p_f07f2f09-a7ff-4bb4-afd1-94681e27fa2b" fo:style-reference="Normal" fo:word-like="paragraph"> <sup id="sup_a49902a0-0c2c-490b-ca55-b5a4f5f4b192" foss:font-size="9" foss:vertical-align="super" foss:border-top="0 solid #000000" foss:border-bottom="0 solid #000000" foss:border-left="0 solid #000000" foss:border-right="0 solid #000000" fo:style-reference="textSup" fo:word-like="text-run" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142515">g</sup> See para. 5.38.</p> </segment> </conbody> </concept> <concept id="concept_0d3e61fd-206f-44b7-b636-b3033b7a1686" xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="urn:iaea:names:dita:xsd:concept.xsd" output:file-name="c_04e67666-5ad5-4deb-859e-e6ff21933baf__54_0.dita" href="c_04e67666-5ad5-4deb-859e-e6ff21933baf__54_0.dita" original-navtitle=""> <title id="title_b0e3a86e-f78e-4957-d37f-e47b57f9619e" fo:style-reference="Heading3" fo:word-like="paragraph" /> <prolog id="prolog_0455f487-a023-47ac-8fcb-0a5e3bc0165e" fo:hidden="true"> <data name="document-type" value="chunk" id="data_513c19e6-f5a6-4694-8a9b-b10a5fd68abd" fo:hidden="true" /> <data name="description" value="GSR PArt 7 on Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency - General requirements - Hazard assessment" id="data_3b0d65e7-bafc-48d0-e45e-fb792d86889f" fo:hidden="true" /> <data name="chunk-type" value="paragraph" id="data_f5efff01-6984-4759-e196-72cced66de4f" fo:hidden="true"> <data name="chunk-role" value="semantic" id="data_6d1513f3-15c0-43ce-fb0b-a8e841774f7d" fo:hidden="true" /> </data> <data name="tags" id="data_1958b6bd-9578-4477-fb90-2cae059039fa" fo:hidden="true" /> <data name="major-change" value="false" id="data_d81397c0-0f2f-4e98-d68e-6a843d9af7ca" fo:hidden="true" /> </prolog> <conbody id="conbody_3581a558-c792-4eb9-89b6-226da76867f8"> <segment id="segment_717f450f-7845-420a-b766-89e8833bfacc"> <p id="p_39d83344-9caf-4c0b-afad-06453b4f0cda" fo:style-reference="Normal" fo:word-like="paragraph"> <segnumber id="segnumber_b6c8c2be-098e-404c-cc8b-dd9d21c63528" fo:word-like="text-run">4.20.</segnumber> <tabspace fo:style-reference="Normal" fo:word-like="tab-space" /> <span xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" fo:tab-visual="true" style="width: 6.67188px;"></span>The government shall ensure that for <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/945" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_0b900ea7-da6b-4f01-8167-cf32684f3909" fo:word-like="text-run">facilities and activities</glossaryDefinitionRef>, a <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/167" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_80d87358-13fb-40f9-eec0-e278321bae44" fo:word-like="text-run">hazard assessment</glossaryDefinitionRef> on the basis of a <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/1166" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_2b15c57a-8dc1-4c1c-fbb0-3ab01f8614cc" fo:word-like="text-run">graded approach</glossaryDefinitionRef> is performed. The <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/167" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_31ef158c-d4cb-4963-9cc5-7a803ac93ffe" fo:word-like="text-run">hazard assessment</glossaryDefinitionRef> shall include consideration of:</p> <ol outputclass="alphabetical" id="ol_9954a7f6-acc1-4777-f8a7-68f10b953a19" fo:word-like="list" fo:numbering-style-reference="IAEA-List-Scheme" fo:word-like-list-id="4"> <li id="li_1011fe0f-2ffc-47d8-dbb4-f07e67e1b750"> <p id="p_1e67390b-a7e9-42f9-df8a-742cc488a264" fo:word-like="paragraph" fo:style-reference="IAEA-List-Scheme" fo:list-item-depth="0" fo:list-item-index="0" data-fo-list-item-affix="(a)"> <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/923" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_cee92a46-dfd4-41a0-97f6-a1c27cf84c8f" fo:word-like="text-run">Events</glossaryDefinitionRef> that could affect the <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/945" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_24f872a2-cb22-492b-8d87-8d9c94cfee7b" fo:word-like="text-run">facility or activity</glossaryDefinitionRef>, including <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/923" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_1217137a-df61-4502-858b-9d0457dff1c0" fo:word-like="text-run">events</glossaryDefinitionRef> of very low probability and <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/923" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_b757b188-7c62-49ba-e0b2-fa12060ef577" fo:word-like="text-run">events</glossaryDefinitionRef> not considered in the <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/1138" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_58a8ae8b-5191-488c-9b7e-9006f43da2b6" fo:word-like="text-run">design</glossaryDefinitionRef>;</p> </li> <li id="li_128749d5-e262-46cb-9c6b-776bb06d66f8"> <p id="p_69c2f865-2405-427b-fae9-e14296e8a7a5" fo:word-like="paragraph" fo:style-reference="IAEA-List-Scheme" fo:list-item-depth="0" fo:list-item-index="1" data-fo-list-item-affix="(b)"> <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/923" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_20e6337f-062f-4ee3-cd72-c476da7ca9d0" fo:word-like="text-run">Events</glossaryDefinitionRef> involving a combination of a <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/676" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_c2ef9d35-43e7-48da-df1f-06b7e02d187d" fo:word-like="text-run">nuclear or radiological emergency</glossaryDefinitionRef> with a conventional <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/872" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_446c6a68-27ab-41c8-b36a-571177d3ef02" fo:word-like="text-run">emergency</glossaryDefinitionRef> such as an <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/872" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_e16d1ca8-207f-4e32-c3a6-ec81384ada0b" fo:word-like="text-run">emergency</glossaryDefinitionRef> following an earthquake, a <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/912" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_a31413f9-b40d-424b-d648-39b6b57ebc8f" fo:word-like="text-run">volcanic eruption</glossaryDefinitionRef>, a tropical cyclone, severe weather, a tsunami, an <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/1269" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_f2f4e51f-f4d7-4b96-de71-7efe04e576a0" fo:word-like="text-run">aircraft</glossaryDefinitionRef> crash or civil disturbances that could affect wide <noGlossaryTerm id="noGlossaryTerm_498da040-d9ce-4982-ec12-4a1185b4df2f" fo:word-like="text-run">areas</noGlossaryTerm> and/or could impair capabilities to provide support in the <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/892" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_e26ef0e7-2adf-4e17-a21d-81c9c7354dfe" fo:word-like="text-run">emergency response</glossaryDefinitionRef>;</p> </li> <li id="li_cf577aad-dca1-4540-9f33-3f91c1a6245e"> <p id="p_3b82c8d9-0f5a-48c5-915c-bfd4b484abeb" fo:word-like="paragraph" fo:style-reference="IAEA-List-Scheme" fo:list-item-depth="0" fo:list-item-index="2" data-fo-list-item-affix="(c)"> <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/923" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_8649c8a5-5a59-4af8-9854-92a4b0854439" fo:word-like="text-run">Events</glossaryDefinitionRef> that could affect several <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/945" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_565258c4-fbee-4148-8131-ffd62530b06d" fo:word-like="text-run">facilities and activities</glossaryDefinitionRef> concurrently, as well as consideration of the interactions between the <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/945" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_f47930b5-2019-4723-8b1a-d614de79f7fd" fo:word-like="text-run">facilities and activities</glossaryDefinitionRef> affected;</p> </li> <li id="li_9f45551a-f009-4380-f34d-9e5ce36cd594"> <p id="p_e89957dd-ae34-4efd-b891-3923e6d93a3d" foss:margin-bottom="12" fo:word-like="paragraph" fo:style-reference="IAEA-List-Scheme" fo:list-item-depth="0" fo:list-item-index="3" data-fo-list-item-affix="(d)" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142516"> <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/923" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_ee1a1130-c355-41e3-bcee-ba6aa07d076f" fo:word-like="text-run">Events</glossaryDefinitionRef> at <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/946" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_59324d6d-043f-4e09-b7fa-818acbcd432b" fo:word-like="text-run">facilities</glossaryDefinitionRef> in other States or <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/923" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_c30d2b36-8553-4994-9ff5-1c3b150ec320" fo:word-like="text-run">events</glossaryDefinitionRef> involving <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/947" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_9f30a398-9a1e-4ccd-f556-7526db7f4bb0" fo:word-like="text-run">activities</glossaryDefinitionRef> in other States.</p> </li> </ol> </segment> <segment id="segment_ee32bcb2-6456-4a02-90c2-9942fb91be92"> <p id="p_7fff15b0-7580-4769-b93b-fd3c375fbbc4" fo:style-reference="Normal" fo:word-like="paragraph"> <segnumber id="segnumber_55154507-1736-4ba4-be7f-65135c0bd172" fo:word-like="text-run">4.21.</segnumber> <tabspace fo:style-reference="Normal" fo:word-like="tab-space" /> <span xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" fo:tab-visual="true" style="width: 6.67188px;"></span>The government shall ensure that the <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/167" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_42fce89b-1720-4ec2-871f-dfea6957cafd" fo:word-like="text-run">hazard assessment</glossaryDefinitionRef> identifies those <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/946" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_aab1c578-5f98-4f29-fad2-c26b4c8431d1" fo:word-like="text-run">facilities</glossaryDefinitionRef> and locations at which there is a significant likelihood of encountering a <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/1220" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_3aaf0e7b-bb00-4f70-98ec-532526da4e57" fo:word-like="text-run">dangerous source</glossaryDefinitionRef> that is not under <noGlossaryTerm id="noGlossaryTerm_4b813b4d-5654-4e3d-d8f1-ce9ef1c6357c" fo:word-like="text-run">control</noGlossaryTerm>.<sup foss:font-size="9" foss:vertical-align="super" foss:border-top="0 solid #000000" foss:border-bottom="0 solid #000000" foss:border-left="0 solid #000000" foss:border-right="0 solid #000000" fo:style-reference="textSup" fo:word-like="text-run" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142517">8</sup><fn id="fn_f29522ad-a599-44d9-d9cf-98a6871354b0" fo:word-like="footnote" fo:id="e968a172-636a-40f2-922f-472e7d42d7d6"><fo:schemaless-content fo:word-like="text-run" fo:style-reference="FootnoteReference">8</fo:schemaless-content></fn></p> </segment> <segment id="segment_49def9b3-406b-4a3d-b744-0a15da989156"> <p id="p_9432e0c2-4fdf-494f-bdd0-0902264b43f1" fo:style-reference="Normal" fo:word-like="paragraph"> <segnumber id="segnumber_37c4d5df-b1b9-433a-8805-2b44f41d8338" fo:word-like="text-run">4.22.</segnumber> <tabspace fo:style-reference="Normal" fo:word-like="tab-space" /> <span xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" fo:tab-visual="true" style="width: 6.67188px;"></span>The government shall ensure that the <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/167" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_731a112b-a8df-429c-b6df-1e89e627ba47" fo:word-like="text-run">hazard assessment</glossaryDefinitionRef> includes consideration of the results of threat <noGlossaryTerm id="noGlossaryTerm_1cf6b242-0ccf-4576-e151-297556066ec6" fo:word-like="text-run">assessments</noGlossaryTerm> made for <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/1185" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_2514c1ef-d735-4241-cba5-ab5fdf0584ef" fo:word-like="text-run">nuclear security</glossaryDefinitionRef> purposes [<xref format="html" href="http://nucleus-apps.iaea.org/nss-oui/Content/Index?CollectionId=m_0fce2a40-ac12-4db9-ad3b-e4bfc93f678e&type=PublishedCollection#c_ea945aea-2009-46d2-8522-d3939a8596d0#concept_40a171b9-5073-4aaf-8c45-c8a90612ac23/li_af49d4d0-f5d2-45fc-cc92-ce9dfebf277c" id="xref_b952c3ee-57cd-4d54-9e03-cd90305c301d" fo:word-like="text-run">9</xref>, <xref format="html" href="http://nucleus-apps.iaea.org/nss-oui/Content/Index?CollectionId=m_0fce2a40-ac12-4db9-ad3b-e4bfc93f678e&type=PublishedCollection#c_ea945aea-2009-46d2-8522-d3939a8596d0#concept_40a171b9-5073-4aaf-8c45-c8a90612ac23/li_170a3887-976a-4bdb-a687-654a9c91b1d5" id="xref_91e16bf7-000e-4d77-a068-22cfc81685ac" fo:word-like="text-run">10</xref>, <xref format="html" href="http://nucleus-apps.iaea.org/nss-oui/Content/Index?CollectionId=m_0fce2a40-ac12-4db9-ad3b-e4bfc93f678e&type=PublishedCollection#c_ea945aea-2009-46d2-8522-d3939a8596d0#concept_40a171b9-5073-4aaf-8c45-c8a90612ac23/li_85bd113d-aa8c-41c3-a48e-a8386f123e88" id="xref_4c767da3-0149-4309-a761-e2120152dc78" fo:word-like="text-run">11</xref>].<sup foss:font-size="9" foss:vertical-align="super" foss:border-top="0 solid #000000" foss:border-bottom="0 solid #000000" foss:border-left="0 solid #000000" foss:border-right="0 solid #000000" fo:style-reference="textSup" fo:word-like="text-run" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142518">9</sup><fn id="fn_69c7e533-581c-4ee3-dea6-2732418147ce" fo:word-like="footnote" fo:id="040e15fb-05a7-484b-9d3e-5adc37efee29"><fo:schemaless-content fo:word-like="text-run" fo:style-reference="FootnoteReference">9</fo:schemaless-content></fn></p> </segment> <segment id="segment_7c41013d-6ed5-4c8e-f7e9-eee043fba611"> <p id="p_20296322-f558-470f-8b60-6a7c20d2fb6b" fo:style-reference="Normal" fo:word-like="paragraph"> <segnumber id="segnumber_96c2b35c-2270-464e-d6f3-7580bc8a9178" fo:word-like="text-run">4.23.</segnumber> <tabspace fo:style-reference="Normal" fo:word-like="tab-space" /> <span xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" fo:tab-visual="true" style="width: 6.67188px;"></span>In the <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/167" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_05449e58-98cc-4626-f54b-f922c35a3597" fo:word-like="text-run">hazard assessment</glossaryDefinitionRef>, <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/945" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_5178f65a-1085-4586-be9b-18fdb4970589" fo:word-like="text-run">facilities and activities</glossaryDefinitionRef>, <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/684" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_48a0fd79-2c41-4122-c885-d3ed76fd806a" fo:word-like="text-run">on-site</glossaryDefinitionRef><noGlossaryTerm id="noGlossaryTerm_3a47a87b-ebd2-4730-d2aa-75fa5001fa19" fo:word-like="text-run">areas</noGlossaryTerm>, <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/682" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_f82cdab5-139f-4bc5-f1fa-60f440dd9c1a" fo:word-like="text-run">off-site</glossaryDefinitionRef><noGlossaryTerm id="noGlossaryTerm_3c9ff777-0a6d-48f5-aa69-6f9bb88f7c93" fo:word-like="text-run">areas</noGlossaryTerm> and locations shall be identified for which a <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/676" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_583a5844-8adf-43f3-b32c-dac9a571ab0e" fo:word-like="text-run">nuclear or radiological emergency</glossaryDefinitionRef> could — with account taken of the <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/535" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_bf81d63f-118b-416a-8643-983c425517c2" fo:word-like="text-run">uncertainties</glossaryDefinitionRef> in and limitations of the information available — warrant any of the following:</p> <ol outputclass="alphabetical" id="ol_c5050b5e-3791-40fa-e667-e26ba36ebeaa" fo:word-like="list" fo:numbering-style-reference="IAEA-List-Scheme" fo:word-like-list-id="5"> <li id="li_2e42da04-ba91-4964-8908-33d9ef57e724"> <p id="p_0aede728-0264-4a6a-bf93-7f3916c9736d" fo:word-like="paragraph" fo:style-reference="IAEA-List-Scheme" fo:list-item-depth="0" fo:list-item-index="0" data-fo-list-item-affix="(a)"> <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/635" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_c06882cc-40bb-44fa-8a5b-93d1fe7d1313" fo:word-like="text-run">Precautionary urgent protective actions</glossaryDefinitionRef> to avoid or to minimize <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/368" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_d880c877-5c97-4b4b-c83c-3082d215092f" fo:word-like="text-run">severe deterministic effects</glossaryDefinitionRef> by keeping <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/1096" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_05e51e28-e63f-4276-80ff-76bce9704320" fo:word-like="text-run">doses</glossaryDefinitionRef> below levels approaching the <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/831" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_9316eaac-b2ef-4919-a11e-f20be56db114" fo:word-like="text-run">generic criteria</glossaryDefinitionRef> at which <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/292" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_e8b339ff-2aca-400d-b0af-b6f070e535c0" fo:word-like="text-run">urgent protective actions</glossaryDefinitionRef> and <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/894" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_5fa5c258-d095-4123-b5ba-8bdae3aeafb3" fo:word-like="text-run">other response actions</glossaryDefinitionRef> are required to be undertaken under any circumstances, with account taken of Appendix II;</p> </li> <li id="li_f5b3c3de-83f8-4a22-962a-ab41c37635c0"> <p id="p_c5538be5-bed9-49a8-9700-d6d67aa2884a" fo:word-like="paragraph" fo:style-reference="IAEA-List-Scheme" fo:list-item-depth="0" fo:list-item-index="1" data-fo-list-item-affix="(b)"> <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/292" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_bdd6c7e4-ec41-4268-8819-5fa813ab00b8" fo:word-like="text-run">Urgent protective actions</glossaryDefinitionRef> and <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/894" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_ce6e13bb-0ac1-4a71-a196-67f57d022006" fo:word-like="text-run">other response actions</glossaryDefinitionRef> to avoid or to minimize <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/368" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_ff9db121-59a6-4579-e052-6c541a7cc437" fo:word-like="text-run">severe deterministic effects</glossaryDefinitionRef> and to reduce the <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/1206" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_a101ead9-1f55-4153-a47a-d4b86199c91b" fo:word-like="text-run">risk</glossaryDefinitionRef> of <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/421" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_0cf356c4-96f4-48bf-fc5d-399afa3d2328" fo:word-like="text-run">stochastic effects</glossaryDefinitionRef>, with account taken of Appendix II;</p> </li> <li id="li_5a9f48b8-3f40-43da-b86e-a8a1db3cd8be"> <p id="p_e3019d29-5529-4eaf-89a6-b9944a10f472" fo:word-like="paragraph" fo:style-reference="IAEA-List-Scheme" fo:list-item-depth="0" fo:list-item-index="2" data-fo-list-item-affix="(c)"> <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/633" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_1579da66-78ce-4eb8-a63d-a8bdc495990c" fo:word-like="text-run">Early protective actions</glossaryDefinitionRef> and <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/894" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_0510dca6-edf8-4ee3-d8f9-66d86ed07ba1" fo:word-like="text-run">other response actions</glossaryDefinitionRef>, with account taken of Appendix II;</p> </li> <li id="li_00d819d9-2f5f-46ca-aa60-f0149d0a5058"> <p id="p_2138ad9d-54e3-4130-8d1c-c354be07fac6" fo:word-like="paragraph" fo:style-reference="IAEA-List-Scheme" fo:list-item-depth="0" fo:list-item-index="3" data-fo-list-item-affix="(d)"> <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/894" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_65658cba-1037-49b8-83b1-3dcf7444a6af" fo:word-like="text-run">Other emergency response actions</glossaryDefinitionRef> such as longer term medical actions, with account taken of Appendix II, and <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/893" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_4932d7fa-ae49-49e0-8ebf-7a469b1592b5" fo:word-like="text-run">emergency response actions</glossaryDefinitionRef> aimed at enabling the termination of the <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/872" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_271d839e-d769-45a0-a020-200b91a8a61d" fo:word-like="text-run">emergency</glossaryDefinitionRef> (see <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/510" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_99e50aad-a090-4392-bf8f-84258f6b207d" fo:word-like="text-run">Requirement</glossaryDefinitionRef> 18); or</p> </li> <li id="li_c1682142-d2a1-4c78-f33b-916428a9bc59"> <p id="p_4a1efe1c-e253-41e3-9b39-3e71a5ac9391" foss:margin-bottom="12" fo:word-like="paragraph" fo:style-reference="IAEA-List-Scheme" fo:list-item-depth="0" fo:list-item-index="4" data-fo-list-item-affix="(e)" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142519"> <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/626" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_29056f95-8476-4249-e985-3120e1f82670" fo:word-like="text-run">Protection</glossaryDefinitionRef> of <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/898" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_4fa612dc-ef0e-4fb3-a5a9-5fd641bb3c90" fo:word-like="text-run">emergency workers</glossaryDefinitionRef> in accordance with <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/510" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_0c8766b5-6c0d-4c34-89cd-b1356f952291" fo:word-like="text-run">Requirement</glossaryDefinitionRef> 11 and with account taken of Appendix I.</p> </li> </ol> </segment> <segment id="segment_379258bc-1c3f-4b64-ff4c-a83c37034814"> <p id="p_6c6ec0bd-6a67-4c40-e984-1955bd2bae00" fo:style-reference="Normal" fo:word-like="paragraph"> <segnumber id="segnumber_996efd78-639a-4b51-e02c-7c2c45688461" fo:word-like="text-run">4.24.</segnumber> <tabspace fo:style-reference="Normal" fo:word-like="tab-space" /> <span xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" fo:tab-visual="true" style="width: 6.67188px;"></span>The government shall ensure that the <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/167" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_8ae3b977-ec17-42d8-b90d-e56cad5b3ed4" fo:word-like="text-run">hazard assessment</glossaryDefinitionRef> also identifies non-radiation-related <noGlossaryTerm id="noGlossaryTerm_9c1f6226-9241-40d9-e999-6369c52b4a4d" fo:word-like="text-run">hazards</noGlossaryTerm><sup foss:font-size="9" foss:vertical-align="super" foss:border-top="0 solid #000000" foss:border-bottom="0 solid #000000" foss:border-left="0 solid #000000" foss:border-right="0 solid #000000" fo:style-reference="textSup" fo:word-like="text-run" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142520">10</sup><fn id="fn_c230ba47-ce6f-4fac-c35a-e836e71b19da" fo:word-like="footnote" fo:id="6db72027-00bb-40d5-ad09-973b3d96fac7"><fo:schemaless-content fo:word-like="text-run" fo:style-reference="FootnoteReference">10</fo:schemaless-content></fn> to people <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/684" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_bb2b8ef2-b0a8-4581-e194-8e233df35111" fo:word-like="text-run">on the site</glossaryDefinitionRef> and <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/682" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_b99b727d-fc92-4c74-dbf0-d0c8909eebfa" fo:word-like="text-run">off the site</glossaryDefinitionRef> that are associated with the <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/945" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_b746f128-1ad8-464b-f664-5eede232549e" fo:word-like="text-run">facility or activity</glossaryDefinitionRef> and that may impair the effectiveness of the response actions to be taken.</p> </segment> <segment id="segment_00da487f-58b6-4eda-fc0c-13b06494fa6f"> <p id="p_3dcb706d-abd0-456a-9751-b331227a270a" fo:style-reference="Normal" fo:word-like="paragraph"> <segnumber id="segnumber_dc90c61c-75f9-4597-b067-9da94444ecd9" fo:word-like="text-run">4.25.</segnumber> <tabspace fo:style-reference="Normal" fo:word-like="tab-space" /> <span xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" fo:tab-visual="true" style="width: 6.67188px;"></span>The government shall ensure that a review of the <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/167" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_f0ba7cbe-c45f-4b4c-dbe9-ddb887b0dd53" fo:word-like="text-run">hazard assessment</glossaryDefinitionRef> is performed periodically with the aims of: (a) ensuring that all <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/945" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_a5d160cb-7146-4509-dea2-c55c0d22b5ba" fo:word-like="text-run">facilities and activities</glossaryDefinitionRef>, <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/684" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_e21d8493-2f20-49c2-b95e-84d400c2a8f5" fo:word-like="text-run">on-site</glossaryDefinitionRef><noGlossaryTerm id="noGlossaryTerm_e13c3e86-392f-41bc-a8e2-3892e194ab68" fo:word-like="text-run">areas</noGlossaryTerm>, <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/682" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_9672e4b3-61fb-401d-efd2-728a32d4cebb" fo:word-like="text-run">off-site</glossaryDefinitionRef><noGlossaryTerm id="noGlossaryTerm_c494a085-0101-4415-d48d-c9f9988c72bc" fo:word-like="text-run">areas</noGlossaryTerm> and locations where <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/923" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_2bb0bfc4-d15c-45ef-f9b4-5c01d63d28a5" fo:word-like="text-run">events</glossaryDefinitionRef> could occur that would necessitate <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/632" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_68e060b9-5b0c-4fae-d3c1-fa6143b37b86" fo:word-like="text-run">protective actions</glossaryDefinitionRef> and <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/894" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_b547c95d-18aa-4309-9d91-8049a76db3d4" fo:word-like="text-run">other response actions</glossaryDefinitionRef> are identified, and (b) taking into account any changes in the <noGlossaryTerm id="noGlossaryTerm_4b7522ba-4e3d-43bb-a4d0-b40c6ffad159" fo:word-like="text-run">hazards</noGlossaryTerm> within the State and beyond its borders, any changes in <noGlossaryTerm id="noGlossaryTerm_08c259b7-ed35-40f5-a346-cd73de1a68bf" fo:word-like="text-run">assessments</noGlossaryTerm> of threats for <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/1185" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_42b653af-e099-4ef4-c2a6-2f2ffef5c3fb" fo:word-like="text-run">nuclear security</glossaryDefinitionRef> purposes, the experience and lessons from research, <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/690" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_cd43f86a-5590-4675-ac39-d30a9f178fea" fo:word-like="text-run">operation</glossaryDefinitionRef> and <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/872" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_79f2a226-146f-4e63-c79f-33b6b7e87b36" fo:word-like="text-run">emergency</glossaryDefinitionRef> exercises, and technological developments (see paras 6.30, 6.36 and 6.38). The results of this review shall be used to revise the <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/873" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_02fb2f8e-a9df-4264-a46c-fdfe8518bf6c" fo:word-like="text-run">emergency arrangements</glossaryDefinitionRef> as necessary.</p> </segment> <segment id="segment_16cb35c8-cf5f-46ad-ba6c-b8a27a8f7ad9"> <p id="p_8157c988-b8c3-4473-90f0-7f86e2286385" fo:style-reference="Normal" fo:word-like="paragraph"> <segnumber id="segnumber_2f2a4c20-94ab-45d3-8e50-6877c5bc0a5c" fo:word-like="text-run">4.26.</segnumber> <tabspace fo:style-reference="Normal" fo:word-like="tab-space" /> <span xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" fo:tab-visual="true" style="width: 6.67188px;"></span>The government through the <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/490" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_905f837f-5681-4834-831e-d1dcbf924295" fo:word-like="text-run">regulatory body</glossaryDefinitionRef> shall ensure that <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/1186" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_26af8b35-4b95-4d86-fae4-97ae3dfe80d9" fo:word-like="text-run">operating organizations</glossaryDefinitionRef> review appropriately and, as necessary, revise the <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/873" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_8ada34b4-56f4-42c7-8faf-a7179fc25cd1" fo:word-like="text-run">emergency arrangements</glossaryDefinitionRef> (a) prior to any changes in the <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/945" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_a80b3d60-6f43-4a28-9f56-8e3080008763" fo:word-like="text-run">facility or activity</glossaryDefinitionRef> that affect the existing <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/167" id="glossaryDefinitionRef_c64320ad-dae5-49e1-9c5e-6f75a51023c3" fo:word-like="text-run">hazard assessment</glossaryDefinitionRef> and (b) when new information becomes available that provides insights into the adequacy of the existing <glossaryDefinitionRef href="https://vocabulary.iaea.org/iaea-safety-glossary/873" id="id-a436c539-7675-4e86-d3c2-f169ae12a96a" fo:word-like="text-run">arrangements</glossaryDefinitionRef>.<sup foss:font-size="9" foss:vertical-align="super" foss:border-top="0 solid #000000" foss:border-bottom="0 solid #000000" foss:border-left="0 solid #000000" foss:border-right="0 solid #000000" fo:style-reference="textSup" fo:word-like="text-run" foss:inline-style-id="inline-142521">11</sup><fn id="fn_219d5b1e-fa89-492d-b2b6-19a1922040b2" fo:word-like="footnote" fo:id="73a024c3-1faa-4978-bf6f-d1ec4b6b6192"><fo:schemaless-content fo:word-like="text-run" fo:style-reference="FootnoteReference">11</fo:schemaless-content></fn></p> </segment> </conbody> </concept> <fo:bookmark fo:reference-id="concept_410140a2-1e87-4998-fab9-51b26302b1e0" fo:word-like="bookmark-start" /> <overarchingRequirement id="concept_410140a2-1e87-4998-fab9-51b26302b1e0" xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation="urn:iaea:names:dita:xsd:concept.xsd" output:file-name="c_479b2f40-a9ba-4cc1-84df-32c122d39ec6__54_0.dita" href="c_479b2f40-a9ba-4cc1-84df-32c122d39ec6__54_0.dita" original-navtitle="Requirement 5: Protection strategy for a nuclear or radiological emergency" fo:bookmark-level-toc-sections="2" fo:bookmark-label-toc-sections="Requirement 5: Protection strategy for a nuclear or radiological emergency"> <title id="title_ea5e8aa8-5428-47e9-ed28-43e46bd2029d" fo:style-reference="Heading3" fo:word-like="paragraph">Requirement 5: Protection strategy for a nuclear or radiological emergency

The government shall ensure that protection strategies are developed, justified and optimized at the preparedness stage for taking protective actions and other response actions effectively in a nuclear or radiological emergency.

4.27. The government shall ensure that, on the basis of the hazards identified and the potential consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency, protection strategies are developed, justified and optimized at the preparedness stage for taking protective actions and other response actions effectively in a nuclear or radiological emergency to achieve the goals of emergency response.

4.28. Development of a protection strategy shall include, but shall not be limited to, the following:

  1. Consideration shall be given to actions to be taken to avoid or to minimize severe deterministic effects and to reduce the risk of stochastic effects. Deterministic effects shall be evaluated on the basis of relative biological effectiveness (RBE) weighted absorbed dose to a tissue or organ. Stochastic effects in a tissue or organ shall be evaluated on the basis of equivalent dose to the tissue or organ. The detriment associated with the occurrence of stochastic effects in individuals in an exposed population shall be evaluated on the basis of the effective dose.

  2. A reference level expressed in terms of residual dose shall be set, typically as an effective dose in the range 20–100 mSv, acute or annual, that includes dose contributions via all exposure pathways. This reference level shall be used in conjunction with the goals of emergency response (see para. 3.2) and the specific time frame in which particular goals are to be achieved.1212

  3. On the basis of the outcome of the justification and the optimization of the protection strategy, national generic criteria for taking protective actions and other response actions, expressed in terms of projected dose or of dose that has been received, shall be developed with account taken of the generic criteria in Appendix II. If the national generic criteria for projected dose or received dose are exceeded, protective actions and other response actions, either individually or in combination, shall be implemented;

  4. Once the protection strategy has been justified and optimized and a set of national generic criteria has been developed, pre-established operational criteria (conditions on the site, emergency action levels (EALs) and operational intervention levels (OILs)) for initiating the different parts of an emergency plan and for taking protective actions and other response actions shall be derived from the generic criteria1313. Arrangements shall be established in advance to revise these operational criteria, as appropriate, in the course of a nuclear or radiological emergency, with account taken of the prevailing conditions as they evolve.

4.29. Each protective action, in the context of the protection strategy, and the protection strategy itself shall be demonstrated to be justified (i.e. to do more good than harm), with account taken not only of those detriments that are associated with radiation exposure but also of those detriments associated with impacts of the actions taken on public health1414, the economy, society and the environment.

4.30. The government shall ensure that interested parties are involved and are consulted, as appropriate, in the development of the protection strategy.

4.31. The government shall ensure that the protection strategy is implemented safely and effectively in an emergency response through the implementation of emergency arrangements, including but not limited to:

  1. Promptly taking urgent protective actions and other response actions with account taken of Appendix II to avoid or to minimize severe deterministic effects, if possible, on the basis of observed conditions and before any exposure occurs;

  2. Taking early protective actions and other response actions to reduce the risk of stochastic effects with account taken of Appendix II;

  3. Providing for registration, health screening and longer term medical follow-up, as appropriate, with account taken of Appendix II;

  4. Taking actions to protect emergency workers, with account taken of guidance values provided in Appendix I;

  5. Taking actions to mitigate non-radiological consequences, with account taken of Appendix II;

  6. Assessing the effectiveness of the actions taken and adjusting them as appropriate on the basis of prevailing conditions and available information as well as the reference level expressed in terms of residual dose;

  7. Revising the protection strategy as necessary and its further implementation;

  8. Discontinuing protective actions and other response actions when they are no longer justified.

See also:

GSG-2 Criteria for Use in Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency

GSG-11 Arrangements for the Termination of a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency

You may also wish to read:

Considerations in the Development of a Protection Strategy for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (EPR-Protection Strategy)

Actions to Protect the Public in an Emergency due to Severe Conditions at a Light Water Reactor (EPR-NPP Public Protective Actions)

Operational Intervention Levels for Reactor Emergencies and Methodology for Their Derivation (EPR-NPP-OILs)

5. Functional requirements General

5.1. The requirements established in this section address the functions that are essential for the emergency response in a nuclear or radiological emergency to be effective and for achieving the goals of emergency response (see para. 3.2).

Requirement 6: Managing operations in an emergency response

The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place for operations in response to a nuclear or radiological emergency to be appropriately managed.

5.2. For facilities in categories I, II and III, arrangements shall be made for the on-siteemergency response to be promptly executed and managed without impairing the performance of the continuing operational safety and security functions both at the facility and at any other facilities on the same site. The transition from normal operations to operations under emergency conditions on the site shall be clearly specified and shall be effectively made. The responsibilities of all personnel who would be on the site in an emergency shall be designated as part of the arrangements for this transition. It shall be ensured that the transition to the emergency response and the performance of initial response actions do not impair the ability of operating personnel (such as operating personnel in the control room) to ensure safe and secure operation while taking mitigatory actions.

5.3. For facilities in categories I, II and III, and, where appropriate, for activities in category IV, arrangements shall be made for an off-siteemergency response to be promptly executed, effectively managed and coordinated with an on-siteemergency response.

5.4. For a site where several facilities in categories I and II are collocated, adequate arrangements shall be made to manage the emergency response at all the facilities if each of them is under emergency conditions simultaneously. This shall include arrangements to manage the deployment of and the protection of personnel responding on and off the site (see Requirement 11).

5.5. For facilities and activities in categories I, II, III and IV, arrangements have to be made, as far as practicable, so that the facility or activity has a nuclear security system or systems [9, 10, 11] that would be functional in a nuclear or radiological emergency.

5.6. Arrangements for response to a nuclear or radiological emergency shall be coordinated and integrated with arrangements at the local, regional and national levels for response to a conventional emergency and to a nuclear securityevent.1515 These arrangements shall take into consideration the fact that the initiator of the nuclear or radiological emergency may not be known early in the response.

5.7. Arrangements shall be made for the establishment and use of a clearly specified and unified command and control system for emergency response under the all-hazards approach as part of the emergencymanagement system (see paras 4.1–4.3). The command and control system shall provide sufficient assurance for effective coordination of the on-site and off-site response. The authority and responsibility for directing the emergency response and for making decisions on emergency response actions to be taken shall be clearly assigned. The responsibility for directing the emergency response and for decision making on emergency response actions to be taken shall be promptly discharged following a notification of an emergency.

5.8. Arrangements shall be made for obtaining and assessing the information necessary for making decisions on the allocation of resources for all response organizations throughout a nuclear or radiological emergency.

5.9. For facilities in category I or II and areas in category V, arrangements shall be made for coordinating the emergency response between response organizations (including those of other States) within the emergency planning zones and emergency planning distances (see para. 5.38) and for providing mutual support.

5.10. Arrangements shall be made with other States, as appropriate, for coordinated response to a radiological emergency.

See also:

GSG-11 Arrangements for the Termination of a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency

You may also wish to read:

Method for Developing Arrangements for Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency - updating IAEA-TECDOC-953 (EPR-Method)

Manual for First Responders to a Radiological Emergency (EPR-First Responders)

Generic Procedures for Medical Response During a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (EPR-Medical)

Communication with the Public in a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (EPR-Public Communication)

Requirement 7: Identifying and notifying a nuclear or radiological emergency and activating an emergency response

The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place for the prompt identification and notification of a nuclear or radiological emergency and for the activation of an emergency response.

5.11. An off-sitenotification point1616, or more than one, shall be established to receive notification of an actual or potential nuclear or radiological emergency. The notification point(s) shall be maintained in a state of continuous availability to receive any notification or request for support and to respond promptly, or to initiate a preplanned and coordinated off-siteemergency response appropriate to the emergency class or the level of emergency response. The notification point(s) shall be able to initiate immediate communication by suitable, reliable and diverse means with the response organizations that are providing support.

5.12. For facilities in categories I and II and for areas in category V, the notification point shall be able to initiate immediate communication with the authority that has been assigned the responsibility to decide on and to initiate precautionary urgent protective actions and urgent protective actionsoff the site (see also para. 5.7).

5.13. For facilities and locations at which there is a significant likelihood of encountering a dangerous source that is not under control (see para. 4.21), arrangements shall be made to ensure that the on-site managers of operations and other personnel are aware of the indicators of a potential radiological emergency, the appropriate notification, and protective actions and other response actions that are immediately warranted in an emergency. For facilities and locations for which there is a significant likelihood of encountering a dangerous source that is not under control and for an emergency at an unforeseen location, arrangements shall be made to ensure that the local officials responsible for the response and first responders are aware of the indicators of a potential radiological emergency, the appropriate notification, and protective actions and other response actions that are warranted to be taken immediately in an emergency.

5.14. The operating organization of a facility or activity in category I, II, III or IV shall make arrangements for promptly classifying, on the basis of the hazard assessment, a nuclear or radiological emergency warranting protective actions and other response actions to protect workers, emergency workers, members of the public and, as relevant, patients and helpers in an emergency, in accordance with the protection strategy (see Requirement 5). This shall include a system for classifying all types of nuclear or radiological emergency1717 as follows:

  1. General emergency at facilities in category I or II for an emergency that warrants taking precautionary urgent protective actions, urgent protective actions, and early protective actions and other response actionson the site and off the site. Upon declaration of this emergency class, appropriate actions shall promptly be taken, on the basis of the available information relating to the emergency, to mitigate the consequences of the emergencyon the site and to protect people on the site and off the site.

  2. Site area emergency at facilities in category I or II for an emergency that warrants taking protective actions and other response actionson the site and in the vicinity of the site. Upon declaration of this emergency class, actions shall promptly be taken: (i) to mitigate the consequences of the emergencyon the site and to protect people on the site; (ii) to increase the readiness to take protective actions and other response actionsoff the site if this becomes necessary on the basis of observable conditions, reliable assessments and/or results of monitoring; and (iii) to conduct off-sitemonitoring, sampling and analysis.

  3. Facility emergency at facilities in category I, II or III for an emergency that warrants taking protective actions and other response actions at the facility and on the site but does not warrant taking protective actionsoff the site. Upon declaration of this emergency class, actions shall promptly be taken to mitigate the consequences of the emergency and to protect people at the facility and on the site. Emergencies in this class do not present an off-sitehazard.

  4. Alert at facilities in category I, II or III for an event that warrants taking actions to assess and to mitigate the potential consequences at the facility. Upon declaration of this emergency class, actions shall promptly be taken to assess and to mitigate the potential consequences of the event and to increase the readiness of the on-siteresponse organizations.

  5. Other nuclear or radiological emergency 18 18 for an emergency in category IV that warrants taking protective actions and other response actions at any location. Upon declaration of this emergency class and the level of emergency response, actions shall promptly be taken to mitigate the consequences of the emergencyon the site, to protect those in the vicinity (e.g. workers and emergency workers and the public) and to determine where and for whom protective actions and other response actions are warranted.

5.15. For facilities in category I, II or III and for category IV, arrangements shall be made to review the declared emergency class in the light of any new information and, as appropriate, to revise it.

5.16. The emergency classification system for facilities and activities in categories I, II, III and IV shall take into account all postulated emergencies, including those arising from events of very low probability. The operational criteria for classification shall include emergency action levels and other observable conditions (i.e. ‘observables’) and indicators of the conditions at the facility and/or on the site or off the site. The emergency classification system shall be established with the aim of allowing for the prompt initiation of an effective response in recognition of the uncertainty of the available information. It shall be ensured that any process for rating an event on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) [15] does not delay the emergency classification or emergency response actions.1919

5.17. For facilities and activities in categories I, II and III, and for category IV, arrangements shall be made: (1) to promptly recognize and classify a nuclear or radiological emergency; (2) upon classification, to promptly declare the emergency class and to initiate a coordinated and preplanned on-site response; (3) to notify the appropriate notification point (see para. 5.11) and to provide sufficient information for an effective off-site response; and (4) upon notification, to initiate a coordinated and preplanned off-site response, as appropriate, in accordance with the protection strategy. These arrangements shall include suitable, reliable and diverse means of warning persons on the site, of notifying the notification point (see paras 5.41–5.43, 6.22 and 6.34) and of communication between response organizations.

5.18. In the event of a transnational emergency, the notifying State shall promptly notify2020,2121 the IAEA of the emergency and, either directly or through the IAEA, those States that could be affected by it. The notifying State shall provide information on the nature of the emergency and on its potential transnational consequences, and shall respond to requests from other States and from the IAEA for information for the purposes of mitigating any consequences.

5.19. The State shall make known to the IAEA and to other States, directly or through the IAEA, its single warning point responsible for receiving emergencynotifications and information from other States and information from the IAEA. This warning point shall be maintained in a state of continuous availability to receive any notification, request for assistance or request for verification and to promptly initiate a response or verification. The State shall promptly inform the IAEA and shall inform other States, directly or through the IAEA, of any changes that occur in respect of the warning point. The State shall make arrangements for promptly notifying and for providing relevant information, directly or through the IAEA, to those States that could be affected by a transnational emergency.

5.20. The notifying State shall have arrangements in place for promptly responding to requests from other States or from the IAEA for information in respect of a transnational emergency, in particular with regard to minimizing any consequences. These arrangements shall include making known to the IAEA and to other States, directly or through the IAEA, the notifying State’s designated organization(s) for so doing.

5.21. Arrangements shall be made for promptly and directly notifying any State within the emergency planning zones and emergency planning distances (see para. 5.38) within which urgent protective actions and early protective actions and other response actions could be required to be taken.

5.22. Appropriate emergency response actions shall be initiated in a timely manner upon the receipt of a notification from another State or of information from the IAEA on a notification relating to an actual or potential transnational emergency that could have impacts on the State or its nationals.

See also:

GS-G-2.1 Safety Guide on Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (2007)

GSG-2 Criteria for Use in Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency

You may also wish to read:

Method for Developing Arrangements for Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency - updating IAEA-TECDOC-953 (EPR-Method)

Generic Procedures for Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency at Research Reactors - Training Material (EPR-Research Reactors)

Actions to Protect the Public in an Emergency due to Severe Conditions at a Light Water Reactor (EPR-NPP Public Protective Actions)

Classification, Assessment and Prognosis During Nuclear Power Plant Emergencies (EPR-NPP-CAP (2024))

Requirement 8: Taking mitigatory actions

The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place for taking mitigatory actions in a nuclear or radiological emergency.

5.23. The operating organization of a facility or activity in category I, II, III or IV shall promptly decide on and take actions2222on the site that are necessary to mitigate the consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency involving a facility or an activity under its responsibility.

5.24. Off-site emergency services shall be made available for the purpose of, and shall be capable of, supporting the on-site response at facilities and activities in category I, II, III or IV.2323

5.25. For facilities in category I, II or III, arrangements shall be made for mitigatory actions to be taken by the operating personnel, in particular:

  1. To prevent escalation of an emergency;

  2. To return the facility to a safe and stable state;

  3. To reduce the potential for, and to mitigate the consequences of, radioactivereleases or exposures.

These arrangements shall take into account the full range of possible conditions affecting the emergency response, including those resulting from conditions in the facility and those resulting from impacts of postulated natural, human induced or other events and affecting regional infrastructure or affecting several facilities simultaneously. Arrangements shall include emergency operating procedures and guidance for operating personnel on mitigatory actions for severe conditions (for a nuclear power plant, as part of the accident management programme [17]) and for the full range of postulated emergencies, including accidents that are not considered in the design and associated conditions. As far as practicable, the continued functionality of nuclear security system(s) (see Refs [9, 10, 11]) needs to be considered in these arrangements.

5.26. The operating organization of a facility or activity in category I, II, III or IV shall assess and determine, at the preparedness stage, when and under what conditions assistance from off-siteemergency services may need to be provided on the site, consistent with the hazard assessment and the protection strategy.23

5.27. For facilities in category I, II or III, arrangements shall be made, in particular by the operating organization, to provide technical assistance to the operating personnel. On-site teams for mitigating the consequences of an emergency (e.g. damage control, firefighting) shall be available and shall be prepared to perform actions at the facility. Paragraph 5.15 of Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design (SSR-2/1) [18] states that:

“Any equipment that is necessary for actions to be taken in manual response and recovery processes shall be placed at the most suitable location to ensure its availability at the time of need and to allow safe access to it under the environmental conditions anticipated.”

The operating personnel directing mitigatory actions shall be provided with information and technical assistance to allow them to take actions effectively to mitigate the consequences of the emergency. Arrangements shall be made to obtain support promptly from the emergency services (e.g. law enforcement agencies, medical services and firefighting services) off the site. Off-siteemergency services shall be afforded prompt access to the facility, and shall be informed of on-site conditions and provided with instructions and with means for protecting themselves as emergency workers.

5.28. Arrangements shall be made for the operating organization of an activity in category IV, first responders in an emergency at an unforeseen location, and those personnel at locations where there is a significant likelihood of encountering a dangerous source that is not under control (see para. 4.21) to take promptly all practicable and appropriate actions to mitigate the consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency. These arrangements shall include providing basic instructions and training in the means of mitigating the potential consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency (see para. 5.44).

5.29. Arrangements shall be made to provide expertise and services in radiation protection promptly to local officials, first responders in an emergency at an unforeseen location and specialized services (e.g. law enforcement agencies) responding to emergencies involving activities and acts in category IV, and to those personnel at locations where there is a significant likelihood of encountering a dangerous source that is not under control (see para. 4.21). This shall include arrangements for on-call advice or other appropriate mechanisms and arrangements to dispatch to the site an emergency team capable of assessing radiationhazards, mitigating radiological consequences and managing the exposure of emergency workers. In addition, arrangements shall be made to determine whether and when additional assistance is necessary and to determine how to obtain such assistance (see paras 5.24 and 5.94).

5.30. Arrangements shall be made to initiate a prompt search in the event that a dangerous source could possibly be in the public domain as a result of its loss or unauthorized removal (see para. 5.47).

You may also wish to read:

Method for Developing Arrangements for Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency - updating IAEA-TECDOC-953 (EPR-Method)

Requirement 9: Taking urgent protective actions and other response actions

The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place to assess emergency conditions and to take urgent protective actions and other response actions effectively in a nuclear or radiological emergency.

5.31. Arrangements shall be made so that the magnitudes of hazards and the possible development of hazardous conditions are assessed initially and throughout a nuclear or radiological emergency in order to promptly identify, characterize or anticipate, as appropriate, new hazards or the extent of hazards and to revise the protection strategy.

5.32. The operating organization of a facility in category I, II or III shall make arrangements to promptly assess and anticipate:

  1. Abnormal conditions at the facility;

  2. Exposures and radioactivereleases and releases of other hazardous material;

  3. Radiological conditions on the site and, as appropriate, off the site;

  4. Any exposures or potential exposures of workers and emergency workers, the public and, as relevant, patients and helpers in an emergency.

5.33. These assessments as stated in para. 5.32 shall be used:

  1. For deciding on mitigatory actions to be taken by the operating personnel;

  2. As a basis for emergency classification (see para. 5.14);

  3. For deciding on protective actions and other response actions to be taken on the site, including those for the protection of workers and emergency workers;

  4. For deciding on protective actions and other response actions to be taken off the site;

  5. Where appropriate, to identify those individuals who could potentially have been exposed on the site at levels requiring appropriate medical attention in accordance with Appendix II.

5.34. These arrangements as stated in para. 5.32 shall include the use of pre-established operational criteria in accordance with the protection strategy (see para. 4.28(4)) and provision for access to instruments displaying or measuring those parameters that can readily be measured or observed in a nuclear or radiological emergency. In these arrangements, the expected response of instrumentation and of structures, systems and components at the facility under emergency conditions shall be taken into account.

5.35. The operating organization for activities in category IV shall make arrangements to assess promptly the extent and/or the significance of any abnormal conditions on the site, any exposures or any contamination. These assessments shall be used:

  1. For initiating the mitigatory actions;

  2. As a basis for protective actions and other response actions to be taken on the site;

  3. For determining the level for emergency response and for communicating the extent of the hazards to the appropriate off-siteresponse organizations.

These arrangements shall include the use of pre-established operational criteria in accordance with the protection strategy (see para. 4.28(4)).

5.36. Arrangements shall be made such that information on emergency conditions, assessments and protective actions and other response actions that have been recommended and have been taken is promptly made available, as appropriate, to all relevant response organizations and to the IAEA throughout the emergency.

5.37. Arrangements shall be made for actions to save human life or to prevent serious injury to be taken without any delay on the grounds of the possible presence of radioactive material (see paras 5.39 and 5.64). These arrangements shall include providing first responders in an emergency at an unforeseen location with information on the precautions to take in giving first aid or in transporting an individual with possible contamination.

5.38. For facilities in category I or II, arrangements shall be made for effectively making decisions on and taking urgent protective actions, early protective actions and other response actions2424off the site in order to achieve the goals of emergency response, on the basis of a graded approach and in accordance with the protection strategy. The arrangements shall be made with account taken of the uncertainties in and limitations of the information available when protective actions and other response actions have to be taken to be effective, and shall include the following:

(a) The specification of off-siteemergency planning zones and emergency planning distances2525 for which arrangements shall be made at the preparedness stage for taking protective actions and other response actions effectively. These emergency planning zones and emergency planning distances shall be contiguous across national borders, where appropriate, and shall include:

(i) A precautionary action zone (PAZ), for facilities in category I, for which arrangements shall be made for taking urgent protective actions and other response actions, before any significant release2626 of radioactive material occurs, on the basis of conditions at the facility (i.e. conditions leading to the declaration of a general emergency; see para. 5.14), in order to avoid or to minimize severe deterministic effects.

(ii)An urgent protective action planning zone (UPZ), for facilities in category I or II, for which arrangements shall be made to initiate urgent protective actions and other response actions, if possible before any significant release of radioactive material occurs, on the basis of conditions at the facility (i.e. conditions leading to the declaration of a general emergency; see para. 5.14), and after a release occurs, on the basis of monitoring and assessment of the radiological situation off the site, in order to reduce the risk of stochastic effects.2727 Any such actions shall be taken in such a way as not to delay the implementation of precautionary urgent protective actions and other response actions within the precautionary action zone.

(iii) An extended planning distance (EPD) from the facility, for facilities in category I or II (beyond the urgent protective action planning zone), for which arrangements shall be made to conduct monitoring and assessment of the radiological situation off the site in order to identify areas, within a period of time that would allow the risk of stochastic effects in the areas to be effectively reduced by taking protective actions and other response actions within a day to a week or to a few weeks following a significant radioactive release.

(iv) An ingestion and commodities planning distance (ICPD) from the facility, for facilities in category I or II (beyond the extended planning distance), for which arrangements shall be made to take response actions (1) for protecting the food chain and water supply2828 as well as for protecting commodities other than food from contamination following a significant radioactive release and (2) for protecting the public from the ingestion of food, milk and drinking water and from the use of commodities other than food with possible contamination following a significant radioactive release.

(b) Criteria, based on the emergency classification and on conditions at the facility and off the site (see paras 4.28(3), 4.28(4), 5.14 and 5.15), for initiating and for adjusting urgent protective actions and other response actions within the emergency planning zones and emergency planning distances, in accordance with the protection strategy.

(c) Authority and responsibility to provide sufficient and updated information to the notification point at any time to allow for an effective off-siteemergency response.

5.39. Within the emergency planning zones and emergency planning distances, arrangements shall be made for taking appropriate protective actions and other response actions effectively, as necessary, promptly upon the notification of a nuclear or radiological emergency. These arrangements shall include arrangements for:

  1. Prompt exercise of authority and discharge of responsibility for making decisions to initiate protective actions and other response actions upon notification of an emergency (see para. 5.12);

  2. Warning the permanent population, transient population groups and special population groups or those responsible for them and warning special facilities;

  3. Taking urgent protective actions and other response actions such as evacuation, restrictions on the food chain and on water supply, prevention of inadvertent ingestion, restrictions on the consumption of food, milk and drinking water and on the use of commodities, decontamination of evacuees, control of access and traffic restrictions;

  4. Protection of emergency workers and helpers in an emergency.

The arrangements shall be coordinated with all jurisdictions (including, to the extent practicable, jurisdictions beyond national borders, where relevant) within any emergency planning zone or distance. These arrangements shall ensure that services necessary for ensuring public safety (e.g. rescue services and health services for the care of critically ill patients) are provided continuously throughout the emergency, including during the period when protective actions and other response actions are being taken.

5.40. Within emergency planning zones and emergency planning distances, arrangements shall be made for the timely monitoring and assessment of contamination, radioactive releases and exposures for the purpose of deciding on or adjusting the protective actions and other response actions that have to be taken or that are being taken. These arrangements shall include the use of pre-established operational criteria in accordance with the protection strategy (see para. 4.28(4)).

5.41. The operating organization of a facility in category I, II or III shall make arrangements to ensure protection and safety for all persons on the site in a nuclear or radiological emergency. These shall include arrangements to do the following:

  1. To notify all persons on the site of an emergencyon the site;

  2. For all persons on the site to take appropriate actions immediately upon notification of an emergency;

  3. To account for those persons on the site and to locate and recover those persons unaccounted for;

  4. To provide immediate first aid;

  5. To take urgent protective actions.

5.42. Arrangements as stated in para. 5.41 shall also include ensuring the provision, for all persons present in the facility and on the site, of:

  1. Suitable assembly points, provided with continuous radiation monitoring;

  2. A sufficient number of suitable escape routes;

  3. Suitable and reliable alarm systems and other means for warning and instructing all persons present under the full range of emergency conditions.

5.43. The operating organization of a facility in category I, II or III shall ensure that suitable, reliable and diverse means of communication are available at all times, under the full range of emergency conditions, for use in taking protective actions and other response actionson the site and for communication with off-site officials responsible for taking protective actions and other response actionsoff the site or within any emergency planning zones or emergency planning distances.

5.44. Operating personnel for activities in category IV, first responders in an emergency at an unforeseen location and those personnel at locations where there is a significant likelihood of encountering a dangerous source that is not under control (see para. 4.21) shall be provided with guidance and training on taking urgent protective actions and other response actions. This shall include guidance and training on the approximate radius of the inner cordoned off area in which urgent protective actions and other response actions would initially be taken and on the adjustment of this area on the basis of observed or assessed conditions on the site.

See also:

GS-G-2.1 Safety Guide on Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (2007)

GSG-2 Criteria for Use in Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency

GSG-11 Arrangements for the Termination of a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency

You may also wish to read:

Method for Developing Arrangements for Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency - updating IAEA-TECDOC-953 (EPR-Method)

Manual for First Responders to a Radiological Emergency (EPR-First Responders)

Generic Procedures for Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency at Research Reactors - Training Material (EPR-Research Reactors)

Actions to Protect the Public in an Emergency due to Severe Conditions at a Light Water Reactor (EPR-NPP Public Protective Actions)

Classification, Assessment and Prognosis During Nuclear Power Plant Emergencies (EPR-NPP-CAP (2024))

Operational Intervention Levels for Reactor Emergencies and Methodology for Their Derivation (EPR-NPP-OILs)

Requirement 10: Providing instructions, warnings and relevant information to the public for emergency preparedness and response

The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place to provide the public who are affected or are potentially affected by a nuclear or radiological emergency with information that is necessary for their protection, to warn them promptly and to instruct them on actions to be taken.

5.45. For facilities in category I or II and areas in category V, arrangements shall be made to provide the permanent population, transient population groups and special population groups or those responsible for them and special facilities within the emergency planning zones and emergency planning distances (see para. 5.38), before operation and throughout the lifetime of the facility, with information on the response to a nuclear or radiological emergency. This information shall include information on the potential for a nuclear or radiological emergency, on the nature of the hazards, on how people would be warned or notified, and on the actions to be taken in such an emergency. The information shall be provided in the languages mainly spoken by the population residing within the emergency planning zones and emergency planning distances. The effectiveness of these arrangements for public information shall be periodically assessed.

5.46. For facilities in category I or II and in areas in category V, arrangements shall be made to register those members of the public in special population groups and, as appropriate, those responsible for them, and to promptly issue them and the permanent population and transient population groups, as well as special facilities in the emergency planning zones and emergency planning distances, with a warning and with instructions to be followed upon declaration of a general emergency (see para. 5.14). This shall include providing instructions on the actions to be taken in the languages mainly spoken by the population residing within these emergency planning zones and emergency planning distances (see para. 5.38).

5.47. For facilities in category III and category IV, arrangements shall be made to provide the public with information and instructions in order to identify and locate people who may have been affected by a nuclear or radiological emergency and who may need response actions such as decontamination, medical examination or health screening. These arrangements shall include arrangements for issuing a warning to the public and providing information in the event that a dangerous source could be in the public domain as a consequence of its loss or unauthorized removal.

5.48. Arrangements shall be made by response organizations in a State to promptly provide information and advice to its nationals and to those people with interests in other States2929 in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency declared beyond national borders, with due account taken of the response actions recommended in the State in which the emergency occurs as well as in the State(s) affected by that emergency (see paras 5.73 and 6.14).

See also:

GSG-14 Arrangements for Public Communication in Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency

You may also wish to read:

Method for Developing Arrangements for Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency - updating IAEA-TECDOC-953 (EPR-Method)

Communication with the Public in a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (EPR-Public Communication)

Method for Developing a Communication Strategy and Plan for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (EPR Communication Plan)

Actions to Protect the Public in an Emergency due to Severe Conditions at a Light Water Reactor (EPR-NPP Public Protective Actions)

Requirement 11: Protecting emergency workers and helpers in an emergency

The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place to protect emergency workers and to protect helpers in a nuclear or radiological emergency.

5.49. Arrangements shall be made to ensure that emergency workers are, to the extent practicable, designated in advance and are fit for the intended duty. These arrangements shall include health surveillance for emergency workers for the purpose of assessing their initial fitness and continuing fitness for their intended duties (see also GSR Part 3 [8]).

5.50. Arrangements shall be made to register and to integrate into operations in an emergency response those emergency workers who were not designated as such in advance of a nuclear or radiological emergency and helpers in an emergency. This shall include designation of the response organization(s) responsible for ensuring protection of emergency workers and protection of helpers in an emergency.

5.51. The operating organization and response organizations shall determine the anticipated hazardous conditions, both on the site and off the site, in which emergency workers might have to perform response functions in a nuclear or radiological emergency in accordance with the hazard assessment and the protection strategy.

5.52. The operating organization and response organizations shall ensure that arrangements are in place for the protection of emergency workers and protection of helpers in an emergency for the range of anticipated hazardous conditions in which they might have to perform response functions. These arrangements, as a minimum, shall include:

  1. Training those emergency workers designated as such in advance;

  2. Providing emergency workers not designated in advance and helpers in an emergency immediately before the conduct of their specified duties with instructions on how to perform the duties under emergency conditions (‘just in time’ training);

  3. Managing, controlling and recording the doses received;

  4. Provision of appropriate specialized protective equipment and monitoring equipment;

  5. Provision of iodine thyroid blocking, as appropriate, if exposure due to radioactive iodine is possible;

  6. Obtaining informed consent to perform specified duties, when appropriate;

  7. Medical examination, longer term medical actions and psychological counselling, as appropriate.

5.53. The operating organization and response organizations shall ensure that all practicable means are used to minimize exposures of emergency workers and helpers in an emergency in the response to a nuclear or radiological emergency (see para. I.2 of Appendix I), and to optimize their protection.

5.54. In a nuclear or radiological emergency, the relevant requirements for occupational exposure in planned exposure situations established in GSR Part 3 [8] shall be applied, on the basis of a graded approach, for emergency workers, except as required in para. 5.55.

5.55. The operating organization and response organizations shall ensure that no emergency worker is subject to an exposure in an emergency that could give rise to an effective dose in excess of 50 mSv other than:

  1. For the purposes of saving human life or preventing serious injury;

  2. When taking actions to prevent severe deterministic effects or actions to prevent the development of catastrophic conditions that could significantly affect people and the environment;

  3. When taking actions to avert a large collective dose.

5.56. For the exceptional circumstances of para. 5.55, national guidance values shall be established for restricting the exposures of emergency workers, in accordance with Appendix I.

5.57. The operating organization and response organizations shall ensure that emergency workers who undertake emergency response actions in which doses received might exceed an effective dose of 50 mSv do so voluntarily3030; that they have been clearly and comprehensively informed in advance of associated health risks as well as of available protective measures; and that they are, to the extent possible, trained in the actions that they might be required to take. Emergency workers not designated as such in advance shall not be the first emergency workers chosen for taking actions that could result in their doses exceeding the guidance values of dose for lifesaving actions, as given in Appendix I. Helpers in an emergency shall not be allowed to take actions that could result in their receiving doses in excess of an effective dose of 50 mSv.

5.58. Arrangements shall be made to assess as soon as practicable the individual doses received in a response to a nuclear or radiological emergency by emergency workers and helpers in an emergency and, as appropriate, to restrict further exposures in the response to the emergency (see Appendix I).

5.59. Emergency workers and helpers in an emergency shall be given appropriate medical attention for doses received in a response to a nuclear or radiological emergency (see Appendix II) or at their request.

5.60. Emergency workers who receive doses in a response to a nuclear or radiological emergency shall normally not be precluded from incurring further occupational exposure. However, qualified medical advice3131 shall be obtained before any further occupational exposure occurs if an emergency worker has received an effective dose exceeding 200 mSv, or at the request of the emergency worker.

5.61. Information on the doses received in the response to a nuclear or radiological emergency and information on any consequent health risks shall be communicated, as soon as practicable, to emergency workers and to helpers in an emergency.

See also:

GSG-2 Criteria for Use in Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency

GSG-11 Arrangements for the Termination of a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency

You may also wish to read:

Method for Developing Arrangements for Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency - updating IAEA-TECDOC-953 (EPR-Method)

Generic Procedures for Medical Response During a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (EPR-Medical)

Requirement 12: Managing the medical response in a nuclear or radiological emergency

The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place for the provision of appropriate medical screening and triage, medical treatment and longer term medical actions for those people who could be affected in a nuclear or radiological emergency.

5.62. On the presentation by an individual of clinical symptoms of radiation exposure or other indications associated with a possible nuclear or radiological emergency, the medical personnel or other responsible parties who identify the clinical symptoms or other indications shall notify the appropriate local or national officials and shall take response actions as appropriate.

5.63. Arrangements shall be made for medical personnel, both general practitioners and emergency medical staff, to be made aware of the clinical symptoms of radiation exposure, and of the appropriate notification procedures and other emergency response actions to be taken if a nuclear or radiological emergency arises or is suspected.

5.64. Arrangements shall be made so that, in a nuclear or radiological emergency, individuals with possible contamination can promptly be given appropriate medical attention. These arrangements shall include ensuring that transport services are provided where needed and providing instructions3232 to medical personnel on the precautions to take.

5.65. For facilities in categories I, II and III, arrangements shall be made to manage an adequate number of any individuals with contamination or of any individuals who have been overexposed to radiation, including arrangements for first aid, the estimation of doses, medical transport and initial medical treatment in predesignated medical facilities.

5.66. For areas within emergency planning zones (see para. 5.38), arrangements shall be made for performing medical screening and triage and for assigning to a predesignated medical facility any individual exposed at levels exceeding the criteria in Table II.1 of Appendix II. These arrangements shall include the use of pre-established operational criteria in accordance with the protection strategy (see para. 4.28(4)).

5.67. Arrangements shall be made to identify individuals with possible contamination and individuals who have possibly been sufficiently exposed for radiation induced health effects to result, and to provide them with appropriate medical attention, including longer term medical follow-up. These arrangements shall include:

  1. Guidelines for effective diagnosis and treatment;

  2. Designation of medical personnel trained in clinical management of radiation injuries;

  3. Designation of institutions for evaluating radiation exposure (external and internal), for providing specialized medical treatment and for longer term medical actions.

These arrangements shall also include the use of pre-established operational criteria in accordance with the protection strategy (see para. 4.28(4)) and arrangements for medical consultation on treatment following any exposure that could result in severe deterministic effects (see Appendix II) with medical personnel experienced in dealing with such injuries.3333

5.68. Arrangements shall be made for the identification of individuals who are in those population groups that are at risk of sustaining increases in the incidence of cancers as a result of radiation exposure in a nuclear or radiological emergency. Arrangements shall be made to take longer term medical actions to detect radiation induced health effects among such population groups in time to allow for their effective treatment. These arrangements shall include the use of pre-established operational criteria in accordance with the protection strategy (see para. 4.28(4)).

See also:

GS-G-2.1 Safety Guide on Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (2007)

GSG-2 Criteria for Use in Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency

GSG-11 Arrangements for the Termination of a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency

You may also wish to read:

Generic Procedures for Medical Response During a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (EPR-Medical)

Medical Management of Persons Internally Contaminated with Radionuclides in a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, A Manual for Medical Personnel (EPR-Internal Contamination)

Requirement 13: Communicating with the public throughout a nuclear or radiological emergency

The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place for communication with the public throughout a nuclear or radiological emergency.

5.69. Arrangements shall be made for providing useful, timely, true, clear and appropriate information to the public in a nuclear or radiological emergency, with account taken of the possibility that the usual means of communication might be damaged in the emergency or by its initiating event (e.g. by an earthquake or by flooding) or overburdened by demand for its use. These arrangements shall also include arrangements for keeping the international community informed, as appropriate. These arrangements shall take into account the need to protect sensitive information in circumstances where a nuclear or radiological emergency is initiated by a nuclear security event. Communication with the public in a nuclear or radiological emergency shall be carried out on the basis of a strategy to be developed at the preparedness stage as part of the protection strategy. Arrangements shall be made to adjust this strategy in the emergency response on the basis of prevailing conditions.

5.70. Arrangements shall be made to ensure that information provided to the public by response organizations, operating organizations, the regulatory body, international organizations and others in a nuclear or radiological emergency is coordinated and consistent, with due recognition of the evolutionary nature of an emergency.

5.71. Arrangements shall be made so that in a nuclear or radiological emergency information is provided to the public in plain and understandable language.

5.72. The government shall ensure that a system for putting radiological health hazards in perspective in a nuclear or radiological emergency is developed and implemented with the following aim:

— To support informed decision making concerning protective actions and other response actions to be taken;

— To help in ensuring that actions taken do more good than harm;

— To address public concerns regarding potential health effects.

In the development of such a system, due consideration shall be given to pregnant women and children as the individuals who are most vulnerable with regard to radiation exposure.

5.73. Arrangements shall be made to explain to the public any changes in the protective actions and other response actions recommended in the State and any differences from those recommended in other States (see paras 6.13–6.15).

5.74. Arrangements shall be made to identify and address, to the extent practicable, misconceptions, rumours and incorrect and misleading information that might be circulating widely in a nuclear or radiological emergency, in particular those that might result in actions being taken beyond those emergency response actions that are warranted3434 (see Requirement 16).

5.75. Arrangements shall be made to respond to enquiries from the public and from news media, both national and international, including enquiries received from or through the IAEA. These arrangements shall recognize the evolutionary nature of emergencies and the need to respond in a timely manner to enquiries even when the information requested is not yet available.

See also:

GS-G-2.1 Safety Guide on Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (2007)

GSG-2 Criteria for Use in Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency

GSG -14 Arrangements for Public Communication in Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency

Communication with the Public in a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (EPR-Public Communication)

Method for Developing a Communication Strategy and Plan for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (EPR-Communication Plan)

Actions to Protect the Public in an Emergency due to Severe Conditions at a Light Water Reactor (EPR-NPP Public Protective Actions)

You may also wish to read:

Communication with the Public in a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (EPR-Public Communication)

Method for Developing a Communication Strategy and Plan for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (EPR-Communication Plan)

Actions to Protect the Public in an Emergency due to Severe Conditions at a Light Water Reactor (EPR-NPP Public Protective Actions)

Requirement 14: Taking early protective actions and other response actions

The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place to take early protective actions and other response actions effectively in a nuclear or radiological emergency.

5.76. Within the extended planning distance (see para. 5.38), arrangements shall be made for effective relocation that may be required following a significant radioactive release and for the prevention of inadvertent ingestion, in accordance with the protection strategy (see Requirement 5). These arrangements shall include:

  1. Provision of instructions and advice to prevent inadvertent ingestion;

  2. Prompt monitoring and assessment;

  3. Use of pre-established operational criteria in accordance with the protection strategy (see para. 4.28(4));

  4. The means for accomplishing relocation and for assisting those persons who have been relocated;

  5. Provisions to extend monitoring and assessment and actions beyond the extended planning distance if necessary.

5.77. For areas within the ingestion and commodities planning distance (see para. 5.38), arrangements shall be made for prompt protection in relation to, and for restriction of, non-essential local produce, forest products (e.g. wild berries, wild mushrooms), milk from grazing animals, drinking water supplies, animal feed and commodities with contamination or possibly with contamination following a significant radioactiverelease, in accordance with the protection strategy (see Requirement 5). These arrangements shall include:

(a) Provision of instructions and advice:

(i) To protect the food chain, water supply and commodities from contamination;

(ii) To prevent ingestion of food, milk and drinking water with contamination or possibly with contamination;

(iii) To prevent use of commodities with contamination or possibly with contamination;

(b) Prompt monitoring, sampling and analysis;

(c) Use of pre-established operational criteria in accordance with the protection strategy (see para. 4.28(4));

(d) The means to enforce the restrictions;

(e) Provisions to expand monitoring and assessment and actions beyond this distance if necessary.

5.78. Within the emergency planning zones and the inner cordoned off area, arrangements shall be made for monitoring the levels of contamination of people, vehicles and goods moving out of areas with contamination, in order to control the spread of contamination and, as applicable, for the purposes of decontamination in accordance with the protection strategy (see Requirement 5). These arrangements shall include the use of pre-established operational criteria in accordance with the protection strategy (see para. 4.28(4)) and shall take into consideration that some vehicles and items potentially with contamination, as well as members of the public and emergency workers, might have left these areas before the establishment of contamination control points and boundaries.

5.79. Arrangements shall be made for access control and enforcing of restrictions for areas in which evacuations and relocations would be carried out within emergency planning zones, the extended planning distance and the inner cordoned off area, in accordance with the protection strategy (see Requirement 5). Returns to these areas for short periods of time shall be permitted if justified (e.g. to feed animals left behind) and provided that those individuals entering the area are:

  1. Subject to controls and to dose assessment while in the area;

  2. Instructed on how to protect themselves;

  3. Briefed on the associated health hazards.

5.80. Arrangements shall be made to test methods of decontamination before their general use and to assess their effectiveness in terms of dose reduction.

5.81. For a transnational emergency in category IV, arrangements shall be made for taking early protective actions and other response actions as appropriate for areas beyond category V, including promptly conducting monitoring and assessment of contamination (a) of food, milk and drinking water and, as appropriate, of commodities other than food, and (b) of vehicles and cargoes that are likely to have contamination, with the aim of mitigating the consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency and reassurance of the public. These arrangements shall include the use of pre-established operational criteria in accordance with the protection strategy (see para. 4.28(4)).

5.82. Monitoring in response to a nuclear or radiological emergency shall be carried out on the basis of a strategy to be developed at the preparedness stage as part of the protection strategy. Arrangements shall be made to adjust the monitoring in the emergency response on the basis of prevailing conditions.

5.83. Arrangements shall be made to carry out retrospective assessment of exposure of members of the public in a nuclear or radiological emergency, and to make the results of these assessments publicly available. The assessments shall be based on the best available information, shall be put into perspective in terms of the associated health hazards (see para. 5.72) and shall be promptly updated in the light of information that would yield substantially more accurate results.

See also:

GS-G-2.1 Safety Guide on Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (2007)

GSG-2 Criteria for Use in Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency

GSG-11 Arrangements for the Termination of a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency

Generic procedures for monitoring in a nuclear or radiological emergency (TECDOC-1092)

Method for Developing Arrangements for Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency - updating IAEA-TECDOC-953 (EPR-Method)

Cytogenetic Dosimetry: Applications in Preparedness for and Response to Radiation Emergencies (EPR-Biodosimetry)

Actions to Protect the Public in an Emergency due to Severe Conditions at a Light Water Reactor (EPR-NPP Public Protective Actions)

Operational Intervention Levels for Reactor Emergencies and Methodology for Their Derivation (EPR-NPP-OILs)

Requirement 15: Managing radioactive waste in an emergency

The government shall ensure that radioactive waste is managed safely and effectively in a nuclear or radiological emergency.

5.84. The national policy and strategy for radioactive waste management[19] shall apply for radioactive waste generated in a nuclear or radiological emergency, with account taken of paras 5.85 to 5.88.

5.85. The protection strategy (see Requirement 5) shall take into account radioactive waste that might arise from protective actions and other response actions that are to be taken.

5.86. Radioactive waste arising in a nuclear or radiological emergency, including radioactive waste arising from associated protective actions and other response actions taken, shall be identified, characterized and categorized in due time and shall be managed in a manner that does not compromise the protection strategy, with account taken of prevailing conditions as these evolve.

5.87. Arrangements shall be made for radioactive waste to be managed safely and effectively. These arrangements shall include:

  1. A plan to characterize waste, including in situ measurements and analysis of samples;

  2. Criteria for categorization of waste;

  3. Avoiding, to the extent possible, the mixing of waste of different categories;

  4. Minimizing the amount of material unduly declared as radioactive waste;

  5. A method for determining appropriate options for predisposal management of radioactive waste (including processing, storage and transport), with account taken of the interdependences between all steps as well as impacts on the anticipated end points (clearance, authorized discharge, reuse, recycling, disposal) [19, 20];

  6. A method of identifying appropriate storage options and sites;

  7. Consideration of non-radiological aspects of waste (e.g. chemical properties such as toxicity, and biological properties).

5.88. Consideration shall be given to the management of human remains and animal remains with contamination as a result of a nuclear or radiological emergency, with due account taken of religious practices and cultural practices.

See also:

GSG-11 Arrangements for the Termination of a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency

Method for Developing Arrangements for Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency - updating IAEA-TECDOC-953 (EPR-Method)

Requirement 16: Mitigating non-radiological consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency and of an emergency response

The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place for mitigation of non-radiological consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency and of an emergency response.

5.89. Non-radiological consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency and of an emergency response shall be taken into consideration in deciding on the protective actions and other response actions to be taken in the context of the protection strategy (see Requirement 5).

5.90. Arrangements shall be made for mitigating the non-radiological consequences of an emergency and those of an emergency response and for responding to public concern in a nuclear or radiological emergency. These arrangements shall include arrangements for providing the people affected with:

  1. Information on any associated health hazards and clear instructions on any actions to be taken (see Requirement 10 and Requirement 13);

  2. Medical and psychological counselling, as appropriate;

  3. Adequate social support, as appropriate.

5.91. Arrangements shall be made to mitigate the impacts on international trade of a nuclear or radiological emergency and associated protective actions and other response actions, with account taken of the generic criteria in Appendix II. These arrangements shall provide for issuing information to the public and interested parties (such as importing States) on controls put in place in relation to traded commodities, including food, and on vehicles and cargoes being shipped, and on any revisions of the relevant national criteria.

5.92. Arrangements shall be put in place for any actions taken, beyond those emergency response actions that are warranted, by members of the public and by commercial, industrial, infrastructural or other governmental or non-governmental bodies to be, to the extent practicable, promptly identified and appropriately addressed. This shall include the designation of organization(s) with the responsibility for monitoring for, identifying and addressing such actions.

See also:

GS-G-2.1 Safety Guide on Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (2007)

Method for Developing Arrangements for Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency - updating IAEA-TECDOC-953 (EPR-Method)

Communication with the Public in a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (EPR-Public Communication)

Requirement 17: Requesting, providing and receiving international assistance for emergency preparedness and response

The government shall ensure that adequate arrangements are in place to benefit from, and to contribute to the provision of, international assistance for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency.

5.93. Governments and international organizations shall put in place and shall maintain arrangements to respond in a timely manner to a request made by a State, in accordance with established mechanisms and respective mandates, for assistance in preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency.

5.94. Arrangements shall be put in place and maintained for requesting and obtaining international assistance from States or international organizations and for providing assistance to States (either directly or through the IAEA) in preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency, on the basis of international instruments (e.g. the Assistance Convention [13]), bilateral agreements or other mechanisms. These arrangements shall take due account of compatibility requirements for the capabilities to be obtained from and to be rendered to different States so as to ensure the usefulness of these capabilities.

See also:

GS-G-2.1 Safety Guide on Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (2007)

IAEA Response and Assistance Network: EPR-RANET 2018

Method for Developing Arrangements for Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency - updating IAEA-TECDOC-953 (EPR-Method)

Guidelines on the Harmonization of Response and Assistance Capabilities for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (EPR-Harmonized Assistance Capabilities)

Requirement 18: Terminating a nuclear or radiological emergency

The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place and are implemented for the termination of a nuclear or radiological emergency, with account taken of the need for the resumption of social and economic activity.

5.95. Adjustment of protective actions and other response actions and of other arrangements that are aimed at enabling the termination of an emergency shall be made by a formal process that includes consultation of interested parties.

5.96. Arrangements for communication with the public in a nuclear or radiological emergency (see Requirement 13) shall include arrangements for communication on the reasons for any adjustment of protective actions and other response actions and other arrangements aimed at enabling the termination of the emergency. This shall include providing the public with information on the need for any continuing protective actions following termination of the emergency and on any necessary modifications to their personal behaviour. Arrangements shall be made, during this period, to closely monitor public opinion and the reaction in the news media in order to ensure that any concerns can be promptly addressed. These arrangements shall ensure that any information provided to the public puts health hazards in perspective (see para. 5.72).

5.97. The termination of a nuclear or radiological emergency shall be based on a formal decision that is made public and shall include prior consultation with interested parties, as appropriate.

5.98. Both radiological consequences and non-radiological consequences shall be considered in deciding on the termination of an emergency as well as in the justification and optimization of further protection strategies as necessary.

5.99. The transition to an existing exposure situation or to a planned exposure situation shall be made in a coordinated and orderly manner, by making any necessary transfer of responsibilities and with the increased involvement of relevant authorities and interested parties.

5.100. The government shall ensure that, as part of its emergency preparedness, arrangements are in place for the termination of a nuclear or radiological emergency. The arrangements shall take into account that the termination of an emergency might be at different times in different geographical areas. The planning process shall include as appropriate:

  1. The roles and functions of organizations;

  2. Methods of transferring information;

  3. Means for assessing radiological consequences and non-radiological consequences;

  4. Conditions, criteria and objectives to be met for enabling the termination of a nuclear or radiological emergency (see Appendix II);

  5. A review of the hazard assessment and of the emergency arrangements;

  6. Establishment of national guidelines for the termination of an emergency;

  7. Arrangements for continued communication with the public, and for monitoring of public opinion and the reaction in the news media;

  8. Arrangements for consultation of interested parties.

5.101. Once the emergency is terminated, all workers undertaking relevant work shall be subject to the relevant requirements for occupational exposure in planned exposure situations[8], and individual monitoring, environmental monitoring and health surveillance shall be conducted subject to the requirements for planned exposure situations or existing exposure situations, as appropriate [8].

See also

GSG-11 Arrangements for the Termination of a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency

Requirement 19: Analysing the nuclear or radiological emergency and the emergency response

The government shall ensure that the nuclear or radiological emergency and the emergency response are analysed in order to identify actions to be taken to avoid other emergencies and to improve emergency arrangements.

5.102. Arrangements shall be made to document, protect and preserve, in an emergency response, to the extent practicable, data and information important for an analysis of the nuclear or radiological emergency and the emergency response. Arrangements shall be made to undertake a timely and comprehensive analysis of the nuclear or radiological emergency and the emergency response with the involvement of interested parties. These arrangements shall give due consideration to the need for making contributions to relevant internationally coordinated analyses and for sharing the findings of the analysis with relevant response organizations. The analysis shall give due consideration to:

  1. The reconstruction of the circumstances of the emergency;

  2. The root causes of the emergency;

  3. Regulatory controls including regulations and regulatory oversight;

  4. General implications for safety, including the possible involvement of other sources or devices (including those in other States);

  5. General implications for nuclear security, as appropriate;

  6. Necessary improvements to emergency arrangements;

  7. Necessary improvements to regulatory control.

5.103. Arrangements shall be made to enable comprehensive interviews on the circumstances of the nuclear or radiological emergency to be conducted with those involved.

5.104. Arrangements shall be made to acquire (e.g. from the IAEA, from another State or from the manufacturer of relevant equipment) the expertise necessary to conduct an analysis of the circumstances of the nuclear or radiological emergency.

5.105. Arrangements shall be made to take actions promptly on the basis of ananalysis to avoid other emergencies, including provision of information to other operating organizations, as relevant, or to other States, directly or through the IAEA.

6. Requirements for infrastructure General

6.1. This section establishes the requirements for infrastructural elements that are essential to providing the capability for fulfilling the requirements established in Section 5 in accordance with the hazard assessment and the protection strategy.

Requirement 20: Authorities for emergency preparedness and response

The government shall ensure that authorities for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency are clearly established.

6.2. The authorities for developing, maintaining and regulating arrangements, both on the site and off the site, for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency shall be established by means of acts, legal codes or statutes.

6.3. All of the functions specified in Section 5 shall be assigned to the appropriate operating organizations and to local, regional and national response organizations. The involvement of all these organizations in the performance of these functions, or in support of their performance, shall be documented.3535 The documentation shall specify their roles, functions, authorities and responsibilities in emergency preparedness and response and shall assent to the authorities, roles and responsibilities of other response organizations. Conflicting or potentially conflicting and overlapping roles and responsibilities shall be identified and conflicts shall be resolved at the preparedness stage through the national coordinating mechanism (see para. 4.10).

6.4. The authority and responsibility for making decisions on response actions to be taken on the site and off the site (see para. 5.7) and the authority and responsibility for communication with the public shall be clearly assigned for each phase of the response.

6.5. The emergency arrangements shall include clear assignment of responsibilities and authorities, and shall provide for coordination and for communication in all phases of the response. These arrangements shall include:

— Ensuring that for each response organization a position in the response hierarchy has the authority and responsibility to direct and to coordinate its response actions;

— Clearly assigning the authority and responsibility for the direction and coordination of the entire response (see para. 5.7) and for the prevention and resolution of conflicts between response organizations;

— Assigning to an on-site position the authority and responsibility for notifying the appropriate response organization(s) of an emergency and for taking immediate on-site actions;

— Assigning to an on-site position the responsibility for directing the entire on-siteemergency response (see paras 5.2 and 5.7).

These arrangements shall be such as to ensure that those personnel with authority and responsibility to perform critical response functions3636 in an emergency response are not assigned any other responsibilities in an emergency that would interfere with the prompt performance of the specified functions.

6.6. The arrangements for delegation and/or transfer of authority shall be specified in the relevant emergency plans, together with arrangements for notifying all appropriate parties of the transfer.

See also:

GS-G-2.1 Safety Guide on Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (2007)

Method for Developing Arrangements for Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency - updating IAEA-TECDOC-953 (EPR-Method)

Requirement 21: Organization and staffing for emergency preparedness and response

The government shall ensure that overall organization for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency is clearly specified and staffed with sufficient personnel who are qualified and are assessed for their fitness for their intended duties.

6.7. The organizational relationships for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency and interfaces between all the response organizations shall be established.

6.8. The positions responsible within each operating organization and response organization for performance of the response functions specified in Section 5 shall be assigned in the emergency plans and procedures. The positions responsible in each operating organization, in each response organization and in the regulatory body for the performance of activities at the preparedness stage, in accordance with these requirements, shall be assigned as part of the routine organizational structures and shall be specified, as appropriate, in the emergency plans and procedures.

6.9. Personnel who are assigned to positions in all operating organizations and response organizations to perform the functions necessary to meet the requirements established in Section 5 shall be qualified and shall be assessed for their initial fitness and continuing fitness for their intended duties.

6.10. Appropriate numbers of suitably qualified personnel shall be available at all times (including during 24 hour a day operations) so that appropriate positions can be promptly staffed as necessary following the declaration and notification of a nuclear or radiological emergency. Appropriate numbers of suitably qualified personnel shall be available for the long term to staff the various positions necessary to take mitigatory actions, protective actions and other response actions.

6.11. For a site where multiple facilities in category I or II are collocated, an appropriate number of suitably qualified personnel shall be available to manage an emergency response at all facilities if each of the facilities is under emergency conditions simultaneously (see para. 5.4).

See also:

GS-G-2.1 Safety Guide on Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (2007)

Method for Developing Arrangements for Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency - updating IAEA-TECDOC-953 (EPR-Method)

Generic Procedures for Medical Response During a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (EPR-Medical)

Manual for First Responders to a Radiological Emergency (EPR-First Responders)

Generic Procedures for Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency at Research Reactors - Training Material (EPR-Research Reactors)

Actions to Protect the Public in an Emergency due to Severe Conditions at a Light Water Reactor (EPR-NPP Public Protective Actions)

Considerations in Emergency Preparedness and Response for a State Embarking on a Nuclear Power Programme (EPR-Embarking)

Requirement 22: Coordination of emergency preparedness and response

The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place for thecoordination of preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency between the operating organization and authorities at the local, regional and national levels, and, where appropriate, at the international level.

6.12. Arrangements shall be developed, as appropriate, for the coordination of emergency preparedness and response and of protocols for operational interfaces between operating organizations and authorities at the local, regional and national levels, including those organizations and authorities responsible for the response to conventional emergencies and to nuclear security events (see paras 4.3, 4.10, 6.3 and Requirement 6). The arrangements shall be clearly documented and the documentation shall be made available to all relevant parties. Arrangements shall be put in place to ensure effective working relationships among these organizations, both at the preparedness stage and in an emergency.

6.13. When several different organizations of the State or of other States are expected to have or to develop tools, procedures or criteria for use in the response to an emergency, arrangements for coordination shall be put in place to improve the consistency of the assessments of the situation, including assessments of contamination, doses and radiation induced health effects and any other relevant assessments made in a nuclear or radiological emergency, so as not to give rise to confusion.

6.14. Arrangements shall be made to coordinate with other States in the event of a transnational emergency any protective actions and other response actions that are recommended to their citizens and to their embassies in order either to ensure that they are consistent with those recommended in other States, or to provide an opportunity for them to explain to the public the basis for any differences (see para. 5.73).

6.15. Arrangements shall be made to ensure that States with areas in category V are provided with appropriate information for developing their own preparedness to respond to a transboundary emergency and that appropriate coordination across national borders is in place. These arrangements shall include:

  1. Agreements and protocols to provide information necessary to develop a coordinated means for notification, classification schemes and criteria for taking and for adjusting protective actions and other response actions;

  2. Arrangements for communication with the public;

  3. Arrangements for the exchange of information between decision making authorities.

See also:

GS-G-2.1 Safety Guide on Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (2007)

Method for Developing Arrangements for Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency - updating IAEA-TECDOC-953 (EPR-Method)

Requirement 23: Plans and procedures for emergency response

The government shall ensure that plans and procedures necessary for effective response to a nuclear or radiological emergency are established.

6.16. Plans, procedures and other arrangements for effective emergency response, including coordinating mechanisms, letters of agreement or legal instruments, shall be made for coordinating a national emergency response. The arrangements for a coordinated national emergency response:

— Shall specify the organization responsible for the development and maintenance of the arrangements;

— Shall describe the responsibilities of operating organizations and other response organizations;

— Shall describe the coordination effected between these arrangements and the arrangements for response to a conventional emergency and to a nuclear security event.

Consideration shall be given in these plans, procedures and other arrangements to the need to protect information that might be confidential.

6.17. Each response organization shall prepare an emergency plan or plans for coordinating and performing their assigned functions as specified in Section 5 and in accordance with the hazard assessment and the protection strategy. An emergency plan shall be developed at the national level that integrates all relevant plans for emergency response in a coordinated manner and consistently with an all-hazards approach. Emergency plans shall specify how responsibilities for managing operations in an emergency response are to be discharged on the site, off the site and across national borders, as appropriate. The emergency plans shall be coordinated with other plans and procedures that may be implemented in a nuclear or radiological emergency, to ensure that the simultaneous implementation of the plans would not reduce their effectiveness or cause conflicts. Such other plans and procedures include:

  1. Emergency plans for facilities in category I and for areas in category V;

  2. Security plans and contingency plans [9, 10];

  3. Procedures for the investigation of a nuclear security event, including identification, collection, packaging and transport of evidence contaminated with radionuclides, nuclear forensics and related activities [11];

  4. Evacuation plans;

  5. Plans for firefighting.

6.18. The appropriate responsible authorities shall ensure that:

  1. A ‘concept of operations’3737 for emergency response is developed at the beginning of the preparedness stage.

  2. Emergency plans and procedures are prepared and, as appropriate, approved for any facility or activity, area or location that could give rise to an emergency warranting protective actions and other response actions.

  3. Response organizations and operating organizations, as appropriate, are involved in the preparation of emergency plans and procedures, as appropriate.

  4. Account is taken in the content, features and extent of emergency plans of the results of any hazard assessment and any lessons from operating experience and from past emergencies, including conventional emergencies (see paras 4.18–4.26).

  5. Emergency plans and procedures are periodically reviewed and updated (see paras 6.36 and 6.38).

6.19. The operating organization of a facility or for an activity in category I, II, III or IV shall prepare an emergency plan. This emergency plan shall be coordinated with those of all other bodies that have responsibilities in a nuclear or radiological emergency, including public authorities, and shall be submitted to the regulatory body for approval.

6.20. The operating organization and response organizations shall develop the necessary procedures and analytical tools to be able to perform the functions specified in Section 5 for the goals of emergency response to be achieved and for the emergency response to be effective.

6.21. Procedures and analytical tools shall be tested under simulated emergency conditions and shall be validated prior to initial use. Any arrangements for the use of analytical tools early in an emergency response for supporting decision making on protective actions and other response actions shall be made in due recognition of the limitations3838 of such analytical tools and in a way that would not reduce the effectiveness of response actions. These limitations shall be made clear to, and shall be recognized by, those responsible for decision making.

See also:

GS-G-2.1 Safety Guide on Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (2007)

Method for Developing Arrangements for Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency - updating IAEA-TECDOC-953 (EPR-Method)

Generic procedures for monitoring in a nuclear or radiological emergency (TECDOC-1092)

Generic procedures for assessment and response during a radiological emergency (TECDOC 1162)

Generic Procedures for Medical Response During a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (EPR-Medical)

Manual for First Responders to a Radiological Emergency (EPR-First Responders)

Communication with the Public in a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (EPR-Public Communication)

Method for Developing a Communication Strategy and Plan for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (EPR Communication Plan)

Requirement 24: Logistical support and facilities for emergency response

The government shall ensure that adequate logistical support and facilities are provided to enable emergency response functions to be performed effectively in a nuclear or radiological emergency.

6.22. Adequate tools, instruments, supplies, equipment, communication systems, facilities and documentation (such as documentation of procedures, checklists, manuals, telephone numbers and email addresses) shall be provided for performing the functions specified in Section 5. These items and facilities shall be selected or designed to be operational under the conditions (such as radiological conditions, working conditions and environmental conditions) that could be encountered in the emergency response, and to be compatible with other procedures and equipment for the response (e.g. compatible with the communication frequencies used by other response organizations), as appropriate. These support items shall be located or provided in a manner that allows their effective use under the emergency conditions postulated.

6.23. For facilities in categories I and II, as contingency measures, alternative supplies for taking on-sitemitigatory actions, such as an alternative supply of water and an alternative electrical power supply, including any necessary equipment, shall be ensured. This equipment shall be located and maintained so that it can be functional and readily accessible when needed (see also Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design (SSR-2/1) [18]).

6.24. Emergency response facilities or locations to support an emergency response under the full range of postulated hazardous conditions shall be designated and shall be assigned the following functions, as appropriate:

  1. Receiving notifications and initiating the response;

  2. Coordination and direction of on-site response actions;

  3. Providing technical and operational support to those personnel performing tasks at a facility and those personnel responding off the site;

  4. Direction of off-site response actions and coordination with on-site response actions;

  5. Coordination of national response actions;

  6. Coordination of communication with the public;

  7. Coordination of monitoring, sampling and analysis;

  8. Managing those people who have been evacuated (including reception, registration, monitoring and decontamination, as well as provision for meeting their personal needs, including for housing, food and sanitation);

  9. Managing the storage of necessary resources;

  10. Providing individuals who have undergone exposure or contamination with appropriate medical attention including medical treatment.

6.25. For facilities in category I, emergency response facilities3939 separate from the control room and supplementary control room shall be provided so that:

  1. Technical support can be provided to the operating personnel in the control room in an emergency (from a technical support centre).

  2. Operational control by personnel performing tasks at or near the facility can be maintained (from an operational support centre).

  3. The on-siteemergency response is managed (from an emergency centre).

These emergency response facilities shall operate as an integrated system in support of the emergency response, without conflicting with one another’s functions, and shall provide reasonable assurance of being operable and habitable under a range of postulated hazardous conditions, including conditions not considered in the design.

6.26. Arrangements shall be made for performing appropriate and reliable analyses of samples4040 and measurements of internal contamination for the purposes of emergency response and of health screening, as appropriate. Such arrangements shall include the designation of laboratories that would be operational under postulated emergency conditions.

6.27. Arrangements shall be made to obtain appropriate support from organizations responsible for providing support in conventional emergencies for logistics and communication, for social welfare and in other areas.

See also:

GS-G-2.1 Safety Guide on Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (2007)

Method for Developing Arrangements for Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency - updating IAEA-TECDOC-953 (EPR-Method)

Requirement 25: Training, drills and exercises for emergency preparedness and response

The government shall ensure that personnel relevant for emergency response shall take part in regular training, drills and exercises to ensure that they are able to perform their assigned response functions effectively in a nuclear or radiological emergency.

6.28. The operating organization and response organizations shall identify the knowledge, skills and abilities necessary to perform the functions specified in Section 5. The operating organization and response organizations shall make arrangements for the selection of personnel and for training to ensure that the personnel selected have the requisite knowledge, skills and abilities to perform their assigned response functions. The arrangements shall include arrangements for continuing refresher training on an appropriate schedule and arrangements for ensuring that personnel assigned to positions with responsibilities in an emergency response undergo the specified training.

6.29. For facilities in category I, II or III, all personnel and all other persons on the site shall be instructed in the arrangements for them to be notified of an emergency and of their actions if notified of an emergency.

6.30. Exercise programmes shall be developed and implemented to ensure that all specified functions required to be performed for emergency response, all organizational interfaces for facilities in category I, II or III, and the national level programmes for category IV or V are tested at suitable intervals. These programmes shall include the participation in some exercises of, as appropriate and feasible, all the organizations concerned, people who are potentially affected, and representatives of news media. The exercises shall be systematically evaluated (see para. 4.10(h)) and some exercises shall be evaluated by the regulatory body. Programmes shall be subject to review and revision in the light of experience gained (see paras 6.36 and 6.38).

6.31. The personnel responsible for critical response functions shall participate in drills and exercises on a regular basis so as to ensure their ability to take their actions effectively.

6.32. Officials off the site who are responsible for making decisions on protective actions and other response actions shall be trained and shall regularly participate in exercises. Officials off the site who are responsible for communication with the public in a nuclear or radiological emergency shall regularly participate in exercises.

6.33. The conduct of exercises shall be evaluated against pre-established objectives of emergency response to demonstrate that identification, notification, activation and response actions can be performed effectively to achieve the goals of emergency response (see para. 3.2).

See also:

GS-G-2.1 Safety Guide on Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (2007)

Method for Developing Arrangements for Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency - updating IAEA-TECDOC-953 (EPR-Method)

Preparation, Conduct and Evaluation of Exercises to Test Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (EPR-Exercise)

Requirement 26: Quality management programme for emergency preparedness and response

The government shall ensure that a programme is established within an integrated management system to ensure the availability and reliability of all supplies, equipment, communication systems and facilities, plans, procedures and other arrangements necessary for effective response in a nuclear or radiological emergency.

6.34. The operating organization, as part of its management system (see Ref. [14]), and response organizations, as part of their emergencymanagement system, shall establish a programme to ensure the availability and reliability of all supplies, equipment, communication systems and facilities, plans, procedures and other arrangements necessary to perform functions in a nuclear or radiological emergency as specified in Section 5 (see para. 6.22). The programme shall include arrangements for inventories, resupply, tests and calibrations, to ensure that these are continuously available and are functional for use in a nuclear or radiological emergency.

6.35. The programme shall also include periodic and independent appraisals against functions as specified in Section 5, including participation in international appraisals4141.

6.36. Arrangements shall be made to maintain, review and update emergency plans, procedures and other arrangements and to incorporate lessons from research, operating experience (such as in the response to emergencies) and emergency exercises.

6.37. The operating organization and response organizations shall establish and maintain adequate records in relation to both emergency arrangements and the response to a nuclear or radiological emergency, to include dose assessments, results of monitoring and inventory of radioactive waste managed, in order to allow for their review and evaluation. These records shall also provide for the identification of those persons requiring longer term medical actions, as necessary, and shall provide for the long term management of radioactive waste.

6.38. The operating organization and response organizations shall make arrangements to review and evaluate responses in actual events and in exercises, in order to record the areas in which improvements are necessary and to ensure that the necessary improvements are made (see Requirement 19).

6.39. Relevant international organizations shall review and update their applicable standards and guidelines and their relevant arrangements in emergency preparedness and response on the basis of research and lessons from the response to actual emergencies and in emergency exercises.

See also:

GS-G-2.1 Safety Guide on Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (2007)

7. Appendices

Appendix I - GUIDANCE VALUES FOR RESTRICTING EXPOSURE OF EMERGENCY WORKERS

I.1. This Appendix provides guidance values as a basis for operational guidance for restricting the exposure of emergency workers.

I.2. Table I.1 provides guidance values for restricting the exposure of emergency workers in an emergency response in terms of personal dose equivalentHp(10) from external exposure to strongly penetrating radiation. The values for Hp(10) in Table I.1 assume that every effort has been made for protection against external exposure to weakly penetrating radiation and against exposure due to intakes or skin contamination (see para. 5.53).

I.3. The total effective dose and the relative biological effectiveness (RBE) weighted absorbed dose to a tissue or organ via all exposure pathways (i.e. both dose from external exposure and committed dose from intakes) need to be estimated as early as possible in a nuclear or radiological emergency. Table I.1 also provides guidance on the effective dose and the RBE weighted absorbed dose to a tissue or organ for consideration in restricting further exposure in the response to a nuclear or radiological emergency once these doses have been estimated.

I.4. Severe deterministic effects to a fetus could possibly occur following an equivalent dose to the fetus of greater than 100 mSv. Consequently, in the response to a nuclear or radiological emergency, female workers who are aware that they are pregnant or who might be pregnant need to be (1) informed of this risk and (2) excluded from taking actions that might result in an equivalent dose to the embryo and fetus exceeding 50 mSv for the full period of in utero development of the embryo and fetus.

TABLE I.1 GUIDANCE VALUES FOR RESTRICTING EXPOSURE OF EMERGENCY WORKERS

Tasks

Guidance valuesa

H p(10)b

E c

AD T d

Lifesaving actions

<500 mSv

<500 mSv

< 1 2 A D T , T a b l e I I . 1 e

This value may be exceeded — with due consideration of the generic criteria in Table II.1 of Appendix II — under circumstances in which the expected benefits to others clearly outweigh the emergency worker’s own health risks, and the emergency worker volunteers to take the action and understands and accepts these health risks

Actions to prevent severe deterministic effects and actions to prevent the development of catastrophic conditions that could significantly affect people and the environment

<500 mSv

<500mSv

< 1 2 A D T , T a b l e I I . 1

Actions to avert a large collective dose

<100 mSv

E<100 mSv

< 1 10 A D T , T a b l e I I . 1

a These values are set to be two to ten times lower than the generic criteria in Table II.1 of Appendix II and they apply for:

  1. The dose from external exposure to strongly penetrating radiation for Hp(10). Doses from external exposure to weakly penetrating radiation and from intake or skin contamination need to be prevented by all possible means. If this is not feasible, the effective dose and the RBE weighted absorbed dose to a tissue or organ have to be limited to minimize the health risk to the individual in line with the risk associated with the guidance values given here.

  2. The total doseeffective doseE and the RBE weighted absorbed dose to a tissue or organ ADT via all exposure pathways (i.e. both dose from external exposure and committed dose from intakes) which are to be estimated as early as possible in order to enable any further exposure to be restricted as appropriate.

b Personal dose equivalent H p (d) where d = 10 mm.

c Effective dose.

d RBE weighted absorbed dose to a tissue or organ.

e Values of RBE weighted absorbed dose to a tissue or organ given in Table II.1 of Appendix II.

Appendix II - GENERIC CRITERIA FOR USE IN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

II.1 This Appendix provides generic criteria:

  1. For doses for which protective actions and other response actions are expected to be undertaken under any circumstances in a nuclear or radiological emergency to avoid or to minimize severe deterministic effects;

  2. For doses for which protective actions and other response actions are expected to be taken, if they can be taken safely, in a nuclear or radiological emergency to reasonably reduce the risk of stochastic effects;

  3. For doses for which restriction of international trade is warranted in a nuclear or radiological emergency, with due consideration of non-radiological consequences;

  4. For doses for use as a target dose for the transition to an existing exposure situation.

Appendix II includes examples of associated protective actions and other response actions. These generic criteria and associated protective actions and other response actions shall be taken into account in the development of the protection strategy, including national generic criteria in accordance with Requirement 5. If protective actions in the context of the protection strategy are to be taken when doses are below the generic criteria given in this Appendix, careful consideration is necessary to ensure that such actions are justified (i.e. that they do more good than harm) and that they are optimized in accordance with Requirement 5.

GENERIC CRITERIA FOR DOSES RECEIVED WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME FOR WHICH RESPONSE ACTIONS ARE EXPECTED TO BE TAKEN UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES IN AN EMERGENCY RESPONSE

II.2. Table II.1 provides generic criteria for doses received within a short period of time for which protective actions and other response actions are expected to be taken under any circumstances in a nuclear or radiological emergency to avoid or to minimize severe deterministic effects.

TABLE II.1. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR DOSES RECEIVED WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME FOR WHICH PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND OTHER RESPONSE ACTIONS ARE EXPECTED TO BE TAKEN UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES IN AN EMERGENCY TO AVOID OR TO MINIMIZE SEVERE DETERMINISTIC EFFECTS

Acute external exposure (<10 h)

AD red marrow a

1 Gy

If the dose is projected:

  • Take precautionary urgent protective actions immediately (even under difficult conditions) to keep doses below the generic criteria;

  • Provide public information and warnings;

  • Carry out urgent decontamination.

AD fetus

0.1bGy

AD tissue c

25 Gy at 0.5 cm

AD skin d

10 Gy to 100 cm2

Acute internal exposure due to an acute intake

(Δ = 30 de)

AD(Δ)red marrow

0.2 Gy for radionuclides with atomic number Z ≥ 90f

2 Gy for radionuclides with atomic number Z ≤ 89f

If the dose has been received:

  • Perform immediate medical examination, medical consultation and indicated medical treatment;

  • Carry out contaminationcontrol;

  • Carry out immediate decorporationg (if applicable);

  • Conduct registration for longer term medical follow-up;

  • Provide comprehensive psychological counselling.

AD(Δ)thyroid

2 Gy

AD(Δ)lungh

30 Gy

AD(Δ)colon

20 Gy

AD(Δ′)fetusi

0.1bGy

a AD red marrow represents the average RBE weighted absorbed dose to internal tissues or organs (e.g. red marrow, lung, small intestine, gonads, thyroid) and to the lens of the eye from exposure in a uniform field of strongly penetrating radiation.

b At 0.1 Gy there would be only a very small probability of severe deterministic effects to the fetus and only during certain periods post-conception (e.g. between 8 and 15 weeks of in utero development), and only if the dose is received at high dose rates. During other periods post-conception and for lower dose rates, the fetus is less sensitive. There is a high probability of severe deterministic effects at 1 Gy. Therefore, 1 Gy is used as the generic criterion for doses to the fetus received within a short period of time: (i) in the hazard assessment (see para. 4.23), to identify facilities and activities, on-siteareas, off-siteareas and locations for which a nuclear or radiological emergency could warrant precautionary urgent protective actions to avoid or to minimize severe deterministic effects; (ii) for identifying situations in which exposure is dangerous to health; and (iii) for making arrangements (see para. 5.38) for applying decisions on urgent protective actions and other response actions to be taken off the site to avoid or to minimize the occurrence of severe deterministic effects (e.g. establishing a precautionary action zone).

c Dose delivered to 100 cm2 at a depth of 0.5 cm under the body surface in tissue due to close contact with a radioactive source (e.g. source carried in the hand or pocket).

d The dose is to the 100 cm2 dermis (skin structures at a depth of 40 mg/cm2 (or 0.4 mm) below the surface)

e AD(Δ) is the RBE weighted absorbed dose delivered over a period of time Δ by the intake (I05) that will result in a severe deterministic effect in 5% of exposed individuals. This dose is calculated as described in appendix I of Ref. [21].

f Different generic criteria are used to take account of the significant difference in RBE weighted absorbed dose from exposure at the intake threshold values specific for these two groups of radionuclides.

g Decorporation is the action of the biological processes, facilitated by chemical or biological agents, by means of which incorporated radionuclides are removed from the human body. The generic criterion for decorporation is based on the projected dose without decorporation.

h For the purposes of these generic criteria, ‘lung’ means the alveolar–interstitial region of the respiratory tract.

i For this particular case, ‘Δ’ refers to the period of in utero development of the embryo and fetus.

GENERIC CRITERIA FOR PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND OTHER RESPONSE ACTIONS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS

II.3. Table II.2 provides generic criteria for taking protective actions and other response actions in a nuclear or radiological emergency to reduce the risk of stochastic effects.

TABLE II.2. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND OTHER RESPONSE ACTIONS IN AN EMERGENCY TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS

Generic criteria

Examples of protective actions and other response actionsa

Projected dose that exceeds the following generic criteria:

Take urgent protective actions and other response actions

H thyroid

50 mSvb in the first 7 days

Iodine thyroid blocking c

E d

100 mSv in the first 7 days

Shelteringe; evacuation; prevention of inadvertent ingestion; restrictions on food, milk and drinking waterg and restrictions on the food chain and water supply; restrictions on commodities other than food; contaminationcontrol; decontamination; registration; reassurance of the public

H fetus f

100 mSv in the first 7 days

Projected dose that exceeds the following generic criteria:

Take early protective actions and other response actions

E d

100 mSv in the first year

Temporary relocation; prevention of inadvertent ingestion; restrictions on food, milk and drinking waterg and restrictions on the food chain and water supply; restrictions on commodities other than food; contaminationcontrol; decontamination; registration; reassurance of the public

H fetus f

100 mSv for the full period of in utero development

Dose that has been received and that exceeds the following generic criteria:

Take longer term medical actions to detect and to effectively treat radiation induced health effects

E d

100 mSv in a month

Health screening based on equivalent doses to specific radiosensitive organs (as a basis for longer term medical follow-up)h, registration, counselling

H fetus f

100 mSv for the full period of in utero development

Counselling to allow informed decisions to be made in individual circumstances

a These examples are neither exhaustive nor grouped in a mutually exclusive way.

b The equivalent dose to the thyroid (Hthyroid) only due to exposure to radioiodine.

c This generic criterion applies only for administration of iodine thyroid blocking.

For the thyroid, iodine thyroid blocking is an urgent protective action that is prescribed:

  1. if exposure due to radioactive iodine is involved,

  2. before or shortly after a release of radioactive iodine, and

  3. within only a short period before or after the intake of radioactive iodine.

d Effective dose.

e As a less disruptive protective action, sheltering may be ordered at lower doses as long as justified and optimized in accordance with Requirement 5 with due consideration of the reference level in para. 4.28(2).

f H fetus is the equivalent dose to the fetus, derived as the sum of the dose from external exposure and the maximum committed equivalent dose to any organ of the embryo or fetus from intake to the embryo or fetus for different chemical compounds and different times relative to conception.

g Restrictions on food, milk and drinking water using these generic criteria are to be applied before sampling and analysis of food, milk and drinking water are carried out. Such restrictions apply as long as replacements of food, milk and drinking water or other alternatives are available to ensure they would not result in severe malnutrition, dehydration or other severe health impacts.

h When results of the health screening indicate that the criteria in Table II.1 are exceeded, then appropriate medical attention on the basis of Appendix II (see Table II.1) is necessary.

GENERIC CRITERIA FOR FOOD, MILK AND DRINKING WATER AND OTHER COMMODITIES TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS

II.4. Table II.3 provides generic criteria for taking protective actions and other response actions to reduce the risk of stochastic effects from the ingestion of food, milk and drinking water and from the use of other commodities in a nuclear or radiological emergency.

II.5. A value of 1/10 of the generic criteria given in Table II.2 for early protective actions and other response actions is established as generic criteria for restrictions on food, milk and drinking water and on other commodities to ensure that the dose via all exposure pathways, including ingestion, will not exceed the generic criteria given in Table II.2 for early protective actions and other response actions.

II.6. If restrictions on food, milk or drinking water would result in severe malnutrition or dehydration because replacements are not available, food, milk or drinking water with concentration levels of radionuclides that are projected to result in doses above the generic criteria given in Table II.3 may be consumed until replacements are available provided that this would not result in doses from all exposure pathways above the generic criteria given in Table II.2; otherwise, the people affected may be relocated.

TABLE II.3. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR FOOD, MILK AND DRINKING WATER AND OTHER COMMODITIES TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS

Generic criteria

Examples of protective actions and other response actions

Projected dose from ingestion of food, milk and drinking water and from the use of other commodities that exceeds the following generic criteria:

Take protective actions and other response actions

E a

10 mSv in the first year

Restrict consumption, distribution and sale of non-essentialbfood, milk and drinking waterc and restrict the use and distribution of other commodities.

Replace essential food, milk and drinking water as soon as possible or relocate the people affected if replacements are not available. Estimate the doses of those who might have consumed food, milk and drinking water or used other commodities to determine whether this may have resulted in doses warranting medical attention in accordance with Table II.2.

H fetus d

10 mSv for the full period of in utero development

a Effective dose.

b Restricting essential food, milk or drinking water could result in dehydration, severe malnutrition or other severe health impacts; therefore, essential food, milk and drinking water is to be restricted only if alternatives are available.

c These criteria for taking actions on food, milk and drinking water are applied once the sampling and analysis of food, milk and drinking water is carried out. This would also provide a basis for discontinuing restrictions imposed on food, milk and drinking water as a precaution on the basis of the generic criteria in Table II.2.

d H fetus is the equivalent dose to the fetus derived as the sum the dose from external exposure and the maximum committed equivalent dose to any organ from intake to the embryo or fetus for different chemical compounds and different times relative to conception.

You may also wish to read:

TECDOC No. 1788, Criteria for Radionuclide Activity Concentrations for Food and Drinking Water

GENERIC CRITERIA FOR VEHICLES, EQUIPMENT AND OTHER ITEMS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS

II.7. Table II.4 provides generic criteria for taking protective actions and other response actions to reduce the risk of stochastic effects arising from the use of vehicles, equipment and other items from an area affected by a nuclear or radiological emergency.

II.8. A value of 1/10 of the generic criteria given in Table II.2 for early protective actions and other response actions is established as generic criteria for vehicles, equipment and other items from an affected area, to ensure that the dose via all exposure pathways, including the use of such vehicles, equipment and other items, would not exceed the generic criteria given in Table II.2 for early actions for a member of the public.

II.9. Restricting the use of vehicles, equipment and other items from an affected area could interfere with taking urgent protective actions and other response actions or with providing services essential to public health or well-being (e.g. restricting the use of vehicles for transferring individuals requiring critical medical treatment or preventing a ship or an aircraft that has left an affected area from reaching its final destination). Such vehicles, equipment and other items whose use would give rise to a projected dose to their users above the generic criteria given in Table II.4 may be used until replacements are available, provided that:

  1. Their use will not result in doses from all exposure pathways that exceed the generic criteria given in Table II.2 for members of the public or the guidance values given in Appendix I for restricting the exposure of emergency workers, or the restriction set in para. 5.57 for exposures of helpers in an emergency.

  2. Actions are taken to manage and control the exposure of the user as an emergency worker, a helper in an emergency or a member of the public, as appropriate.

TABLE II.4. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR VEHICLES, EQUIPMENT AND OTHER ITEMS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS

Generic criteria

Examples of protective actions and other response actions

Projected dose from the use of vehicles, equipment or other items from an affected area that exceed the following generic criteria:

Take protective actions and other response actions

E a

10 mSv in the first year

Restrict non-essentialb use. Use essential vehicles, equipment and other items from an affected area until replacements are available provided that:

  1. their use will not result in doses from all exposure pathways exceeding the generic criteria given in Table II.2 for a member of the public or the guidance values given in Appendix I for restricting the exposure of emergency workers, or the restriction set in para. 5.57 for exposures of helpers in an emergency; and

  2. actions are taken to control the dose to the user as an emergency worker, helper in an emergency or a member of the public, as appropriate. Estimate doses to those emergency workers, helpers in an emergency and members of the public who may have used a vehicle, equipment or other item from an affected area to determine whether this could have resulted in a dose warranting medical attention in accordance with Table II.2.

H fetus c

10 mSv for the full period of in utero development

a Effective dose.

b Restricting the use of vehicles, equipment and other items from an affected area could interfere with taking urgent protective actions and other response actions or with providing services essential to public health or well-being (e.g. restricting the use of vehicles for transferring individuals requiring critical medical treatment).

c H fetus is the equivalent dose to the fetus derived as the sum of the dose from external exposure and the maximum committed equivalent dose to any organ from intake to the embryo or fetus for different chemical compounds and different times relative to conception.

GENERIC CRITERIA FOR FOOD AND OTHER COMMODITIES TRADED INTERNATIONALLY

II.10. Table II.5 provides generic criteria aimed at the effective implementation of response actions to reduce the non-radiological consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency by providing a basis for the continuation or the resumption of international trade.

II.11. Values that exceed the generic criteria in Table II.5 may be acceptable under emergency (temporary) conditions.

II.12 The generic criteria for food traded internationally derive from the level used by the Joint FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission[22]. These generic criteria, and generic criteria for other commodities traded internationally that could contain radionuclides following a nuclear or radiological emergency, are established at 1/100 of the generic criteria given in Table II.2 for early protective actions and other response actions to ensure that doses to the public would be a small fraction of those for which actions are warranted to reduce the risk of stochastic effects.

II.13. For food traded internationally that could contain radionuclides following a nuclear or radiological emergency, the operational criteria (i.e. guideline levels) as published by the Joint FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission[22] may ultimately be used (see para. 5.23 of GSR Part 3 [8]).

II.14. If restricting trade in food and other commodities could result in severe health impacts or other detrimental effects in another State, then the food and other commodities that would give rise to a projected dose that exceeds the generic criteria in Table II.5 may be traded — if the trade is justified — until replacements are available, provided that:

  1. The trade is approved with the receiving State.

  2. The trade will not result in doses that exceed the generic criteria for the public given in Table II.2 and Table II.3.

  3. Actions are taken to manage and controlexposures during shipping.

  4. Actions are taken to control the consumption of food and use of other commodities and to reduce the exposure of members of the public.

TABLE II.5. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR FOOD AND OTHER COMMODITIES TRADED INTERNATIONALLY

Generic criteria

Examples of other response actions

Projected dose from food and other commodities that exceed the generic criteria:

Take response actions to restrict international trade.

E a

1 mSv per year

Restrict non-essentialb international trade. Trade essential food and other commodities until replacements are available if: (a) trade is approved with the receiving State; (b) trade will not result in doses to the public that exceed the generic criteria given in Table II.2 for all exposure pathways and in Table II.3 for the respective pathways; (c) actions are taken to manage and control the dose during shipping; and (d) actions are taken to control the consumption and use of food and other commodities and to reduce the exposure of members of the public.

H fetus c

1 mSv for the full period of in utero development

a Effective dose.

b Restricting the trade of essential commodities and food could result in severe health impacts or other detrimental conditions in another State.

c H fetus is the equivalent dose to the fetus derived as the sum of the dose from external exposure and the maximum committed equivalent dose to any organ from intake to the embryo or fetus for different chemical compounds and different times relative to conception.

GENERIC CRITERIA FOR ENABLING A TRANSITION TO AN EXISTING EXPOSURE SITUATION

II.15. Generic criteria shall be established in terms of the projected dose for the implementation of protective actions and other actions aimed at enabling the termination of a nuclear or radiological emergency and the subsequent transition to an existing exposure situation with due consideration of, and verification of the fulfilment of, the conditions set out in para. II.16. These criteria are established as 1/5 of the generic criteria for the early protective actions and other response actions given in Table II.24242 and are:

  1. An effective dose of 20 mSv per year;

  2. An equivalent dose to a fetus of 20 mSv for the full period of in utero development.

II.16. The decision to terminate the nuclear or radiological emergency and the subsequent transition to an existing exposure situation is to be taken after:

  1. Justified actions (see para. 4.29) have been taken to reach the generic criteria4343 for enabling the transition to an existing exposure situation and it has been confirmed that any further actions to reach these criteria would do more harm than good;

  2. Confirmation that the source of exposure is fully characterized for all members of the public living as normal in the area;

  3. The situation with regard to exposure has been understood and has remained stable;

  4. Any restrictions on normal living conditions are limited and provisions are in place to confirm compliance with such restrictions;

  5. Confirmation that interested parties, including the public, have been consulted and are being kept informed about the basis for the adjustment of emergency response actions and for the transition, with the associated health hazards put into perspective (see para. 5.72).

References
  1. EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Fundamental Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, IAEA, Vienna (2006).

  2. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Objective and Essential Elements of a State’s Nuclear Security Regime: Nuclear Security Fundamentals, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 20, IAEA, Vienna (2013).

  3. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, The 2007 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, Publication 103, Elsevier, Oxford and New York (2007).

  4. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Criteria for Use in Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSG-2, IAEA, Vienna (2011).

  5. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE CO-ORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-G-2.1, IAEA, Vienna (2007).

  6. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Planning and Preparing for Emergency Response to Transport Accidents Involving Radioactive Material, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. TS-G-1.2 (ST-3), IAEA, Vienna (2002).

  7. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 1 (Rev. 1), IAEA, Vienna (in preparation).

  8. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 3, IAEA, Vienna (2014).

  9. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5), IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13, IAEA, Vienna (2011).

  10. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 14, IAEA, Vienna (2011).

  11. EUROPEAN POLICE OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION–INTERPOL, UNITED NATIONS INTERREGIONAL CRIME AND JUSTICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, WORLD CUSTOMS ORGANIZATION, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 15, IAEA, Vienna (2011).

  12. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, IAEA Safety Glossary: Terminology Used in Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection, 2007 Edition, IAEA, Vienna (2007).

  13. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, Legal Series No. 14, IAEA, Vienna (1987).

  14. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, The Management System for Facilities and Activities, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-3, IAEA, Vienna (2006). (Revision of this publication in preparation.)

  15. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, INES: The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale User’s Manual, 2008 Edition, IAEA, Vienna (2013).

  16. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, International Health Regulations (2005), Second Edition, World Health Organization, Geneva (2008).

  17. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-2/2 (Rev. 1), IAEA, Vienna (in preparation).

  18. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-2/1 (Rev. 1), IAEA, Vienna (in preparation).

  19. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 5, IAEA, Vienna (2009).

  20. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Disposal of Radioactive Waste, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-5, IAEA, Vienna (2011).

  21. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Dangerous Quantities of Radioactive Material (D-values), Emergency Preparedness and Response Series, EPR-D-VALUES 2006, IAEA, Vienna (2006).

  22. CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMMISSION, Codex General Standard for Contaminants and Toxins in Food and Feed, Schedule 1 — Radionuclides, CODEX STAN 193-1995, Codex Alimentarius Commission, Rome (2006).

[TS-G-1.2 (ST-3) has been revised and is now issued as SSG-65 Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency Involving the Transport of Radioactive Material

[7] GSR Part 1 (Rev. 1) Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety is now issued

[12] The 2018 Edition of the IAEA Safety Glossary is also now available here

[14] GS-R-3 has been revised and is now superseded by GSR Part 2 on Leadership and Management for Safety

[17] SSR-2/2 (Rev. 1) on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Commissioning and Operation is now issued

[18] SSR-2/1 (Rev. 1) on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design is now issued

Annex I - APPLICABILITY OF PARAGRAPHS IN THIS PUBLICATION BY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CATEGORY

A-1. Table A-1 presents the applicability of paragraphs in this publication by emergency preparedness category.

TABLE A–1. APPLICABILITY OF PARAGRAPHS IN THIS PUBLICATION BY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CATEGORY

Category

Paragraphs applicable in this publication

I

1.1–1.17 2.1–2.8 3.1–3.2 4.1–4.10, 4.18–4.20, 4.22–4.25, 4.27–4.31 5.1, 5.6–5.8, 5.11, 5.18–5.20, 5.22, 5.31, 5.36–5.37, 5.48–5.61, 5.64, 5.67–5.75, 5.78–5.80, 5.82–5.105 6.1–6.10, 6.12–6.14, 6.16–6.18, 6.20–6.22, 6.24, 6.26–6.28, 6.30–6.39

4.11–4.17, 4.26 5.3, 5.5, 5.14–5.17, 5.23–5.24, 5.26 6.19

5.2, 5.25, 5.27, 5.32–5.34, 5.41–5.43, 5.65 6.29

5.4, 5.9, 5.12, 5.21, 5.38–5.40, 5.45–5.46, 5.66, 5.76–5.77 6.11, 6.15, 6.23

6.25

II

III

5.10, 5.47

IV

4.21 5.13, 5.28–5.30, 5.35, 5.44, 5.62–5.63, 5.81

V

5.9, 5.12, 5.21, 5.39–5.40, 5.45–5.46, 5.66, 5.76–5.77 6.15

In the current version of the software, the display in html of this table looks different from the same table in the IAEA publication. The paragraphs listed in the first column - after the column on the Categories - apply to all five categories.

Table Of Contents

Table Of Contents

Table Of Contents 1. Introduction
1. Introduction  #
TOC \z \h 1. Introduction PAGE # Background
Background  #
Background PAGE # Objective
Objective  #
Objective PAGE # Scope
Scope  #
Scope PAGE # Structure
Structure  #
Structure PAGE # 2. Interpretation, resolution of conflicts and entry into force
2. Interpretation, resolution of conflicts and entry into force  #
2. Interpretation, resolution of conflicts and entry into force PAGE # Definitions
Definitions  #
Definitions PAGE # Interpretation
Interpretation  #
Interpretation PAGE # Resolution of conflicts
Resolution of conflicts  #
Resolution of conflicts PAGE # Entry into force
Entry into force  #
Entry into force PAGE # 3. Goals of emergency preparedness and response
3. Goals of emergency preparedness and response  #
3. Goals of emergency preparedness and response PAGE # Goal of emergency preparedness
Goal of emergency preparedness  #
Goal of emergency preparedness PAGE # Goals of emergency response
Goals of emergency response  #
Goals of emergency response PAGE # 4. General requirements
4. General requirements  #
4. General requirements PAGE # Requirement 1: The emergency management system
Requirement 1: The emergency management system  #
Requirement 1: The emergency management system PAGE # Requirement 2: Roles and responsibilities in emergency preparedness and response
Requirement 2: Roles and responsibilities in emergency preparedness and response  #
Requirement 2: Roles and responsibilities in emergency preparedness and response
PAGE #
General
General  #
General PAGE # Coordinating mechanism
Coordinating mechanism  #
Coordinating mechanism PAGE # Regulatory body
Regulatory body  #
Regulatory body PAGE # Operating organization
Operating organization  #
Operating organization PAGE # Requirement 3: Responsibilities of international organizations in emergency preparedness and response
Requirement 3: Responsibilities of international organizations in emergency preparedness and response  #
Requirement 3: Responsibilities of international organizations in emergency preparedness and response PAGE # Requirement 4: Hazard assessment
Requirement 4: Hazard assessment  #
Requirement 4: Hazard assessment PAGE # Requirement 5: Protection strategy for a nuclear or radiological emergency
Requirement 5: Protection strategy for a nuclear or radiological emergency  #
Requirement 5: Protection strategy for a nuclear or radiological emergency
PAGE #
5. Functional requirements
5. Functional requirements  #
5. Functional requirements PAGE # General
General  #
General PAGE # Requirement 6: Managing operations in an emergency response
Requirement 6: Managing operations in an emergency response  #
Requirement 6: Managing operations in an emergency response PAGE # Requirement 7: Identifying and notifying a nuclear or radiological emergency and activating an emergency response
Requirement 7: Identifying and notifying a nuclear or radiological emergency and activating an emergency response  #
Requirement 7: Identifying and notifying a nuclear or radiological emergency and activating an emergency response PAGE # Requirement 8: Taking mitigatory actions
Requirement 8: Taking mitigatory actions  #
Requirement 8: Taking mitigatory actions PAGE # Requirement 9: Taking urgent protective actions and other response actions
Requirement 9: Taking urgent protective actions and other response actions  #
Requirement 9: Taking urgent protective actions and other response actions
PAGE #
Requirement 10: Providing instructions, warnings and relevant information to the public for emergency preparedness and response
Requirement 10: Providing instructions, warnings and relevant information to the public for emergency preparedness and response  #
Requirement 10: Providing instructions, warnings and relevant information to the public for emergency preparedness and response PAGE # Requirement 11: Protecting emergency workers and helpers in an emergency
Requirement 11: Protecting emergency workers and helpers in an emergency  #
Requirement 11: Protecting emergency workers and helpers in an emergency
PAGE #
Requirement 12: Managing the medical response in a nuclear or radiological emergency
Requirement 12: Managing the medical response in a nuclear or radiological emergency  #
Requirement 12: Managing the medical response in a nuclear or radiological emergency PAGE # Requirement 13: Communicating with the public throughout a nuclear or radiological emergency
Requirement 13: Communicating with the public throughout a nuclear or radiological emergency  #
Requirement 13: Communicating with the public throughout a nuclear or radiological emergency PAGE # Requirement 14: Taking early protective actions and other response actions
Requirement 14: Taking early protective actions and other response actions  #
Requirement 14: Taking early protective actions and other response actions
PAGE #
Requirement 15: Managing radioactive waste in an emergency
Requirement 15: Managing radioactive waste in an emergency  #
Requirement 15: Managing radioactive waste in an emergency PAGE # Requirement 16: Mitigating non-radiological consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency and of an emergency response
Requirement 16: Mitigating non-radiological consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency and of an emergency response  #
Requirement 16: Mitigating non-radiological consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency and of an emergency response PAGE # Requirement 17: Requesting, providing and receiving international assistance for emergency preparedness and response
Requirement 17: Requesting, providing and receiving international assistance for emergency preparedness and response  #
Requirement 17: Requesting, providing and receiving international assistance for emergency preparedness and response PAGE # Requirement 18: Terminating a nuclear or radiological emergency
Requirement 18: Terminating a nuclear or radiological emergency  #
Requirement 18: Terminating a nuclear or radiological emergency PAGE # Requirement 19: Analysing the nuclear or radiological emergency and the emergency response
Requirement 19: Analysing the nuclear or radiological emergency and the emergency response  #
Requirement 19: Analysing the nuclear or radiological emergency and the emergency response PAGE # 6. Requirements for infrastructure
6. Requirements for infrastructure  #
6. Requirements for infrastructure PAGE # General
General  #
General PAGE # Requirement 20: Authorities for emergency preparedness and response
Requirement 20: Authorities for emergency preparedness and response  #
Requirement 20: Authorities for emergency preparedness and response PAGE # Requirement 21: Organization and staffing for emergency preparedness and response
Requirement 21: Organization and staffing for emergency preparedness and response  #
Requirement 21: Organization and staffing for emergency preparedness and response
PAGE #
Requirement 22: Coordination of emergency preparedness and response
Requirement 22: Coordination of emergency preparedness and response  #
Requirement 22: Coordination of emergency preparedness and response PAGE # Requirement 23: Plans and procedures for emergency response
Requirement 23: Plans and procedures for emergency response  #
Requirement 23: Plans and procedures for emergency response PAGE # Requirement 24: Logistical support and facilities for emergency response
Requirement 24: Logistical support and facilities for emergency response  #
Requirement 24: Logistical support and facilities for emergency response
PAGE #
Requirement 25: Training, drills and exercises for emergency preparedness and response
Requirement 25: Training, drills and exercises for emergency preparedness and response  #
Requirement 25: Training, drills and exercises for emergency preparedness and response PAGE # Requirement 26: Quality management programme for emergency preparedness and response
Requirement 26: Quality management programme for emergency preparedness and response  #
Requirement 26: Quality management programme for emergency preparedness and response PAGE # 7. Appendices
7. Appendices  #
7. Appendices PAGE # Appendix I ‐ GUIDANCE VALUES FOR RESTRICTING EXPOSURE OF EMERGENCY WORKERS
Appendix I ‐ GUIDANCE VALUES FOR RESTRICTING EXPOSURE OF EMERGENCY WORKERS  #
Appendix I ‐ GUIDANCE VALUES FOR RESTRICTING EXPOSURE OF EMERGENCY WORKERS PAGE # TABLE I.1 GUIDANCE VALUES FOR RESTRICTING EXPOSURE OF EMERGENCY WORKERS
TABLE I.1 GUIDANCE VALUES FOR RESTRICTING EXPOSURE OF EMERGENCY WORKERS  #
TABLE I.1 GUIDANCE VALUES FOR RESTRICTING EXPOSURE OF EMERGENCY WORKERS PAGE # Appendix II ‐ GENERIC CRITERIA FOR USE IN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
Appendix II ‐ GENERIC CRITERIA FOR USE IN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE  #
Appendix II ‐ GENERIC CRITERIA FOR USE IN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE PAGE # GENERIC CRITERIA FOR DOSES RECEIVED WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME FOR WHICH RESPONSE ACTIONS ARE EXPECTED TO BE TAKEN UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES IN AN EMERGENCY RESPONSE
GENERIC CRITERIA FOR DOSES RECEIVED WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME FOR WHICH RESPONSE ACTIONS ARE EXPECTED TO BE TAKEN UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES IN AN EMERGENCY RESPONSE  #
GENERIC CRITERIA FOR DOSES RECEIVED WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME FOR WHICH RESPONSE ACTIONS ARE EXPECTED TO BE TAKEN UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES IN AN EMERGENCY RESPONSE PAGE # TABLE II.1. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR DOSES RECEIVED WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME FOR WHICH PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND OTHER RESPONSE ACTIONS ARE EXPECTED TO BE TAKEN UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES IN AN EMERGENCY TO AVOID OR TO MINIMIZE SEVERE DETERMINISTIC EFFECTS
TABLE II.1. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR DOSES RECEIVED WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME FOR WHICH PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND OTHER RESPONSE ACTIONS ARE EXPECTED TO BE TAKEN UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES IN AN EMERGENCY TO AVOID OR TO MINIMIZE SEVERE DETERMINISTIC EFFECTS  #
TABLE II.1. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR DOSES RECEIVED WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME FOR WHICH PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND OTHER RESPONSE ACTIONS ARE EXPECTED TO BE TAKEN UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES IN AN EMERGENCY TO AVOID OR TO MINIMIZE SEVERE DETERMINISTIC EFFECTS PAGE # GENERIC CRITERIA FOR PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND OTHER RESPONSE ACTIONS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS
GENERIC CRITERIA FOR PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND OTHER RESPONSE ACTIONS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS  #
GENERIC CRITERIA FOR PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND OTHER RESPONSE ACTIONS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS PAGE # TABLE II.2. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND OTHER RESPONSE ACTIONS IN AN EMERGENCY TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS
TABLE II.2. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND OTHER RESPONSE ACTIONS IN AN EMERGENCY TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS  #
TABLE II.2. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND OTHER RESPONSE ACTIONS IN AN EMERGENCY TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS PAGE # GENERIC CRITERIA FOR FOOD, MILK AND DRINKING WATER AND OTHER COMMODITIES TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS
GENERIC CRITERIA FOR FOOD, MILK AND DRINKING WATER AND OTHER COMMODITIES TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS  #
GENERIC CRITERIA FOR FOOD, MILK AND DRINKING WATER AND OTHER COMMODITIES TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS
PAGE #
TABLE II.3. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR FOOD, MILK AND DRINKING WATER AND OTHER COMMODITIES TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS
TABLE II.3. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR FOOD, MILK AND DRINKING WATER AND OTHER COMMODITIES TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS  #
TABLE II.3. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR FOOD, MILK AND DRINKING WATER AND OTHER COMMODITIES TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS PAGE # GENERIC CRITERIA FOR VEHICLES, EQUIPMENT AND OTHER ITEMS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS
GENERIC CRITERIA FOR VEHICLES, EQUIPMENT AND OTHER ITEMS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS  #
GENERIC CRITERIA FOR VEHICLES, EQUIPMENT AND OTHER ITEMS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS PAGE # TABLE II.4. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR VEHICLES, EQUIPMENT AND OTHER ITEMS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS
TABLE II.4. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR VEHICLES, EQUIPMENT AND OTHER ITEMS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS  #
TABLE II.4. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR VEHICLES, EQUIPMENT AND OTHER ITEMS TO REDUCE THE RISK OF STOCHASTIC EFFECTS PAGE # GENERIC CRITERIA FOR FOOD AND OTHER COMMODITIES TRADED INTERNATIONALLY
GENERIC CRITERIA FOR FOOD AND OTHER COMMODITIES TRADED INTERNATIONALLY  #
GENERIC CRITERIA FOR FOOD AND OTHER COMMODITIES TRADED INTERNATIONALLY PAGE # TABLE II.5. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR FOOD AND OTHER COMMODITIES TRADED INTERNATIONALLY
TABLE II.5. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR FOOD AND OTHER COMMODITIES TRADED INTERNATIONALLY  #
TABLE II.5. GENERIC CRITERIA FOR FOOD AND OTHER COMMODITIES TRADED INTERNATIONALLY PAGE # GENERIC CRITERIA FOR ENABLING A TRANSITION TO AN EXISTING EXPOSURE SITUATION
GENERIC CRITERIA FOR ENABLING A TRANSITION TO AN EXISTING EXPOSURE SITUATION  #
GENERIC CRITERIA FOR ENABLING A TRANSITION TO AN EXISTING EXPOSURE SITUATION PAGE # References
References  #
References PAGE # Annex I ‐ APPLICABILITY OF PARAGRAPHS IN THIS PUBLICATION BY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CATEGORY
Annex I ‐ APPLICABILITY OF PARAGRAPHS IN THIS PUBLICATION BY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CATEGORY  #
Annex I ‐ APPLICABILITY OF PARAGRAPHS IN THIS PUBLICATION BY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CATEGORY PAGE # TABLE A–1. APPLICABILITY OF PARAGRAPHS IN THIS PUBLICATION BY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CATEGORY
TABLE A–1. APPLICABILITY OF PARAGRAPHS IN THIS PUBLICATION BY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CATEGORY  #
TABLE A–1. APPLICABILITY OF PARAGRAPHS IN THIS PUBLICATION BY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CATEGORY PAGE #

1 1 FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2, IAEA, Vienna (2002).

2 2A ‘nuclear securityevent’ is an event that has potential or actual implications for nuclear security that must be addressed. Such events include criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities or associated activities. A nuclear securityevent, for example, sabotage of a nuclear facility or detonation of a radiological dispersal device, may give rise to a nuclear or radiological emergency.

3 3 Arrangements set under the Assistance Convention and under the Early Notification Convention [13] are examples of international emergency arrangements that are relevant for States Parties to these Conventions.

4 4This also includes the allocation of roles and responsibilities, as appropriate, among members of the government.

5 5The mechanism for ensuring coordination may differ for different tasks. It may involve an existing body or a newly established body (e.g. a committee consisting of representatives from different organizations and bodies) that has been given the authority to ensure the necessary coordination.

6 6Examples of sources not under regulatory control are sources that have been abandoned, lost or stolen and sources under governmental control but not under regulatory control. Examples also include radioactive material that is out of regulatory control as discussed in Ref. [11].

7 7The Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies and its Joint RadiationEmergency Management Plan of the International Organizations are examples of such coordination.

8 8Examples of such facilities and locations are: scrap metal processing facilities, border crossing points, seaports, airports and abandoned military facilities or other facilities where dangerous sources might have been used in the past.

9 9This includes consideration of ‘strategic locations’, i.e. locations of high security interest in the State which are potential targets for attacks using nuclear and other radioactive material and locations for detection of nuclear and other radioactive material that is out of regulatory control, in line with Ref. [11].

10 10Examples of non-radiation-related hazards are the release of toxic chemicals, e.g. uranium hexafluoride (UF6), fires, explosions and floods.

11 11Examples of such changes and available information include the movement of irradiated nuclear fuel to a new location, projected flooding, and information on storms or other meteorological hazards.

12 12The application solely of the reference level for effective dose would not be sufficient to develop the protection strategy. Consideration needs to be given to the particular goal to be met in the response, the time to allow for actions to be taken effectively, and the appropriate dose quantity to be used to ensure that organ doses will be kept below those at which protective actions and other response actions are justified (see para. 4.28 (1)). For example, actions to avoid or to minimize severe deterministic effects are to be taken urgently when projected doses expected to be received within a short period of time exceed those given in Table II.1 of Appendix II for the RBE weighted absorbed dose to a tissue or organ. In this case, if such doses are received, then prompt and appropriate medical actions are necessary. Moreover, selection of a particular value (to be used for optimization purposes and for retrospective assessment of the effectiveness of actions and strategy taken) within the proposed range of 20–100 mSv acute or annual effective dose would depend on the phase of the emergency, the practicality of reducing or preventing exposures, and other factors. In the urgent phase of an emergency, an effective dose of 100 mSv, acute or annual, might be justified as one of the dosimetric bases for implementing and optimizing a protection strategy. In the later phases, such as during the transition, an effective dose of 20 mSv per year may be justified as one of the dosimetric bases for implementing and optimizing a protection strategy to enable the transition to an existing exposure situation to be made.

13 13The operational criteria (i.e. operational intervention levels) need to be derived for a representative person with account taken of those members of the public that are most vulnerable to radiation exposure (i.e. pregnant women and children).

14 14Examples of such impacts include possible deaths among patients evacuated without the necessary medical care and possible reduced life expectancy due to resettlement.

15 15The coordination and integration of arrangements for response to a nuclear or radiological emergency with arrangements for response to a nuclear securityevent includes coordination with and integration of arrangements for response measures such as identification, collection, packaging and transport of evidence contaminated with radionuclides, nuclear forensics and related activities in the context of an investigation into the circumstances surrounding a nuclear security event.

16 16This may be the notification point used to receive notification of and to initiate an off-siteemergency response to an emergency of any type (conventional, or nuclear or radiological).

17 17The emergency classes may differ from those specified in (a)–(e) provided that emergencies of all these types are included.

18 18This class covers broad types of emergency (see Table 1 and paras 4.21 and 4.22). A graded approach may need to be taken when postulating emergencies and expected consequences within this class in order to determine the level of emergency response warranted.

19 19The emergency classification system is not to be confused with the INES. The INES is a scale developed for use by States solely for the purpose of communicating with the public on the safety significance of events associated with sources of radiation. The INES is not to be used as a basis for emergency response actions.

20 20Such a notification is in accordance with the State’s obligations under the general principles and rules of international law and, for the case of a transboundary release that could be of radiological safety significance for another State, it is in accordance with the Early Notification Convention [13].

21 21A transnational emergency that is considered to represent a public health emergency of international concern may also be expected to be notified in accordance with the International Health Regulations [16].

22 22Such actions may include actions with off-site consequences such as discharge of radioactive material to the environment, provided that the appropriate off-site organizations are notified in advance.

23 23This is not to be understood as diminishing the responsibility of the operating organization to have adequate capabilities to respond to an emergency arising in the facility or activity under its responsibility.

24 24Although defined under this overarching requirement, emergency planning zones and emergency planning distances are applicable for both urgent protective actions and early protective actions and other response actions. Within emergency planning zones, the main focus is on taking precautionary urgent protective actions, urgent protective actions and other response actions. However, within emergency planning distances, urgent decisions may be warranted, as a precaution, to prevent inadvertent ingestion and to restrict the consumption of food, milk and drinking water that could be directly contaminated following a significant release of radioactive material to the environment and then consumed.

25 25The off-siteemergency planning zones and emergency planning distances may differ from those specified provided that, at the preparedness stage, such areas and distances are designated and arrangements are made to effectively take precautionary urgent protective actions, urgent protective actions and early protective actions and other response actions within these areas and distances in order to achieve the goals of emergency response.

26 26A significant release of radioactive material is a radioactiverelease that could lead to severe deterministic effectsoff the site and thus warrants taking protective actions or other response actionsoff the site.

27 27Taking actions within the urgent protective action planning zone in order to reduce the risk of stochastic effects would not mean that no severe deterministic effects could possibly be observed within the urgent protective action planning zone. However, any severe deterministic effects are most likely to occur within the precautionary action zone.

28 28‘Water supply’ refers to water supplies that use rainwater or other untreated surface water.

29 29Examples of people with interests in other States include people travelling, people working and/or living abroad, importers and exporters, and people working in companies operating abroad.

30 30The voluntary basis for response actions by emergency workers is usually covered in the emergency arrangements.

31 31Such qualified medical advice is intended for assessing the continuing fitness of workers for their intended tasks involving occupational exposure in line with GSR Part 3 [8]. In line with para. 5.59 of this Safety Requirements publication, any emergency worker is to be given appropriate medical attention for doses received. To illustrate this, the generic criterion for dose that is received (100 mSv effective dose in a month), as provided in Table II.2 of Appendix II, will indicate that an emergency worker receiving such a dose needs to be registered and subjected to health screening and that the emergency worker will then need appropriate longer term medical follow-up in order to detect radiation induced health effects early and to treat them effectively.

32 32These instructions include advice that universal precautions in health care against infection (e.g. surgical masks and gloves) generally provide medical personnel with adequate protection when treating individuals with possible contamination.

33 33Such arrangements for medical consultation on treatment could include international assistance to be provided through or to be coordinated by the IAEA and by WHO; for example, under the Assistance Convention [13].

34 34Actions beyond those emergency response actions that are warranted include, but are not limited to: actions that interfere with prompt implementation of protective actions, such as self-evacuation both from within and from outside areas from which evacuation is ordered; actions that unnecessarily burden the health care system; actions that shun or otherwise discriminate against people or products from an area affected by a nuclear or radiological emergency; elective terminations of pregnancy that are not radiologically informed; and cancellations of commercial flights that are not radiologically informed.

35 35Typically, the involvement of operating organizations and local, regional and national response organizations is documented as part of the appropriate facility, local, regional and national emergency plans.

36 36 Critical response functions are functions that must be performed promptly and correctly in order to classify, declare and notify an emergency, to activate an emergency response, to manage the response, to take mitigatory actions, to protect emergency workers and to take urgent protective actions on and off the site.

37 37A concept of operations is a brief description of an ideal response to a postulated nuclear or radiological emergency, used to ensure that all those personnel and organizations involved in the development of a capability for emergency response share a common understanding.

38 38An example of such limitations is that the timing and magnitude of radioactive releases in an emergency at a nuclear power plant that would warrant taking precautionary urgent protective actions and urgent protective actionsoff the site before, or shortly after, a radioactive release may not be predictable. In addition, the radioactive release could occur over several days, resulting in complex deposition patterns off the site.

39 39 Emergency response facilities may be collocated (i.e. these functions may be performed from a single emergency response facility or location) provided that it is ensured that they do not conflict with each other in performing their specified functions and provided that they are separated from the control rooms.

40 40 Arrangements for analyses could include, for example, arrangements for performing analyses of environmental and biological samples as well as analyses of other samples taken from the facility for the purpose of assessing its operational status.

41 41Examples of international appraisals include those organized by the IAEA, such as Emergency Preparedness Review (EPREV) missions.

42 42Criteria established as 1/5 of the generic criteria for the early protective actions and other response actions given in Table II.2 are considered to be generically justified. This is of the order of the dose for which the government is required to establish an action plan to reduce activity concentrations for sources of exposure (e.g. 222Rn) for existing exposure situations[8]. Being at the lower bound of the reference level for emergency exposure situations (see para. 4.28 (2)), this level is also consistent with the reference levels established in GSR Part 3 [8] for both emergency exposure situations and existing exposure situations.

43 43Actions taken (see para. 4.29) to reach the generic criteria in para. II.15 need to be justified and optimized in accordance with Requirement 5. However, it may not be feasible to reach these criteria for enabling the transition to an existing exposure situation. If it is not feasible or justified to reach these generic criteria, the transition may still be possible as long as the generic criteria for early protective actions and other response actions given in Table II.2 are not exceeded.